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Inference

is

a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states

are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops (or loops which connect
different stimulus); their intrinsic feature

the transition process between belief states

is

is

recognition.

In inference or reasoning

regulated by the rule of concept usage,

involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states
are also biological states

whose

extrinsic feature

is

recognition, such that, one can

have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing

it

as an experience of X.

One

can, however, also have an experience of an X; in the latter case, one not only has

an X-type experience but also recognizes an

from X-type experience to believing an
pattern.

X to

X as

an X. In some cases the transition

be there instantiates a quasi-inferential

In all such cases the transition process

is

regulated by the rule of

X

usage. In such quasi-inferential transition additional belief states are involved. Such
states assert that there are

no countervailing factors and there are additional factors

conducive to the conclusion. Such belief states are expressed non-propositionally
the language of thought.

in

Propositions are a necessary part of such quasi- inference

vii

for they give content to

thoughts to which one can assign

reasoning requires us to assign
the quasi-inferences
for the conclusion

‘falsity’ to

‘falsity’

and defeasible

our thoughts. Propositions implicated

from experience types to

in

belief states are the evidential reasons

and they can only be accepted as provisionally true and have to

be revised in the light of further information.
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CHAPTER

1

Introduction

In

Western philosophy reasoning or inference

intellectual process. Inference,
itions) get

it is

is

generally

assumed

generally believed, occurs

connected in such a way that the derived

when

beliefs are

to be a purely

beliefs (propos-

well-grounded

if

the

basis beliefs are well-grounded. According to this view, whereas the transition from

‘X

is

a whale’ (basis belief) to ‘X

inferential pattern, the transition

belief; in other

a

mammal’

from ‘X

(derived belief) does not. In the

by the basis

is

first

(derived belief) instantiates a valid

a whale’ (basis belief) to ‘X

is

transition the derived belief

words, the basis belief

derived belief. In the second transition

it is

not

so.

is

is

appropriate in producing the

Sense-experiences, according to

in reasoning or inference.

nothing can be inferred from sense-experiences
there

is

an apple on the table

is

a number’

well-grounded

this view, essentially involve non-intellectual physiological (biological)

and supposedly play no part

is

— a view

Hence,
I

it

is

mechanisms

assumed

that

refute. S” s believing that

caused or sustained by his experiencing an apple on

the table. S's subsequent success in acquiring an apple (not an orange) from the table

shows that

his believing the existence of

of the apple,

i.e.,

the experience

is

an apple

is

well-grounded on his experience

appropriate in producing the

belief.

Clearly, this

transition from the experience of an apple (together with the belief that there are

no countervailing conditions) to believing the existence of an apple instantiates an
acceptable inferential process.
I

show

in this dissertation that

we make

successful inferential connections between

our sense-experiences regarding the external world and our beliefs regarding

it.

In

2
this dissertation

develop theories regarding our experience of the external
world,

I

the belief states that these experiences give rise to, the
inferential patterns that such
transitions instantiate, and our conceptual abilities. Both belief
states and experiential states are,

show

I

here, physical (biological) states.

While

belief states are states

of primary consciousness with recognition as their intrinsic
feature, experiential

whose

states are states

extrinsic feature

recognition.

is

My

gulf between experiential and belief states.

(1992) theory of Neuronal

Group

Thus my theory reduces

scientific

framework

is

the

G. Edelman’s

Selection which explains intellectual processes in

terms of multi-layer complex systems that interact and recategorize both themselves

and the external world. Furthermore,
which having a concept
if

S can

that

identify

an

ability.

develop a theory of concepts according to

S has

the concept of an apple, for example, only

an apple as an apple and distinguish

it

from an orange. Next,

possible to trace inference-like patterns between

it is

states

is

I

and our

some

I

show

of our experiential

belief states. In such connections the belief states are well-grounded

by the experiences and these experiences are the causal reasons

for the belief states.

In such experience-belief transitions additional beliefs (propositions) are implicated;

they are the evidential reason for the conclusion.

These

beliefs (propositions) are

empirical and hence are not absolutely certain; nonetheless, they can be shown to

be probable and we can revise them in the
In chapter 1

my main

I

concern

clarify
is

my

light of further

notion of inference.

to explain

and

In the

knowledge.
first

half of the chapter

criticize a notion of inference that

Heuristic Theory of Reasoning’. According to this theory, to reason
implicit

chapter

and
1 I

explicit set of rationally connected propositions.

develop

my own

Group

to

Selection,

I

show that

call

‘The

know some

In the next half of

theory of inference; central to this theory

that belief states are states of primary consciousness.

theory of Neuronal

is

I

is

the notion

Following Edelman’s (1992)

belief states are reentrant loops

connecting two different stimulus responses; these reentrant loops get connected to

3

memory, where
According to

the rules of concept-usage are stored, and a belief
state

this view,

recognition

primary consciousness). Inference

is

is

is

formed.

an intrinsic feature of any belief state

(of

a causal transition from one state of primary

consciousness to another; such transitions instantiate inferential patterns
by following
the rules of concept usage involved within these states.

Thus

sees an apple can produce his believing that an apple

is

there.

the concept of an apple:

S can

thought

is

an apple and distinguish
regulate

S has

possible because
it

S”s belief state that he

Such transition of
identify

from, say, an orange. The rules of concept-usage, thus,

and put contraints on the

inferential process.

Traditionally, western philosophy has espoused

what

is

known

conditional view of concepts. According to this theory, a person
of

X only

S

if

L

P

is

a bachelor (premise); hence,

P

is

generated by what
is

no

S has

the concept

Dummett

reliable criteria

S can make

if

the following

an unmarried male’.

adhere to the truth-conditional view of concepts because

there

as the truth-

governed by the legitimate pattern of inference which individuates

Thus, S has the concept of bachelor only

the concept.
inference:

is

an apple as

it is

I

do not

vitiated by the problem

calls the Inextricability Thesis (IT).

According to IT,

by which we can separate between those concepts that are

individuated by analytic inferences and those that are not,

for, as

Quine has shown,

the entire synthetic-analytic distinction

I

show

in chapter 2 that

in

its

spurious.

Also,

ordinary language we deal with not only the formal features of a concept but also
substantive features.
In chapter 2

I

develop a theory of concept acquisition consistent with the model

of inference and belief states that

Theory of Concepts’. According
propositional knowledge;

whale only
S,

is

however,

if

S can

may

it is

an

I

had developed

earlier.

I

call this the ‘Operational

to this view of concepts, having a concept
ability or a

is

not

‘knowing how’. S has the concept of

identify a whale as a whale

and distinguish

it

from, say, a bird.

not be guided by the following inferential pattern: ‘A

is

a whale;

4

hence,

A is

ability: to

a mammal’. According to the operational view, knowing
a concept

be able to use that concept correctly.

correctly or not by testing

its

We

can judge whether a rule

conformity to a norm or standard

an

is

is

used

— natural language.

In other words, rules of concept-usage are justified
normatively;

we judge them

as

correct or incorrect in accordance with whether or not they
conform to the standard

usage in natural language.

swimming

use these rules in the same

or driving which guide our action;

and they guide our
In chapter 3

S’ s

we

way we use

the rules of

internalize rules of concept-usage

linguistic behaviors.

expound

I

like belief states,

describe

We

my

view of experiential

are mental (brain) states;

experience as

“its

states.

when S experiences an

seeming to S that an apple

states, however, recognition is not

Experiential states,

is

apple,

there”.

can

Unlike belief

an intrinsic feature of experiential

an extrinsic or acquired feature of them. There

P

states;

it

is

a strong tradition in philosophy

is

according to which recognition (interpretation/representation)

is

an intrinsic feature

of an experiential state. According to this view, experiences are always in the form of

something’s seeming to be the case for the subject.

McGinn

(1982), Peacocke (1983),

and Searle (1986) espouse such a view. In chapter

3

the above philosophers;

an extrinsic or acquired feature of

experience.

My

I

show that recognition

is

argue against the views held by

I

arguments center around the following two

A-type experience without experiencing an

X

as an

A

theses:

1

(2)

;

(1)5 can have an

experience

is

essentially

bottom-up information processing.
In chapter 4 the topics discussed in chapters
I

show that

and

it is

belief states.

1,

2,

I

theory of replay that

is

Here

possible to trace quasi-inferential connections between experience

show that we can evaluate some

to appropriate experience-types. Central to this view

Mhis

and 3 come together.

I

of our belief states in relation
is

the theory of ‘replay’.

The

develop here has to be distinguished from the Cartesian theory

the view advocated by Millar (1991).

5

of repla\ (introspection) in

then

‘see’ it in

we do not

which we

something we had previously seen and

recall

imagination. According to the theory that

recall

an image we
;

In chapter 4

is

I

is

has an apple-type visual experience.

2.
4.

S

is

3.

S is unaware

in the experiential state in

This shows that an

which

it

seems to him that an apple

is

there.

of countervailing conditions for apples existing in the environment.

in the belief state that

Here the conclusion

an apple

is

there.

(belief state) is well-grounded

by the apple-type experience

because the experience-type appropriately causes the belief
is

it.

evaluate the

as follows:

S

inference

Then we

discuss the structure of quasi-inference from an experience type to

1.

is

which caused

in this chapter,

relevant in evaluating the correctness of a belief state.

a belief state; the structure

S

expound

recall the experience-type itself.

belief state in the light of that experience type

experience-type

I

The

state.

regulated by the rules of “apple” usage. Hence, this

is

entire quasi-

a regulative theory

of inference as opposed to a reliability theory, according to which an inference

acceptable

if

the causal process by which

it is

produced

is reliable.

The above

is

quasi-

inference does not take into consideration the transition process by which conclusion
is

formed;

it

proceeds by following the rule of “apple" usage

rule of “apple” usage.

apple

is

there

If

is justified.

—

someone experiences an apple then

it is

regulated by the

his believing that

an

This above quasi-inference (from apple-type experience to

6

believing an apple to be there) requires additional
beliefs which help the transition

process from the experience type to the belief state.
In the above quasi-inference

the table.

Both

Ss

belief is a factor conducive to apples being

his experiential state

belief state that there

is

and

this belief state are causal reasons for 5"

an apple. S belief

factors are, or, in other words,

what the

on

state,

however, does not

us what the

tell

beliefs (“all cases of apple-type experience

are caused by apples”, “no nectarines can cause apple-type
experiences”, etc) are.

These general propositions form the evidential reasons
apple

is

Now

there.

later as he

knows more about

for

belief state that

the concept 2 of an apple,

that sometimes plastic apples cause apple-type experience.

undercuts the previous generalization that

Ss

S

an

learns

This new information

apple-type experiences are caused by

all

apples. 5, then, assigns “falsity” to the proposition “all apple-type experiences
are

caused by apples”
falsity to

some

This way of proceeding

.

of our previous thoughts

is

in

our thought process by assigning

known

in Artificial Intelligence as default

or defeasible reasoning. Thus, we come to accept propositions by default reasoning.
I

said above that S’ s belief in the general proposition “all apple-type experiences

are caused by apples”

may

subsequently be assigned falsity and can be substituted by

the proposition “some apple type experiences are not caused by apples”

;

nonetheless,

so long as the proposition “all apple-type experiences are caused by apples”
feated,

S

for

S takes

it

to be a justified belief.

The

latter belief

to be in a belief state that there are apples.

of the such general propositions?

One

reply

is

normative role within Ss evaluative practices.
is

p.

normative

for

an individual

Sceptics might say that

are not legitimate;

2

Conceptual

we

we

believe

abilities are

if

What

is

not de-

forms the evidential reason
constitutes the justification

that these general propositions play a

A

proposition, p, says Millar (1991),

that individual can legitimately yet groundlessly hold
believe

many

them because

dynamic

as

I

show

in

propositions to be true whose grounds

of superstitions.

chapter

2.

What,

then, constitutes

7

the justification of these general propositions
which form the evidential reasons for

our conclusions? The foundationalists and the coherentists
have their own answers
to this question.

Hume

I

says that

show
all

in chapter 5 that

none of these answers

is

acceptable.

general truths can be reduced to causal connections and
that

no causal connection can be

logically justified.

According to him, we draw causal

conclusions on the basis of instinct and not on the basis of on
any practical
In chapter 6

I

show that while

true that there

is

it

no

is

rule’.

strict deductive rule

by

which we can go from particular instances to the general conclusion “All
apple-type
experiences are caused by apples”, there

The

conclusion.
of things
(1948),

K

inductive rule

is

is

an inductive rule ( IR ) which produces

as follows: If

has the property P, then probably

IR cannot be accepted because

premises more often than not. Suppose

it

I

Further, in recent times

Goodman

with applying the inductive

same evidence. To avoid

rule:

it

Russell’s

all

all

of an appropriate evidence class

K’s have

P.

According to Russell

gives rise to false conclusion from true

have observed some cows; these cows then

have the property of being observed by me.

by using the inductive rule IR that

n/m

this

From

this

we can conclude

(falsely)

cows have the property of being observed.

(1948) also showed that there

is

some problem

gives rise to incompatible conclusions from the

and Goodman’s problems some have attempted

to use the hypothetico-deductive method. Instead of thinking of general propositions
as generalization

from particular instances, they thought of them as hypotheses

be tested and by using them to make predictions.

the predictions are verified

If

then the general hypotheses are confirmed to some degree;

hypotheses are refuted. Unfortunately,
criticism.

A

method too

is

if

not

they are false, then the

immune

modification of the Hypothetico-deductive method

Best Explanation.

According to the

that explains the evidence.
testibility,

this

The

latter,

criteria that

we should choose
we use

to

for

is

to

Goodman’s

Inference to the

the best hypothesis

our selection are simplicity,

and better coherence with other established hypothesis. Inference

to the

8

Best Explanation however, does not answer the following
questions:
,

degree of confirmation of a hypothesis given an item of
evidence?” (2)
degree to which an hypothesis

To answer

evidence?”.

is

•

is

the

“What

is

the

confirmed by the occurrence of antecedent unlikely

these questions

relate Inference to the Best Explanation

I

to probability calculus in the last chapter of this
dissertation.

special weight

“What

(1)

upon Bayes’s theorem which can be formulated

In doing so

I

place

as follows:

P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/P(e)

To apply
assignments.

the above theorem
I

must therefore

these probability values?”

we need hypothesis which already have

“What

face the question,

Most probability values

probability

justifies us in assigning

are relative to the probability

value of some other hypotheses. Thus, we choose hypotheses which have the highest
relative probability value.
relative,

probability values of the initial hypotheses are not

however; their probability value

justify the probability

absolute?”
ical,

The

I

end

assignment of the

this chapter

we cannot accept them

is

The question

absolute.

initial

is,

“How we can

hypotheses whose probability value

by suggesting that since
as certain; nonetheless,

all

is

these hypotheses are empir-

we adopt some

initial

uncertain

hypotheses because they conform to some rationally unobjectionable epistemic ends
that

we have adopted.

Following Aune (1991),

I

suggest that we should choose

those hypotheses which conform to our epistemic ends such as following: simplicity,

comprehensiveness, systematic unity, and
hypothesis h over

its rivals

fidelity

(p.

191).

Thus,

as h contributes towards a conceptual

I

may

choose

scheme which

is

simpler or has minimal redundancy of concepts and explanatory power. Accepting
a hypothesis
permissible

is

a form of behavior.

when

it

Such a behavior, Aune says,

is

epistemically

conforms to unobjectionable epistemic standards or norms that

we have adopted. Since empirical propositions can never be

intrinsically true, the

hypothesis we accept must be viewed only as provisional and we should revise them

9
if

necessary in the light of further information.

to consider all the alternatives of a hypotheses,

limited

number

must do

so,

Since

we can

it

is

not humanly possible

justifiably consider only a

of alternative hypotheses in choosing these initial
hypotheses.

however, in a

critical spirit.

If

someone points out

to us

some

We

further

hypothesis as a significant alternative, we should consider that too.
In concluding this dissertation

upon, but not elaborated,

in the

I

discuss

some important

main body

areas, lelevant to this dissertation, in which

topics that

of the dissertation.
I

would

like to

I

I

have touched

also talk about the

do further research.

CHAPTER
Inference:

My

aim

which

I

making

call the ‘Heuristic

I

show

machine, and, as

I

I

among

chapter

I

reasoning or inference?”

propositions.

The main problems with

here, (1) this type of so-called ‘reasoning’

(2) this

can be simulated

theory does not accurately reflect

ability; (3)

it

in a

human

ignores the biological component of

has no scientific framework to support

is

divided into two main sections.

the Heuristic Theory of Reasoning which

program. According to

I

itself.

In the course of this

In section

1

I

critically survey

develop primarily from Schank’s (1977)

this view, to reason is to

set of ‘rationally connected’ propositions; one

who

know some

implicit

and

beings actually reason. In section 2

framework from which

I

I

biological

discuss the ‘naturalistic view of reasoning.’

draw

my

Neuronal Group Selection. In the course of
conclude this chapter with a brief note on

our ontology.

explicit

‘reasons’, according to this view,

manipulates some propositions. This view of reasoning excludes how we as

I

view

develop a naturalistic theory of reasoning or inference.

This chapter

scientific

this

also show, machines, at least in the present state of technology,

concept acquisition and conceptual
it

is

explain and criticize a theory of reasoning or inference

cannot be said to be ‘reasoning’;

reasoning; (4)

“What

The

vs.

theory of reasoning (or inference)’ that views reasoning as

rational connections

are that, as

The Heuristic View
Naturalistic View

in this chapter is explore the question,

In the course of this chapter

2

theory

is

The

G. Edelman’s theory of (1992)

this section,

why we have

I

discuss this theory briefly.

to import propositions into

11

2.1

The Heuristic Theory

of Inference or Reasoning

Heuiistic Theory of Reasoning’,

I

contend, has

origin in ancient Greece.

its

Starting with the Greek invention of logic and geometry,
Dreyfus (1963) observes,
it

was believed that

reasoning might be reduced to some kind of calculations

all

(Introduction). Dreyfus says that for Plato
definitions

all

knowledge must be stated

— ‘knowing how’ must be reduced to ‘knowing

fus says, Plato

that’.

in explicit

Although, as Drey-

was more concerned with semantics than with syntax the Galelian
,

tendency to formalize physics set a trend to reduce
formal manipulations.

As Hobbes (1958)

said,

all

semantic considerations to

When

“

a

man

reasons

nothing but conceive a sum-total from the addition of parcels,”
nothing but reckoning”
in

(p.

“for

,

he does

REASON

is

45). Further, for Descartes, all understanding “Consists

forming and using appropriate symbolic representations.

For Descartes, these

representations were complex descriptions built out of primitive ideas or elements,

and Frege showed that rules could be formalized so that they could be manipulated

— Introduction).

without intuition or interpretation” (Dreyfus, 1993

In recent times workers in Artificial Intelligence (around 1950’s in the U.S) have

echoed similar sentiments regarding reasoning; to reason, according to them,

is

to

make some connection among

is

to

propositions.

reproduce reasoning in machines.

Schank and Terry Winograd

for

Among

whom

One

these workers, to

reasoning

manipulation’. Schank’s program was to simulate

wanted to do

this

is

name a

some kind

human

some workers

few, are Roger

of ‘formal symbolic

cognition in a machine.

by showing that a machine can be said to be reasoning

human does

if it is

in a piece of

information 1

^chanks’

of the goals of

in the

He

way

a

able to answer questions concerning facts not explicitly contained

original idea

.

Suppose individual S imparts to individual

was that

after hearing a story a

story which are not explicitly part of the story.

I

adopt

P the

following

machine can answer questions about the

this

a

little differently.
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A

information:

P

the

mother

in

law of

has this information, individual

spouse of
is

is

BT P will answer
'

,

“Yes”

not the spouse of BT' Then

B and A

T asks P
Again,

.

P will

has a tendency to resent B. Now, after

“Is it

,

true that an offspring of

T asks,

is

A

answer “No”. “Schankians” would argue that

P

reasoning, Schank contends, can be simulated into a machine.

To do

T posed.

Such

according

this,

machines must have a sort of “representation” that humans beings have

about “mother-in-law” which enables them to answer questions of the
above

When

the

“Is it true that the offspring of

if

can be said to be reasoning by being able to answer the questions
that

to Schank,

A

machines are given the above information and asked questions not

sort.

explicitly

contained in the information, they will give a printout corresponding to the answers
that
of

humans

give.

This shows, “Schankians” would argue, that the machine, by virtue

some representation, can make

rational connections

rationally connected propositions.

I

among

call this the ‘Heuristic

implicit

and

explicit

Theory of Reasoning’.

This type of reasoning accurately models, according to these AI researchers, human
reasoning.

I

show

as accurately reflecting

Searle (1980) has

argument) that

it

few pages that Heuristic Reasoning cannot be taken

in the next

is

how humans reason

shown by
false to

his thought

or

make

inferences.

experiment (known as the Chinese

assume that the machine

is

reasoning because

answer the above question. Depicting the heuristic model as the model
reasoning or inference, according to Searle,

is

therefore wrong.

I

is illiterate in

a

room and

scripts.

S

is

At

at three different stages he

first

he

is

(p.

is

418.).

Now

can

present here Searle’s

Chinese; Chinese script for

(1980) language, “meaningless squiggles”

it

for explaining

(1980) thought experiment in a nut-shell. Take the case of an individual,
native English speaker and

Room

S are,

suppose S

is

S',

who

is

a

in Searle’s

locked up in

given three different batches of Chinese

given simply a batch of Chinese writings. At the second stage

given a second batch of Chinese scripts with a set of rules in English by which S

can correlate the scripts

in the first

batch to that in the second. Now, being a native

13

English speaker,

S has no problems understanding

the rules 2

.

These rules enable S

to correlate one set of formal symbols with another
set; as Searle says, ‘formal’ here

means

that

S can

S

third stage,

is

“identify the

symbols entirely by

S how

(p.

418).

At the

given further scripts and some instructions in English
to correlate

the scripts of the third batch to the scripts of the
instruct

their shapes”

to give

at

two batches. Also, these rules

back certain Chinese symbols of certain shapes

certain sorts of shapes given to

becomes an expert

first

S

in

in the third batch. After a lot of trial

manipulating and matching the Chinese symbols.

response to

and

Now S

give back answers in Chinese as well as a native Chinese speaker.
Further,

a set of English letters and

is

error,

S

is

can

given

asked some questions and he has to answer back

English which he does efficiently as he

is

a native English speaker.

view of someone outside the room &s answers
,

in

From

S

in

the point of

Chinese are indistinguishable from

a native Chinese speaker; they are as good as his answers in English. In the Chinese
case, there

is

a series of input and output. The followers of Schank and Turing claim

that such series of input

how humans

and output and symbolic manipulations accurately model

reason, and such reasoning can be perfectly simulated in a machine.

While agreeing with the contention that such
be perfectly simulated in a machine,

I

or inferential powers of a machine.

My

inferential connections.

It is

sentences.

The

have serious doubts regarding the reasoning
contention

is

that machines cannot

make

more

is

enough to explain reasoning; only

in case of

‘formal’ manipulation than in the case of English

basic difference between the English and the Chinese sentence

that, as Searle says,

whereas

in the

is

former case S understands the meaning of what

saying, in the latter case, as Searle says, he does not understand the meaning

he

is

of

what he

2

it is

and output can

an assumption of the followers of Schank that input-

output and symbolic manipulation
the Chinese sentences

series of input

is

One can use

saying.

the

The assumption

word “program”

for rules.

here, as Searle says,

is

as follows:

we can

14

construct a program that will have the same input
and output as a native speaker.
Searle observes, “The computer and
of understanding since the

no understanding”

me by way

I

program do not provide

sufficient conditions

computer and the program are functioning, and there

(p. 418).

In the Chinese case

its

is

Searle also says,

have everything that

artificial intelligence

can put into

program and I understand nothing; in the English case I
understand everything, and there is so far no reason at all to suppose
that
my understanding has anything to do with complex program, that is, with
computational operations on purely formally specified elements. As long
as the program is defined in terms of computational operations
on purely
of a

formally defined elements, what the example suggests is that these by themselves have no interesting connection with understanding. They are
certainly

not sufficient conditions, and not the slightest reason has been given to
suppose that they are necessary conditions or even that they make significant
contribution to understanding.

...

Well then what is it that I have in the case of the English sentences that I do
not have in the case of the Chinese sentences? The obvious answer is that I

know what
mean.

(p.

the former mean, while

I

hav’nt the faintest idea what the latter

418.)

To summarize, what

is

considered reasoning by the Heuristic view can be very

well simulated in a machine; nonetheless,

it

part of the manipulator, the machine.

cannot model how humans really reason

It

does not involve understanding on the

because humans do understand connections among facts when they are reasoning.
Searle’s Chinese

Following Searle,

I

Room

call the first

to this objection, while

of

S

argument, however, has not been universally accepted.

S'

objection the Systems or Berkeley Reply. According

by himself does not understand Chinese,

the sum-total

plus the pencil, paper, data bank that understand the inferential pattern.

other words, the whole system understands the inferential pattern.
this

it is

assumption

is

In

The problem with

that there are two sub-systems in S, one understanding English and

the other understanding Chinese.

While the English system,

for

example, knows that

“mother-in-law” refers to mother in law, the Chinese system knows that “squiggle
squiggle”

is

followed by “squaggle squaggle”.

Searle says,

“All he

knows

is

that

15

various formal symbols are being introduced at one
end and manipulated according
to rules written in English,

and the other symbols are going out the other end”

(p.

This clearly does not involve understanding meaning of
the symbols on the

419).

part of

S

or the machine. Searle observes,

The only motivation

for saying there

derstands Chinese

that

must be a subsystem in me that unhave a program and I can pass the Turing test;
I can fool native Chinese speakers.
But precisely one of the points at issue
is the adequacy of the Turing test. The
example shows that there could be

two “systems”

is

I

both of which pass the Turing test, but only one of which
it is no argument against this point to say that
since they
both pass the Turing test they both must understand, since this claim fails
,

understands; and

meet the argument that the system in me that understands English has a
great deal more than the system that merely processes Chinese. In short, the
to

systems reply simply begs the question by insisting without argument that
the system must understand Chinese, (p. 419).

A

further objection, which Searle calls the Robot or Yale reply

reasoning, as the following case shows,

Suppose

camera

etc,

S makes an android

scientist

for vision,

the robot

arms and

legs for

not a matter of mere symbolic manipulation.

(or a robot)

and cognize

manipulation.

this information as a

human being would;
The problems with

Room

is

Then

such cognition

this

view

is

that

is

not

first,

not merely a matter of symbolic

can be applied here to show that there

computer

in

some Chinese symbol

R-l

'

s

brain,

S chooses

is

no understanding. Suppose

to put his brother

via the T.V. camera and gives out

symbols to move the motors inside the robots arms and
really

for brain.

Second, as Searle observes, the same thought experiment as the

that instead of a
receives

R-l has a T.V.

in his lab.

movement, and a computer

implicitly accepts the point that cognition

Chinese

R-l

would gather information through perception, walking around, moving,

a matter of symbolic input-output.
it

is

contends that

,

leg.

P

there.

P

some other Chinese

All

P

is

doing here

is

manipulating symbols: receiving “information” from the robot’s “perceptual”

apparatus and giving out “instructions” to

its

motor apparatus without knowing
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what he

is

The

doing.

electrical wiring

and

robot, says Searle,“Is simply

its

program”

moving about

as a result of its

(p. 420.).

Moreover, another objection, which Searle

and M.I.T. Reply has been raised against
,

The Brain Simulator or Berkeley

calls

Searle’s Chinese

Room. Suppose

that

we

use a program which simulates in S the actual sequences
of neural firings at the

synapses of the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he
using a heuristic input-output program. In this case,

which stimulates the same sequence of neurons as

it

S

is

reasoning instead of

takes in Chinese as inputs

had done with native Chinese

speakers and gi\es back answers in Chinese. There

may be

acting in parallel in the

brains presumably operate

manner

that actual

human

a whole set of programs

they process natural language. In this case, we have to say that

what he

is

is

some

valid points against this objection.

self-defeating.

The

structure of the brain to determine

Chinese

Room

argument, with

how humans

room with an

When

the

man

let

it

is

all,

the above

that reasoning

does not look into the actual

reason.

slight variations,

monolingual S with Chinese symbols,
in a

First of

entire point about the Heuristic view

consists in symbolic manipulation and input-output;

his

does understand

manipulating.

Searle raises

objection

S

when

Second, Searle says that

can be adopted here. Instead of

us think of an individual

P who

is

locked

elaborate set of pipes and valves. Searle says,
receives the Chinese symbols, he looks

up the program, written
Each water connection

which valves he has to turn off and on.
in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged
up so that after doing all the right firings, that is after turning on all the right
faucets the Chinese answers pop out at the output end of the series of pipes.
in English,

correspond to a synapse

Now
it

where

is

the understanding in this system?

It

takes Chinese as input,

simulates the formal structure of the synapse of the Chinese brain, and

gives Chinese as output.

But the man
if we are tempted

neither do the water pipes, and

absurd view that somehow the conjunction

(p. 421).

all

what I think is the
man and (sic) water pipes

to adopt

(sic) of

understands, remember that in principle the
structure of the water pipes and do

it

certainly does not understand Chinese,

man can

internalize the formal

the “neuron firings” in his imagination
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What
machine

this

shows

that merely by simulating the neural sequence
of firing in a

is

(or in this case in S’s

brain), one cannot say that the

machine or S thereby

understands the relevant reasoning pattern.

Furthermore, another objection, which Searle

and Stanford Reply has been raised against
,

way we know

this objection, the only
is

calls the

Combination or Berkeley

Searle’s Chinese

Room. According

to

that a native Chinese understands his language

through his behavior; why cannot we say the same thing about
5? The objection

here

is

the

same

as above

a mere input/output series does not

make symbols

meaningful. So far we have dealt with the heuristic view of reasoning,
which, as we
saw, can be simulated in a machine. This cannot be called reasoning or
inference as

no understanding

One

is

involved here.

objection, which Searle calls the Other

against Searle’s Chinese

a

Room. According

mind through observing

Ps

behavior.

Mind

or Yale Reply has been raised
,

to this objection,

Similarly,

S knows

we can say

that

P

has

of a machine, by

observing his behavior, that he has a mind. Searle objects to this reply by saying
that the problem with this objection

is

that the Chinese

Room

argument

is

not

concerned with knowing another person’s cognitive states but as Searle says, “What
it is

that

I

am

attributing to

thrust of this argument

is

that

them when
it

I

attribute cognitive states to them.

The

could’nt be just computational processes and their

output because the computational processes and their output can exist without the
cognitive state.

It is

no answer to

this

argument

to feign anasthesia.

In “cognitive

sciences” one presupposes the reality and knowability of the mental in the

way

same

that in physical sciences one has to presuppose the reality and knowability of

physical objects.”

A

(p.

422).

further objection, which Searle calls

has been raised against Searle’s Chinese

The Many Mansions or Berkeley Reply

Room. According

,

to this objection, Searle’s

arguments are not directed towards AI as such but only towards analogue and

digital
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computers where the input-output has no
the present state of technology than

make a machine with

intentionality in

this objection reduces the

The aim

of

AI is

reflect

to do with

Eventually, scientists

may

be able to

itself.

its

input-output series. According to Searle

whole purpose of AI to that which produces cognition.

By

redefining this claim the original purpose of

object to the Heuristic Theory of Reasoning, as

I

human

more

to produce mental processes that are computational
processes over

formally defined elements.

Moreover,

AI

intentionality; but that has

concept-acquisition process.

it

it.

The theory assumes

that each time an
it

in the

5,

perhaps at

first

form of

This ignores an important component of learning

process of humans: habit formation and internalization of propositions. As
in chapter

lost.

does not accurately

individual thinks of a concept (say, mother-in-law), he represents

proposition which individuates

AI is

individuals do learn concepts de dicto

however, these concepts become de re for him.

He does not have

,

to

I

show

gradually,

remember

or evoke the entire proposition every time he thinks of the concept. This power of
internalizing concepts

observes,

is

absent in machines and

“Even though a beginner

in

a

is

present in humans. Flores (1993)

field like

chess starts by following rules,

a mid-level player dispenses with such rules and uses more intuitive,

seemingly immediate knowledge about what
player should do.

A

is

happening

in the

holistic,

game and what

and
the

high level expert, on the other hand, appears to combine more

experience-based rules of thumb with intuition” 3

.

In addition, according to the Heuristic view a concept

is

a static entity which

is

individuated by the same set of propositions for an individual during his lifetime.

Concepts,

I

tions for the

the inferrer,

3

I

at the

contend, are dynamic and the same concept

same individual
is

have quoted

CAP

at different times. Moreover,

have different implica-

problem

arises as subject,

involved in the inferential process. According to the Heuristic view

this

from a part of Flores’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation which he presented
my request, Flores sent the document to me

conference, Los Angeles, 1994. Later, on

electronically.

may
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of reasoning, each proposition in an inferential
process

human

outside a

being.

One

is

independent and can exit

proposition can be inferred from another without
being

part of the subject’s epistemological framework; the
relationship between an inferrer

and what he
one.

Lastly,

is

I

manipulating, according to the Heuristic view,

is

thus an external

object to the Heuristic view of reasoning or inference
as

it

does not

piovide any scientific framework for a philosophy of mind
to support reasoning or
inference.
I

provide below a scientific theory of the mind.

mind must show how our reasoning

the

the theory

must be based on

arguments. Third,

it

must be
support

falsifiable.

my

I

any

Lastly, such a theory (like all
I

Second,

and not on some a priori

multi-level approach to the

present below what

scientific theory of

rooted in the model of mind.

real experimental science

must have a

brain and nervous system.

is

First,

complex function

good

of

scientific theories)

consider a solid scientific framework to

theory of reasoning or inference: Edelman’s theory of Neuronal Group

Selection.

The

2.2

Naturalistic

According to what

I

Theory of Inference

call the Naturalistic

interconnection of belief states. Belief states,

whose

intrinsic feature

is

recognition

4
.

theory of Inference, inference
I

is

an

contend, are states of consciousness

Edelman

defines recognition as, “Continual

adaptive matching or fitting of elements in one physical domain to novelty occurring
in

elements of another, more or

without prior instruction”

(p.

less

74).

independent domain, a matching that occurs
If

recognition

states then this definition clearly brings belief

4

down

is

the intrinsic feature of belief

to the realm of biological studies

1 argue later that a belief state is some sort of “remembered present” because the memory loop
which has the concept categorizes our reentrant loops.
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and

relieves

it

of abstract propositional content.

I

consider below some aspects of

Edelman’s theory.

Edelman
Edelman
cells.

applies the theory of evolution to neurons.

concept of evolution

s

Cells, according to

The most important

is

that he applies

is

DNA

position in the entire structure);

its definite

is

(2)

way

the

DNA

that directs each individual where to go and
live in

DNA

at a particular time

position in the entire structure.

undetermined; they

that they migrate

structures.

from one place to

structure of the

affect this migration: (1) the internal structure

the cell (the release of a particular
its

to groups instead of to individual

it

only partly determined by the

There are two factors that

by

interesting thing about

Edelman, form the embryological basis of our

feature of these cells

another, this migration

The

is

cells.

(DNA)

of

entirely determined

the cell reacts according to

therefore

is

not the only factor

what to do. The trajectory of

cells is

an undetermined amount of time (depending on internal

resource and the environment) and respond and function according to their internal

DNA

programming and

their location within the

whole structure.

Cells, including

neurons, survive as individuals. These migration of cells are responsible for tissues,
organs, and subsystem; the nervous system
(at the basic level)

is

such a subsystem and

neurons with dendrites at their ends loosely

it is

composed

in contact

of

with other

dendrites through synaptic connections (which are neurotransmitters or electrically

charged bio-molecules) through the limbs at the end of the dendrites. The number
of neurotransmitters fired between receptors are directly proportional to the electric

current charged between them.
is

The strengthening

or weakening of neural connections

caused by the amount of neurotransmitters. The more signals pass through these

dendrites the stronger the connections are; the fewer signal pass, the weaker the
connection.

The connections amongst neurons

Thus, say, neuron x of clusteri
of cluster 2

,

to tissues

is

connected to

and organs

(internal

all

(directly or indirectly)

form maps.

other neurons of clusteri, to neurons

and external), and to a remote neuron

21
in clustery

through cluster 2

.

These connections among neurons and

mapped; thus we have

several

Figure 2.1 (Page

Edelman

22)].

maps

tracing various connections

clusters can be

among neurons

[See

says,

Each map independently

(sic) receives signals from other brain maps
or from
the world (in this example, the signals come from the
world). Within a certain
period, reentrant signaling strongly connects certain active
combinations of
neural groups in one map to different combinations in the
other map. This

occurs thiough the strengthening and weakening of synapses
within groups in
each map and also at their connections with reentrant fibers. In
this way, the
function and activities in one map are connected and correlated
with

those in

another map. This occurs even though each

map

is

receiving independent

Neural Darwinism
Parietal

u

and

^

Frontal Areas

Ai

V

1

Multiple Reentrant

Motor

Secondary Maps

Sensory
Sheets

Cortex

Muscles
and Joints

1

Muscles

|

SENSORY
SAMPLING

Figure 2.1

MOVEMENT
Alteration of

„
Sampling
by Movement

Cells

and Neural Darwinism
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from the world: One set of inputs could be, for example,
from vision,
and the other from touch (p. 87). [See Figures
2.2 (Page 24, 2 3 (Page 25)
v
6
h
and 2.4 (Page 26)]

signals

The question now

is,

“How can

this structure

account for belief states with

The answer

as follows: Synaptic responses

recognition as their intrinsic features?”

to stimuli vary according to stimulus types

—

is

visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory.

Depending on the stimuli-type, independent maps are formed. The
from the environment create bio-molecular

to us

cluster forming

maps.

Let us

call the

the

reentrant

map

that forms between

maps provide

activity inside its

own

come

particular

stimulus coming from a ripe banana via

our visual senses, mapi, the tactile stimulus,

Now

signals that

map 2

,

map! and map 2

map 3

the olfactory stimulus,
is

a reentrant maps.

.

These

the basis of our recognition for association between things;

they also form the basis for pattern recognition and recognition of the salient feature
of a thing.

The

Nervous system of individuals are

structure of the nervous system

is

different in different individuals.

different in different individuals

due to

the variety of neuronal groups (selected through randomness), synaptic responses,

reinforcement of maps; thus each nervous system

is

unique.

The neurons

in charge

of perception created by reentrant loops provide perceptual categorization of the

immediate present. Value-category memory, a special feature of the nervous system
which

is

located in the frontal, temporal, and parietal cortex of the

assigns value to this perceptual categorization and in the next state
states for

which these values are

rules of concepts usage

categorization

we reach

and when

intrinsic.

this

belief states.

recognize entities as X’s or as an Y’s.

we reach

The value category memory

memory

We

human

brain,
belief

stores our

loop gets attached to the perceptual

are then aware of our surroundings;

Memory

we

loop stores the rule of concept-usage,

acquired in the past and applies them to the present perceptual categorization. As
this loop is responsible for

our conceptual categorization
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or belief states,

Edelman terms

the latter,

where the rule of concept-usage
reclassification of reentrant loops

stored,

is

“remembered present”.
is

This memory,

achieved through classification and

between different clusters of neuronal groups

ac-

cording to the adaptation to the environment achieved
by our behavior/response to

Our

external stimuli.

memory

value-category

stores the rule for concept usage (e.g.

whale usage, apple-usage) and endows value or meaning to
these reentrant loops 5
Inference,

Mere causal

I

contend,

transition

is

is

a causal transition from one belief state to the next.

nothing more than connection between one reentrant loop

and another; such transition can be explained by the laws of
category

when

memory

.

regulates and puts constraints

When

biology.

value

upon these reentrant loops

(i.e.,

belief states are formed) the transition process instantiates inferential
6
patterns

Such regulations are obtained by the usage of concept
belief states, in natural language.

In

all

.

rule, involved within these

cases of inference the derived states are

well-grounded on the basis states.

An

important question remains to be answered with regard to propositions and

beliefs that

I

belief states,
is

eventually import into

what

my

ontology:

if

inference

the function of beliefs as propositions?

is

the point in bringing propositions into our ontology?

contents.

The content

of P’s belief

is

P

takes to be true.

is

In other words,

owns a Ford, which S

that the apple

Beliefs are individuated by their content:

are different as the contents of these two beliefs are different.

Ss

5

6

I

same

things, their beliefs

would be of the same

type.

is

red,

and P’s

which
beliefs

Millar (1991) says

that beliefs with different contents are different types of beliefs. If
believe the

what

Beliefs have propositional

the proposition that Jones

takes to be true. In contrast, the content of P’s belief

a transition between

is

S and
If,

for

P, however,

example, S

have borrowed the phrase “value-category memory” from Edelman (1992).

As

theory

I

show

in

chapter

4, I

follow a regulative theory of inference as opposed to a reliability
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P both

and

believed that Jones owns a Ford their beliefs
would be of the same type;
,

they would, however, differ quantitatively as they
are beliefs of two different people.

To quote

Millar,

Kate’s belief B is the belief that
p and Fred’s belief B' is the belief that q,
and the proposition that p is not the same as the
proposition that q, then B
and B' are different beliefs in the sense of being different
If

belief-types. This
regiments the common-sense thought that people have the
same belief only if
what they believe is the same.

Different belief states, in contrast to beliefs, are not of
different types; thus,
belief state (believing

own

Ss

an apple to be there) or P’s belief state (believing Jones to

a Ford) are not different types of belief states, but are belief
states of different

types.

The primary

difference between beliefs as propositional

that the former, unlike the latter, can be true or false.
false are their contents; contents

What makes

do not perform the same function

course, each of these states necessarily has a content, or

and a person
content.

in that state

But the

state

is

not thereby true or
it

is

Two

is

beliefs true or

in belief states.

Of

in,

or appropriate to, that

these properties belong to the

focused upon.

not have the properties of their content.
is,

false;

belief states

focused on a proposition,

is

must have a concept involved

state’s content or the proposition

same, that

and

Nonetheless, these states do

token beliefs

may

may

both might have the same content, but they

be generically the

be causally different.

Belief states are physical states and are causally efficacious. In the above case, P’s
belief state (Jones

P

believing that

she
on.

is

owning a Ford)

Mary was

right

a close friend of Jones),

Suppose S

is

also in the

P

is

sustained by belief states such as the following:

when

she said that Jones

believing that

same

owns a Ford

Mary does not

belief state (Jones

usually

(after all

lie,

and so

owing a Ford) which can be

sustained by the following belief state: Jones has given

S

rides

many

times;

S has

seen Jones driving the car out of his garage for the last fifteen years since he moved
into the neighbourhood, etc.
different.

So the causal ancestry of

S s and
'

P’s belief states are
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In chapter 5

I

propose to deal more

in propositions into

our ontology; here

to conceive of a distinction

thought.
(the

I

may

weather

is

good)

‘The

is

the content of

first

thought that

I

the former, has no truth- value, for

non-propositional thinking.

thought which

is

thought which has a truth value,

may

I

also think

this morning’.

i.e.,

The

import propositions into our ontology?”

I

show

in

The

chapter

question, then,

is

about the above thought
latter thought, unlike

has no distinct content; in other words,

Thinking, as

non-propositional.

possible

good. In this case, the latter proposition

my

had

it

It is

to bring

thinking about a thought
(2) thinking a

is

In contrast to this,

why we need

give only a brief answer.

I

(1)

think that the weather

either true or false.

as follows:

between

with the question

fully

is,

5,

it

is

has a language of

“Why do we

have to

Thinking, as established in recent years,

proceeds by way of defeasible or default reasoning 7

.

In this kind of reasoning,

we

hypothesize something as a reason for another thing. As our thinking proceeds, we
gather further evidence which

may

of the previous hypothesis as false

falsify

we have

our previous hypothesis. In order to think
to view

it

in

terms of

its

contentful statements (or propositions) are true or false. Thus, as
5,

we have

contents, for only
I

show

in

chapter

to import beliefs (propositions) into our ontology because of defeasible

or default reasoning.

To summarize, a

belief state

is

a state of primary consciousness with recognition

as its intrinsic feature. Inference consists of causal transitions from one belief state
(state of

primary consciousness) to the next. Such a transition

is

guided by the rules

of concept-usage involved within these states. In order to develop this idea, a theory
of concept-acquisition has to be introduced;

7

Reiter (1978), Doyle (1979) and

McDermott

I

do so

(1980).

in the

next chapter.

CHAPTER

3

Concepts and Concept-acquisition

My

aim

must be

in this

chapter

fulfilled for

S

is

to consider the following questions:
(1)

to have the concept of

Z? And

(2)

What

What

role

play in the transition process from one belief state to
another?

conditions

does a concept

Belief states, in

biological terms, are reentrant loops and has a natural disposition
to pass to other
belief states.

When

such transitions follow proper usage of concepts involved within

these states, an inferential pattern

This chapter

is

is

instantiated.

divided into two main sections. In section

1 I

distinguish between

a truth-conditional theory and an operational theory of concepts 1 and show

adopt the

latter instead of the former.

why

I

According to the truth-conditional view,

concepts are individuated by their inferential

roles;

according to the operational view,

concepts are individuated by their everyday usage in natural language. In section
2

critically

I

we use

survey the three models that are generally put forward to explain how

rules that govern the use of concepts.

intellectual model, the third person model,

the end of this section

I

These models are as

follows:

the

and the competence/action model. At

review, very briefly, the subdoxastic status of the rules

governing concept-usage.

3.1

Concepts: Logical Role

vs.

Role in Practical Reasoning

According to the truth-conditional view, as Millar observes (1991), a concept
individuated by

Mhe

its inferential role (p.

word “operational”

is

used

in AI.

71.).

Each concept, according

is

to this view,
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is

a component of a network. Patterns of legitimate
inferences individuate concepts:

Thus a
only

if

subject,

S

,

possesses the concept Z, according to the truth-conditional
view,

S has mastered

to this view,

the inferential patterns by which

S possesses

S can

.

also

spinster; therefore

The

is

individuated. According

the concepts of ‘spinster’, for example, only

the following sort of inference: Linda

female

Z

make

is

a spinster; therefore, Linda

is

if

an unmarried

the following inference regarding spinster:

Linda owns several

S can make

‘Linda

a

cats.’

chief distinctions between these two inference are as follows:
(1) In the

inference

is

first

spinster’

is

partly individuated by a analytic inference and in the second

inference ‘spinster’

is

partly individuated by a non-analytic inference.
(2) While the

first

one

purely formal, the second one

is

is

not

3

One

.

possible objection to the above

theory of concepts has been raised by Dummett’s followers.

Dummett’s (1978)
that one cannot

‘Inextricability thesis’ (IT) 4

make a

strict distinction

.

The objection stems from

Dummett,

following Quine, says

between concepts that are individuated

by analytic inference and those that are not.

Such distinction

on the analytic-synthetic distinction which, as Quine has shown,

says,

Dummett

rests, as

is

spurious.

According to IT, convention and experience cannot be separated from each other
being determinants of our linguistic dispositions.

Dummett

which underlies Quine’s substitution of stimulus-analyticity

2

3

The

reverse,

I

contend,

is

says, “It

is

as

this thesis

for analyticity

and of

also true, although Millar (1991) does not say so.

One could

also say that in the first inference the conclusion, Linda is an unmarried female
from the premises without any undischarged assumption. In this sense, the premise, Linda
is a spinster is a conclusive reason for thinking that Linda is an unmarried female. No propositions
other than Linda is a spinster is needed to derive the conclusion that Linda is an unmarried female.
In the second case, the conclusion requires one requires some additional assumptions to go from
the premise to the conclusion such as, “All spinsters are neurotic”; “all neurotic people own cats.”
Of course I realize that these particular assumptions are not the only ones. As Professor Aune
pointed out to me, however, that almost all concepts can be individuated by inferences without
,

follows

,

further assumptions.
4

I

realize that not all philosophers will agree with this;

important point that should be mentioned here.

nonetheless, this

is,

I

contend, an
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stimulus-synonymity
distinction

as such

is

for intuitive

synonymity;

it

consists in the doctrine that no

possible in principle between an analytic sentence
generally recognized

and any other sentence generally accepted

to IT, there are

no

reliable criteria

as true”

According

388).

(p.

by which we can distinguish between inferences

which are purely analytic and those which are not. Millar
(1991) claims, however,
that the difference between these

the notion of conceptual truth.

two

sorts of inferences can be explained by using

Clearly, the

first

generates conceptual truth, says

Millar; the second does not.

Gareth Evans (1982) showed that the notion of conceptual truth
For example,
it

may

owning a

S owns

other point

in the 1920s,

but

owns several

cats’

for

may

be part of T's concept of being a

not be part of P's concept of a ‘spinster

spinster; hence,

P The

cat’

P now.

is

it is

that ‘owning cats’

is

is

not so now.

in 1920’s,

a whale; hence,

What

this

P

is

X

shows

a

is

is

it is

now

‘5*

Quine said that

in

If

that

is

a

spinster’

a spinster; hence, S
it

does not do so

While ‘being a mammal’
a part of his concept. So

mammal’ was

non-analytic in the

that our concept acquisition has to
is

accommodated

to generate ‘conceptual truth’

features of a concept.

is

but not for

different

and

(2) the fact

not static but dynamic and that meaning constantly changes.

substantive features of concepts have to be

would be those

‘S' is

1920 but

in

take note of two things: (1) that individual psychology
that language

T

was part of P's concept of ‘being a

the concept of ‘whale’.

concept of ‘whale’

the inference pattern ‘X

1920’s but

Accordingly, the inference

.

generated a conceptual truth for

S”s

but

1

not so in the 1990’s. So the inference

is

problematic.

‘spinster’,

several cats’ will generate a conceptual truth for

Another good example

was not part of

is

we need

in

So

any reasoning.

to consider only the formal

true then the only inferences allowed by Quine

which the premises

entail the conclusion. For

if

we consider only

the formal features of a concept, as suggested by Quine, a concept, in that case,
is

a reason for another concept only

if

the former entails the latter.

In ordinary
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everyday reasoning, however, we have to take account of non-conclusive
reasonings

and Quine’s

thesis

would be too narrow

to apply in cases of such reasoning. Further,

a premise can be a reason for a conclusion without entailing
In recent times

Goodman

(1955) has shown that

formal feature of a concept. For,
crucial to induction,

Goodman

argues,

it.

we cannot consider only

we cannot make a

the

distinction,

between a “projectible” 5 and a “non-projectible” concept by

appealing only to their formal features. Goodman’s notion of “projectible concepts”
arose from his solution to what he called the “new” problem of induction.

problem by constructing

this

artificial

predicates like “grue” and “bleen”

.

He posed

Goodman

defined ‘grue’ as follows:

•

X

is

X

grue =def

green and examined before the year 2000 or blue and

is

examined afterwards.

Similarly,

•

X is

Goodman

=

bleen

def

defined ‘bleen’ as follows:

X is

blue

and examined

before the

2000 or green and examined

afterwards

Suppose we observe

emeralds before the year 2000 and reach the conclusion

all

that “all emeralds are green”

conclusion

“all

generalizations
of emeralds

.

By

the

same observation we can

emeralds are grue” (according to Goodman’s definition). Both these

seem quite reasonable. The problem, however,

examined

after the year 2000.

Suppose

be examined by individuals after the year 2000.
green and also that
not-green.

also reach the general

it

is

Clearly, this

a self-contradiction.

is

an emerald which

Now, we can say

blue (as everything green
is

E

arises with the color

is

of

E

that

will

it

is

by definition also grue) or

As Pollock (1986)

observes, the

formal feature of the pairs ‘blue’ and ‘green’ and ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ are symmetrical,

5

This

is

Goodman’s word.
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but their substantive features are not. Hence, a distinction
between projectibles and
non-projectibles cannot be

made by appealing

to their formal features;

we have

to

take note of their substantive features as well.

The above theory
theory,

of concept-acquisition, also

clearly problematic.

is

known

propose to replace the above theory of concept

I

acquisition with the Operational Theory of Concepts.

having a concept

knowing how
(1976) says,

is

an

ability to use words,

S

to use a concept.

S knows an

X when

as the truth-conditional

,

for

According to

something other than themselves:

example, has the concept of

he sees one

this theory,

(p.

X

According to the

13.).

as Pollock

if,

latter view,

concepts are not only categories whose interrelationships are purely formal; they are
also categories in terms of

S

which we think of the world. Under what conditions does

have, according to this theory, the concept

of, say,

a whale? S has the concept of a

whale only when a set of conditions, say C, that uniquely determine the

justification

condition of the concept of whale,

the concept

of an apple

C

C"?

is

when a

is fulfilled.

different set of condition, call

it

the condition which being fulfilled enables

one; C'

is

sees one

6

C\

is fulfilled.

C

and
sees

know a whale when he

the condition which being fulfilled enables

S

to

know an apple when he

.

whale plays a truth-conditional

mammal”. This

is

by distinguishing between

role in the inference, “Willy

role of the concept of

whose interrelationship

whale makes

it

to other concepts (such as being a

is

7

Goodman’s

Pollock says that this

7

This

is

a term

I

is

not the

literal

sense of ‘seeing’.

have borrowed from Pollock (1986).

The concept

of

a mere logical category

mammal) can be

case, however, that in all non-conclusive reasoning

6

.

a whale; hence, Willy

logic that takes note only of the formal feature of a concept.

by

are

to

the truth-conditional role and the conceptual role of a concept

a

What

S

Let us see what an operational theory of concepts

is

S has

In contrast to this,

We

we have

studied

have seen

in

to take note
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of both the formal features of a concept and
also their substantive features. Thus,

we must take account
conceptual

its

apply

role.

from

The concept

of whale plays a conceptual role for

properly and can distinguish

it

As Pollock (1976)
it

of not only the truth-conditional role of
a concept, but also

its

says, one

complement

or

it

from a non- whale (say shark or dolphin).

knows a 0 when he can

non -0

(p.

S

14).

I

of one belief-state to another.

showed

identify a

is

0 and exclude

as a

.

in the last chapter, is a causal transition

In addition, such transition

meaningful. Meaning in each case

0

has, in this case, learned the rule of the

usage of the concept of whales in natural language 8

Reasoning or Inference, as

S when S can

is

not arbitrary but

provided by the rules of concept usage in each

belief state; rules constitute the semantics of these states.

One who

has acquired

the rules of concept usage has also acquired the conceptual roles of
concepts in

natural language.

We

have seen above that according to the truth conditional notion

of concept acquisition, to have a concept of a whale
inferential connection

between whale and

its

is

make

to be able to

ingredient component.

certain

For concepts,

according to this view, are components of networks, and to grasp a concept
grasp

its

network. For example, having a concept of whale

propositions such as “whales are

mammals”. But any

is

is

to

knowing some related

person, say

S must have
,

the

concept of whale in the sense of having acquired the conceptual roles of that concept
before being able to articulate these contingent fact about whales.
that

S

is

a marine biologist and knows a

S, as Pollock observes,

lot of

it.

This

8

is

contingent facts about whales. Now,

must have known a whale

these contingent facts, otherwise he would not
the notion of concept that

I

am

subject
I

to be a

whale before acquiring

know a whale when he

is

all

examining

applying here.

may not be able to utter the word
assume that he has a concept of whale
same creature as whale and not as a shark or porpoise.
The

Nonetheless,

Let us suppose

‘whale’,
if

he

is

for

he

may

not

able to identify

know
it

English.

as being the
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While simple concepts (such
individual ostensively 9

knows

a complicated concepts can be

,

their ingredient simple concepts.

a sense which

is

term

define the
‘cat!’.

as the concept of a whale) can be

similar to

‘cat’.

its

One way

The term

known by him only

is

he

if

“ostensive”, as used here, has

usage in ostensive definition.
he can do so

known by an

Suppose S wants to

by pointing to a

real cat

and saying

Similarly, one can acquire other concepts by having an instance of the concept

pointed out in the real world; we can say that he knows the justification condition

As Pollock (1976)

of a cat.

“When you

says,

a person a concept, what you are teaching him
is

an instance of that concept”

cannot be learned ostensively.

is

how

Complex

15).

(p.

use an ostensive definition to teach

A mammal

to judge whether something

concepts, on the other hand,

(concept of a kind), ‘being taller than’

(concept of being a relation), or the concept of ‘being patriotic’ (abstract concept)
are examples of

complex concepts.

Complex concepts

divisible into simpler concepts like ‘being

Once these simpler concepts
Suppose

know
and

uj is

a complex concept;

it

As Pollock

,

we must know

mammal

are

their young’.

up complicated concepts.

consists of the concepts of

u>

a

an animal’ and ‘suckling

are grasped, a child can build

the justification condition of

.

like that of

and

.

Then

the justification concept of

says,

One concept may be

defined verbally in terms of some other concepts, and

those concepts in turn defined in terms of some further concepts, and so on,

but this cannot go on

indefinitely.

without going around in a

circle.

We

cannot define

Our sequence

all

concepts verbally

of verbal definitions

must

eventually terminate with some concepts that can be defined ostensively.

Furthermore,
4>i

to

<f>

n

,

if

the concept of a

which are

then by putting

0

is

verbally defined in terms of some concepts

in turn verbally defined in

all

terms of some concepts

of the definitions together

Consequently,

we can obtain a

definition of

a concept can be defined by means

in terms of 0i...0 n
of a sequence of verbal definitions which terminate ultimately with ostensive
.

if

concepts, then can be defined directly in terms of ostensive concepts. This
those that can be
means that there are in general two kinds of concepts

—

9

This

is

a phrase

I

have borrowed from Pollock [1974].

to

0
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defined ostensively, and those that can be defined
verbally in terms of others
15.)

(P-

One problem

arises at this point.

u

justification condition of

defined in terms of

0

thinking of something that

concept of a

a;

true that to

know what a

uj

.

It

consist of

As a

.

0 and nobody knows whether

result, Pollock says,

it is

u

.

the definition of

u; is is

in this case, to

aw

to

it

and

know how

The above theory

know what a w

complement”

of concepts has

u; is

is

not

this objection

common among

we can

it

in

it

would not be

is

would be something

is

a

knowing

like

Thus we

in the definition.

16).

(p.

some problems.

First of

all, it

may

be objected

one knows the truth conditions of

if

reply as follows: that a truth conditional definition

ordinary speakers of English, although

lexicographers might be able to construct

Moreover,

S justified

uniquely determined by the justification

that one can identify a whale as whale only

To

is

to determine whether something

and having the concepts involved

its

also can be

it

Pollock says, “The justification conditions of the

cannot conclude that the concept of a

whale.

under no conditions

constitute the null class. Under these circumstances,

seems that

conditions of

might be the case, as Pollock says, that the

It

it

is

it

possible that

(Pollock, 1974 p. 14).

can be argued that although a person can identify a whale without

knowing what makes a whale a whale

,

he can do the identifying just

when

truth-conditions are satisfied; hence, knowing the truth-condition of a concept
prerequisite for identifying

it.

the conditions too stringent.

The problem with
Does

S,

this prerequisition

who wrongly

whale, possess the concept of a whale? Does a child,
as a whale, possess the concept of the latter?

It

is

that

identifies a plastic

who wrongly

it

the
is

a

makes

whale as a

identifies a shark

can be replied that owing to the

similarity between the plastic whale and the real whale,

S has

of whale to the plastic whale; this does not, however, preclude

applied the concept

him from having

the

concept of whale in the above sense. In the second case, the child was perhaps not
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paying attention to what he was identifying and
hence he did not identify the whale
correctly; nonetheless, in this case, he

before, concepts are

dynamic

entities

had the concept of whales. Further, as

and they are known within a frame of

I

reference.

Gradually the child learns that whales are things which
cannot be displayed
shops, his original concept of whale changes; he
is

unsuitable for whales.

knows now what frame

In general, having conceptual knowledge,

to ascribe concepts. In all cases,

when S can

rightly judge

and

said

in toy

of reference

S must

be able

identify a whale as

a whale, we can say that he has acquired the concept of whale.
As Pollock (1974)

remarks,

The
not

“

child

This

knowledge

must know how

know what

What

is

is

the

is

who

than theoretical knowledge.

to ascribe the concept to things justifiably, but he need

required for his ascription of

it

meaning of a concept according

the operational theory, the

Hence, one

in the practical sense rather

meaning of “whale”

is

to be justified” (p. 15.).
to the above theory? According to

determined by the rules of

its

usage.

has learned the rules of “whale” -usage has also learned the meaning

of whale in natural language.

In this sense, rules of concept usage constitute the

meaning of that concept;

is

there

to fully appreciate this theory,

How do we

nothing deeper about meaning than

we have

to understand

learn to use concepts in natural language?

this. In

order

two relevant questions:

And

(2)

concept usage mean? These are the question that we consider

What

in the

(1)

does proper

next section.

Epistemic Rules and Their Function

3.2

I

said in the previous section that proper concept-usage are instantiated in some

cases of belief-transition; the latter cases illustrate our notion of inference.
the question remains,

how

But

are these rules used? Generally three models have been

suggested in order to illustrate the rules of concept-usage.
Intellectual model, the Evaluative model,

These model are the

and the Competence/Performance model.
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According to the

A

propositions.

when we

first

model, rules of concept-usage are explicitly
articulated

good example

is

a driver’s manual.

see a stop sign, a yield sign, or a flashing red
light.

start driving

and are not sure how

knowledge that something

is

manual. This

is

them shows how

that the third

model above

is

people

first

propositional knowledge

is

the case. According to the second model, rules are

used to evaluate other people’s behavior.
that neither of

When

to use these rules, they can always check
the

explicitly written regulation in the driving

or

us exactly what to do

It tells

The problem with both

these models

rules govern our speech or language.

appropriate to describe

how

My

is

contention

rules actually

work

in

guiding our linguistic behavior and actions.

Rules of driving, for example, govern our behavior.
first

learn

how

As an expert

to drive.

nonetheless, our behavior
it

to

is

a knowledge ‘how’.

swim, we follow the

become

is

driver

We

we do not think

guided by them. Driving

The case

of

refer to

swimming

is

is

explicitly of these rules;

an ability or competence:

similar.

explicit instructions given to us

manuals when we

When we

first

by the instructor.

learn

As we

experts, however, our behavior automatically conforms to the rules without

our having to think of them. Pollock says that when we

“

our behavior

(p.

is

automatically channeled into that plan.”

undertake to do X,
130.).

Our

linguistic

or conceptual abilities are similar to our ability to drive or swim; they constitute

a description of this plan for swimming or driving, or speaking a language. Rules
guide our behavior; we can apply them, correct them, and refine them.

however, always follow these rules correctly, but we
says, with varying degrees of success (p. 128)

To summarize what
rule in the sense of

10

I

TRY

We

do not,

to do, as Pollock (1986)

10

have said above, there

.

is

a vast difference between knowing a

knowing some propositions and being guided by a

The same thing can be explained by saying that when we
but we do not always apply or use them correctly.

learn a language,

rule.

we

Thus, our

learn

its rules,
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swim

ability (to

or drive) consists in our behavior being
automatically channeled into

following rules.

The

crucial thing here

is

that these rules are internalized by us

— we

do not have to think of them when we perform the relevant
action. This knowledge
consists in doing things as the situation arises.

concept of

say,

a,

there

fulfilled:

a

is

Z

only

Z

in the

of there being a whale
it

it

as

is

the concept of whale)

pointed out before,

unequivocal;

is

it

experience as

from

S

the condition

if

it is

memory and

an instance of whale 11

not a data-bit storage of a computer which

biological

As Pollock (1986)

certain conditions are

his short-term or occurrent

and concludes that
is

Z when

retrieves the rules of concept usage (in this case

and

is

dynamic. There

recognizes the whale 12

S

to be a

environment. According to this theory,

is fulfilled,

in that particular case
I

S knows a Z

if

Thus, 5, for example, knows the

is

is

applies

Memory,

.

and

static

a phenomenal change in

Ss

.

observes,

Having procedural knowledge of what to do under various circumstances does
not involve being able to give a general description of what we should do under
those circumstances. This is the familiar observation that knowing how to
ride a bicycle does not automatically enable one to write a treatise on bicycle
riding. This is true for two different reasons. First, knowing how to ride

a bicycle requires us to know what to do in each situation as it arises but
it does not require us to be able to say what we should do before the fact.
Second, even when a situation has actually arisen, our knowing what to do in
,

that situation need not be propositional knowledge.
that

we should turn

right,

it is

I

In the case of

when

knowing

bicycle leans to the

plausible to suppose that most bicycle riders do have propositional

knowledge of
racket.

the handlebars to the right

this;

but consider knowing how to hit a tennis ball with a tennis

know what

what to do

to

— but even

do

— as the situation unfolds, at each instant

at that instant

should do. Knowing what to do

is

the

I

I

know

cannot give a description of what

same thing

as

knowing to do

it,

I

and

that need not involve propositional knowledge. (129-30).

The important question now
5, for example,

nI
12

explain this

As

I

will

what constitutes the

might use a concept guided by

more

show

is,

fully

in the

justification of these rules?

his rules, while

Y

might use the

with the help of de dicto and de re representation of concepts.

next chapter

how

this

happens.
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same concept

own

their

by

his rules,

and both might argue that they have

notion of which rules are appropriate. Are we not
heading for a thorough

relativism?

The

rules.

differently guided

latter rules?

there are no

One

can, of course, justify these rules with reference
to

question, then, would be as follows:

As Strawson observes
more

(1952),

“What

is

the justification of the

when we have questioned

rules left by reference to which

we can

some other

any

justify

so

much

rules,

that

we have

leached the limit of justification. Following Feigl, we can draw
a distinction between
“validation” and “vindication” of rules.

can be validated by showing that
principles.

There

it

As Salmon (1957)

“A

says,

rule of inference

can be derived from other accepted rules or

however, a second form of justification called “vindication”.

is,

This form of justification consists in showing that a given decision, policy, or
act
is

well adapted to achieving a certain end” (p.

39).

Our aim

is

to achieve correct

usage of ordinary discourse and to be able to communicate and make sense within our
linguistic

community. Flence, the rules we use should be the ones directed towards

this end.

Given any

forbidden to do

so;

rule, r, of

in other words,

sensible discourse which

norm

or a standard

is

true for

is

it

all

it is

permissible to use r

permissible to use r

speakers.

if it

Here we justify

— our ability to learn the use of concepts

if it is

contributes to

r in relation to a

in ordinary discourse.

close this chapter with a brief estimate of the nature of rules of concept-usage as

being subdoxastic.

What

exactly, one

example from grammatical

rules will

may
make

ask,

is

a subdoxastic state? The following

the notion clear. Suppose that

an adult and a competent speaker of English,

is

S',

who

storing the grammatical rule that

should be added with the verb following any third person singular noun. Let us
this

that

not

Rules as Subdoxastic

3.2.1

I

concept usage,

grammatical rule

S

is

r.

Further, suppose that

in the belief state

Bsr The
.

first

one

is

S

believes r to be correct;

is

‘s’

call

we can say

a state (which stores the information
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and the other

r)
r

is

is

have characteristic C\ then
false that

it is r.

r is the rule stored

Bsr

says,
is

the belief state that r

not

If

Bsr

by S

'

s

is

if

To

S encounters

the belief state

S

whose content

we need

believes that r to be true,

Stitch observes,

It

will

S

is

conclude that

it

believes that r and

state r will not cause the belief state that

arrive at the conclusion

latter is that

having C, he

r

rules

language processing mechanism then, as Stitch
13
(1978)

and the subdoxastic

r.

Suppose S believes that no

true.

is

the additional belief state

which

would be easy enough

some thing

is

from the rule

distinct

to marshall

B sri

many more

;

r.

the

As

illustrations of

the fact that the subdoxastic states which store grammatical
information are largely
inferentially isolated

from

beliefs.”

(p.

509). There

is,

of course,

some resemblance

between the subdoxastic state and the states which contain information about
Saying that a state

Stitch says,

information (or fact) p

is

in

it.

an information processing system represents the

to say that the state bears

some

interesting resemblances u

to the belief that p" (p. 510).

Gilbert

Harman

(1973) refuses to believe that there are subdoxastic states which

play any role in our inferences;

all

we have

beliefs interconnected with each other.

experimenter

and

is

ug.

Sentence

P

asks subject S,

‘g’
;

1

‘a

14

15

show that he

is

contends, are

wrong. Suppose

a competent speaker of English language

so,

This

is

‘g’

S cannot

Stitch uses the

Italics

reads “Mary goes to Church” and sentence

“Mary go

b reads,

stands for grammatical and ‘ug’ stands for ungrammatical.

successfully tags

13

is

test will

Harman

willing to cooperate, to label two sentences a and b with two tags g and

Church” 15

doing

who

One

in inferences,

to sentence a

and

‘ug’ to b.

reply for he does not

word

‘belief’; I

When

asked what

know why he reached

have substituted

it

is

the conclusion: he

mine.

it is

Now S

his reason for

with belief states.

not to be taken as an imperitive statement;

to

an assertive statement.
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simply believes

16
it,

.

additional belief state

One may

B sp

point out that

S

arrived at the conclusion with the

believing p to be true, where
p stands for the rule

(

verbs following third person singular nouns should
have an
is

a state whose content

contend,
that r

is

is

is

that r

is

correct, but

it is

s).

As

I

r;

not a belief state; nonetheless, we use r in our inferences.

a not a grammatical rule but a rule of concept usage.

competence to use a concept stores the
the belief that the rule

is

true.

rule for its usage,

These rules are used

and

the latter,

Now

One who has

by

all

I

imagine
the

from

this is distinct

in all inferences

B sp

said before,

not the state

all

competent

speaker of language.

To summarize what
learn

its

I

said in this chapter, acquiring or learning a concept

is

to

proper application in natural language. Such learning involves acquisition

of the rules of concept usage.

These rules are not propositional; they are

internal-

ized goal-oriented subdoxastic states that guide our thought and linguistic
behavior

and when properly used these rules

instantiate inference patterns

which validate

transitions from one belief state to another.

16

Stitch says that one can say that

whole theory of the unconscious

is

it is

an unconscious

hypothetical and

is

belief;

hence,

S cannot

articulate

it.

The

therefore one which should be best avoided.

CHAPTER

4

Nature of Experience: Top-Down vs.
Bottom-Up Information Processing

My

primary aim

chapter

in this

is

to

show

states also contain elements of recognition.

however, as

show

I

here,

part of any belief state,

show that experience,

The

that like belief states experiential
chief difference between the two,

that while the element of recognition

is

it is

is

an

intrinsic

not so in case of experiential state. In this chapter

like recognition, is essentially (to

I

use a phrase from cognitive

psychology) “bottom up information processing.”

This chapter
of

McGinn

views

is

is

divided into two main sections. In section

(1982), Peacocke (1983), and Searle (1982).

that there can be no pre-cognitive experience:

meaningful.
experience 1

I

.

argue against these views

In section 2

in experience.

I

end

tional content

I

is

by

2

experience

by bringing

briefly criticizing the

is

intrinsically

in a typology of

Extreme Perceptual View

.

is

Intrinsically Meaningful:

1 I

McGinn, Peacocke,

have presented

my

Searle

view of belief

states.

this view, belief states are not only physical or biological states (reentrant

have borrowed the phrase “typology of experience” from Millar

This

is

nothing in experiential states besides their representa-

Following Edelman (1992) in chapter

T

central theme of these

2

Experience

According to

in this section

present the views

present the notion of “bottom-up information processing”

this section

according to which there

4.1

The

1 I

a phrase

I

have borrowed from Peacocke [1983].

[1991].
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maps) but are

also meaningful states.

Like physical states generally, belief states

are causally efficacious; they sustain other
belief states.
belief state to another

The

transition from one

can be captured by causal/biological laws.

But sometimes

such transitions, in addition to instantiating causal
laws, also follow proper usage of

concept involved within these states. The rules of usage
of a concept, as
the previous chapter, constitute the
belief states meaningful.

^s

belief state that

According to the

Expei iential

an

states,

I

X is

letter

its

X as

an

A is

X

is

I

there”

am

a necessary or intrinsic part

3

following,

P

seeming to him that a bird

P

they are conscious

can describe

In the latter case,

.

for the content of the experience

for tables, chairs, birds, etc.
its

this theory, recognition is a necessary part

contend, are species of mental states:

seeming to S that

which stands

in

there.

occurrences. According to the convention
ience as

showed

meaning of that concept and hence make those

of belief states. Thus, say, recognizing an

of

I

X

5”s exper-

a schematic

is

and can be replaced by words

can describe &s belief state as “His state

is

there”

.

The

latter experiential state in S,

is

I

that of

contend,

need not be caused by an actual bird. Experiential states have to be distinguished

from the following mental
belief states.

states:

Experiential states differ from perception so far as the

the former, have to be caused by

3

As a

perceptual states, sensations, judgements, and

my

some actual

objects.

My

latter, unlike

perception of a bird on

Aune

I came up with this formulation which, he
and “her being a teacher”, which are all nouns.
Millar (1991) prefers to describe such experiences as “such that it seems to S that an F is there”.
Aune (1993) criticizes Millar as follows: “the pronoun in ‘the experience is such that it seems that an
Fis there’ is grammatically unrelated to the preceding noun. A careless reader might suppose that

result of

pointed out to me,

Millar
is

is

is

discussion with Professor

similar to

“my

feeling sad”

thinking of the experience as creating the impression that an

ruled out by Millar’s claim that

‘it

seems to S that

p'

so long as S believes there are no countervailing facts’

F

is

there, but this supposition

means no more than
Obviously

‘S

would believe that p

this claim disallowes

a causal

interpretation because the truth of the ‘would’ statement does not require anything to occur
the subject believes there are countervailing factors.

An unconnected

disposition

is

when

not adequate,

—

when, say,
one could have such a disposition when no F even appears to be there
is there but one is unable to detect it. If one has an
”
experience of an F, one’s F-type experience should have some effect on one’s consciousness

anyway,

for

a trusted friend has assured one that an F
(p. 241).
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the

window

sill,

example, must be caused by an actual bird on the window

for

can, however, experience a bird on the

I

window

sill

to cause

like itches, tickles,

my

and

experience.

feeling of

window

even

sill

Moreover, experiences

numbness (Millar

p.

contents. Furthermore, the content of an experience
of a judgment.

As Peacocke (1983)

says,

is

however, not the content of his experience; he

violin

hanging on the door although he

10)

is

differ

no bird on the

from sensations

which have no distinct

not the same as the content

someone might judge that there

of a violin painted in oil on the door; the latter then
It is,

there

if

still

judges

is

is

a picture

the content of his judgment.

may
it

sill.

have an experience as of a

as a painted violin.

Experiential states thus differ from belief states; yet, in some ways, they are
similar.

Like belief states, experiential states are causally efficacious; they causally

sustain belief states.

As
if,

I

said earlier,

in

difference between these two states

S can be

S has acquired

Thus, to be

The

in

is

very crucial, however.

a state of believing a red apple to be on the table only

the usage of the concepts “apple” and “red” in ordinary language.

any

belief state,

S

,

the subject,

must have learned the

rules of using A,

or any appropriate concept, involved within that state. So the relationship between

a belief state and the mastery of the rules of

its

ingrediant concept

is

essential.

Further, according to the operational theory of concepts, the rules of concept usage
constitute the
interpreted.

meaning

On

of a concept; hence, belief states are always meaningful and

the other hand, the relation between an experiential state and the

rules of concept usage

is

contingent and not necessary.

without having acquired the rules of the X-usage
the element of recognition (interpretation)

is

in

S can experience an

X

ordinary language. In this sense,

not a necessary part of experience,

it is

a contingent part. All philosophers, however, do not agree with this view. McGinn,
Searle,

and Peacocke think that experience

is

essentially interpreted as the experience

of something. Their formulation of the thesis
their views in the next few paragraphs.

is,

however, different, and

I

expound
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I

S may have an experience

said before that

the locution

a bird

is

his book,

used

I

earlier,

P

The content

there”.

;

latter is

part of his experiential state.

Ss

experience as

of S"s experience

Character of the Mind

something as a bird the

we

can describe

of a bird on the

,

is

window
“its

the bird.

seeming to S that

McGinn

says that in the above case

what

McGinn

his experience

S

is

an

intrinsic

further observes that in cases of hallucination

also experience something as, say, a book, or a table, which

our experience.

(1982) in

experiencing

is

about and

is

following

sill;

the content of

is

In such cases experiential states, according to him, do not have

any objects nonetheless, they have contents. The contents are what the experiencer
;

experiences things

as.

Thus,

in general, all experiences are interpreted as

something and hence are meaningful states

for

McGinn.

Peacocke (1983) holds that experiences represent things to be

A

visual experience

and paper on

it.

may

The

be represented to

representational content of an experience, says Peacocke,
In the

content that

it

it.”

Peacocke says,

“...

it is

in the

presents the world as being, and
is

is

table before

me

nature of representational

cannot be built from concepts unless the subject of the experience

himself has those concepts: the representational content

the subject

is

above cases, the content of

experience can be expressed as the proposition “that there

with pen and paper on

in a certain way.

as of a writing table with a pencil

S'

given by a proposition or a set of propositions.

Ss

being of

it

is

the

way

the experience

can hardly present the world as being that way

incapable of appreciating what that

way

is.

Only those with

if

the concept

of sphere can have an experience as of a sphere in front of them, and only those with
spatial concepts can have experiences which represent things as distributed in depth
in space”

(p.

7).

So, for Peacocke, the representational content of an experience

intrinsic to that experience.

is
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The Adequacy Thesis4 should be mentioned
thesis

is

The

gist of this

that two experiences which represent the world in two
different ways are

different types of experiences.
(e-i)

in this context.

which

P

can describe as

S',

“its

for

example, might be in the experiential state

seeming to S that a table

of this state can be expressed as the proposition that there

is

there”; the content

P

might also

seeming to S that an apple

is

there”; the

content of this state can be expressed by the “proposition that there

is

an apple ”

describe S' s experiential state (e-2) as

“its

is

a table.

E-l and E-2 have different contents; hence, they are different types of experiential
states. It follows that contents of experiential states

Thesis).

(

view

is

known

as the

Ss

tedness.

more than

all

our experiences have a

visual experience of a bird

experience of rain falling

is

their representational content.

is

common

feature:

directed towards rain falling; they are,

we can

So experience

of”. Experience, to use Searle’s phrase,

is

intentional. Hence, experience

interpretative: the element of recognition

is

necessarily

can be demonstrated by showing that

S experiences

experience

is

a flying saucer in the sky,

directed even though there

is

direc-

directed towards a bird, his auditory

experiences of a bird and of rain falling.

If

The

Extreme Perceptual View.

According to Searle (1983),

this fact

Adequacy

According to Peacocke, the Adequacy Thesis implies much stronger view

that experiential states have nothing
latter

determine their types

it is

it

its

is

also say,

always an “experience

part.

is

always

According to Searle,

true even in cases of hallucination.
is

the flying saucer at which his

no real flying saucer

in the external

world. Searle says that experiences are similar to sensations in so far as both have
durations; while sensations are pleasant or unpleasant, experiences are intentional.

To summarize what
cocke, to experience

mental states,

4

This

is

is

I

have said above, according to McGinn, Searle, and Pea-

always to experience something as something. Experiences, as

are, in this view, essentially interpreted

a name given by Peacocke.

and hence they are meaningful.
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Contrary to the above view,

I

contend that a subject,

S need
,

X

ience things as an

or as a T; in other words, recognition

an intrinsic part of experiential states

show that recognition

to

two principles:

it

is

not an essential or

an extrinsic part of them. In order
states,

I

of Typology of Experience5 and (2)

Phenomenal Character. To understand

of

it is

an extrinsic part of experiential

is

The Principle

(1)

—

is

not always exper-

present here

The

Principle

the Principle of Typology of Experience

are produced.

Thus a pain produced by burning

by cutting one’s finger on a sharp

knife.

We

is

different

from that produced

often talk about the pain of the type

produced by burning, or of the type produced by cutting one‘s hand on the
thus regimenting pains according to their causal circumstances.
There
observes, no

way

“Knowing

that a pain

know which

is

type

phenomenal character of that pain.

such a

type.

tooth; he

On

and being

as being of the type
S' s

is

not

is

that there

is

its

phenomenal character”

a basic distinction between having

able to describe that pain as being of such

of the type

(p.

when a

and

cold drink affects a bad

not, however, be able to describe that pain as of the above type to P.

the other hand, suppose

understand

here

Thus S can have a pain

may

Millar says,

Specifications conforming to our regimented form

it is

The fundamental thought

a pain of a certain type

As

of the type produced when/if such and such occurs

merely indicate the type of pain but do not describe
26).

as Millar

of getting around causes of pains which are publicly observable

give us the knowledge of the

yet to

is,

knife,

Classifying pains according to causal circumstances, however, does not

26).

(p.

,

useful to think of pains in relation to the causal
circumstances in which they

when

words, but

S has

cold

the ability to describe (verbally) a certain pain

(e.g.,

P may

burning sensation)

affects a

bad tooth,

P may

not be able to fully grasp them as he had never

experienced such a type of pain. As Millar says, we would not grasp the statement

5

This

is

a phrase

I

have borrowed from Millar [1991].
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that a

man

is

of the type

who wears

do not know what type of
Next,

let

We

he

is (p.

and drives a Volvo

Phenomenal Character.

contrast,

we

According to

can be of same type yet appear to a subject as
phenomenally

describe headaches, for example, as being of dull type,
or of throbbing

These are same types of pains, yet they are phenomenally

type.

if

27.).

us consider the Principle of

this principle, pains
different.

man

shirt with a polo neck

some pains can be both phenomenally

different

and of

By

different.

different pain- types;

examples would be pains produced by a sharp knife and pains produced
by burning.
Let us next apply the typology of experience to sense-experiences
in general.
Ordinarily,

we speak

or of the type produced

silk,

someone runs past
first

of having an experience of the type produced

two are

in the

us.

when we touch a rough

Let us

call

Xs

yield

when

his sense of seeing, hearing, touching

a (red apple)-type experience
(in

auditory modality),

etc.

edge, or of type produced

when

such experiences X-type, T-type, or Z-type. The

modality of touch and the

experiences are those that

when we touch

is

(in visual

Millar says,

last

one in the modality of sight. X-type

the subject

is in

normal (Millar

p.

a suitable position and
28).

Thus, we can have

modality), (rushing- water)-type experience

“A grasp

of the typology

is

implicit in our

ordinary talk of the appearances of things relative to various modalities. This
say

of things” (p. 30). X-type experience contains a
it

refers to conditions

which would

type experience
is

is

modal element,

be true if

we could have a (ghost)-type experience even

whale,

to

implicit in our ordinary talk of the look, or sound, or feel, or smell, or taste

it is

says,

is

if

Millar (1991)

such and such were the case; thus,
the modality

is

empty.

So an

X

not X-indicating; STs whale-type experience, caused by a plastic

not whale-indicating. Further,

it is

possible to modify X-type experiences

by using the Principle of Phenomenal Character.

phenomenally

for, as

different yet be the

apple on a tree type, another

is

same type

Thus, two experiences

may

of experience in the sense that one

an apple on a table type.

We

is

be

an

can schematize these
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X

types of experience as follows:

on background

t-

X on

type and

Such refinements are made from the certain
environmental
is

also possible to

of the subject.

background

factors.

modify our X-type experiences by putting

b- type.

In addition,

it

in special conditions

For example, we can speak of seeing an apple
with one eye or with

eyes partially open which can be schematized as
follows: a as o-type, or a as p- type.

Sometimes we

talk of seeing things with the artist’s eye

of the subject and, as Millar says,

it

Similarly, having a concept of, say,

as

show

I

here, affects the

In the light of what

S

to

X is

that an

I

way a

way a

affects the

X is

—

a special condition

it is

subject experiences an entity.

another special condition of the subject and,

subject experiences that type of experience.

said above, let us see

there. In a typical case

what

it

means when

P says that it seems

P

S

we would take

to imply that

has both

an X-type experience, and also has an experience of an X. To experience something
as an

X

is

to experience something as an instance of

X and

not

its

complement 6

Such judgment requires that the experiencer must have acquired the concept of

and so has the

ability to

X under

know an

appropriate conditions.

If

S

.

X

did not have

the concept of an X, he could, nonetheless, have an X-type experience but not an

experience of an X. In order to
children
the Sea
the

S and

P;

S has

pond and

it

comes within

what happens

S

this point clear let us consider the cases of

P does

the concept of a whale,

World and pass a pond;

experience. Suddenly
is

make

there

is

something which

5”s visual field. Initially

whale

realizes that a

in S”s visual field:

As

S'

is

As

I

show

later, this is the

of countervailing conditions.

S.

As

visit

bobbing up and down

P have

whale- type

up and down the pond. This

STs

(e.g.

the

conceptual capacity affects

phenomenal change and he recognizes

initially he did not.

same as being

is

looks at this thing, certain features

his experience, his experience undergoes a

6

Suppose they both

both S and

floating

shiny black coat of the whale) become salient for

whale as an whale which

not.

two

After this recognition

in the belief state of there

being an

P

the

can describe

X in

the absence
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'

S s ex P er ience by saying
an experience which
Here

I

am

seeming to S that a whale

“its

there”. In this case,

is

S has

both whale-type and of a whale.

is

proposing that an experience gets a definite interpretation

case as an experience of a whale) only secondarily.

Phenomenal Character

,

According to the Principle of

and P's experiences are phenomenally

5”s

(in this

different they are
;

not, however, contrary to

Phenomenal change

is

what Adequacy Thesis

responsible for

whale. Hence, knowing an

only

when S

recognizes an

X

as an

X can

says, different types of experiences.

Ss subsequent

X is

recognition of the whale as the

not an intrinsic part of experiencing an A;

he experience an

X as

an X.

I

propose to

call this,

following cognitive psychologists, “bottom-up information processing”

What
all

I

have just said shows that the theses of McGinn, Searle, and Peacocke, that

experiences are interpreted as experiencing something,

information processing

is

not accepted by

psychologists phenomenal change

is

our above example); recognizing

A as

Ss

experience.

there

is

Knowing an

A as

all

A brings

S' s

processing that conforms to this view

is

(or

recognizing

For these

X as an X (in

about the phenomenal change

an A, according to them,

no such thing as pre-cognitive

not correct. Bottom-up

cognitive psychologists.

not responsible for

an

is

is

in

intrinsic to experience:

we can say A-type) experience.

The

called “top-down information processing”

in cognitive psychology.

The Bottom-up Model

4.2

of Information Processing in Experiences

Top-down information processing
(1983) and

Budd

(1987).

is

advocated by psychologists such as Rock

For Rock our experience

is

always interpretative.

Ac-

cording to this view, we always perceive things, say a portrait, as something or
other.

Famous examples

are duck/rabbit where

we

see a picture

one interpretation (as a duck), and then another (as a
thinks that

we process information

in a

rabbit).

first

according to

M. Budd (1987)

also

top-down way. So, according to these psy-
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chologists,
to

we always experience

things as something or the other. Thus, according

top-down information processing, information

is

cognition driven.

On

the other

hand, according to Fodor, in top-down processing
“In the course of computing a
structural description, information that

is

specified only at relatively high levels of

representation should be ‘fed back’ to determine analysis
at relatively lower levels.”
(p.

“High-level” cognitive processes involve conceptual abilities
(or the ability

64).

to judge an

X to

be an A),

beliefs,

and expectations which get “fed back”

into our

inputs at a “lower level.” According to “Bottom-up processing”,
on the other hand,

sensory inputs do not receive any feedback from higher-order

beliefs, expectations,

or conceptual knowledge; they (inputs) are, to use a phrase from
Fodor (1983),

“encapsulated” from cognitive capacities such as conceptual knowledge,

beliefs,

and

expectations.

Thus, according to the theory of bottom-up information processing,

information

data-driven.

is

Philosophers and cognitive psychologists
processing are Bruner (1970) in his

A

“Conceptual Dependency:
nitive Psychology:

3)

stimulus process”.

He

(pp.

who champion

the top-down information

“New Look” account and Schank

Theory of Natural Language Understanding” (Cog-

552- 631).

(1970) thinks that

Bruner doubts the existence of any “pure

when we stimulate any

subject, say

an appropriate input, S responds by referring the input to some
events.

To use Bruner’s phrase,

in all cases

some

class.

critical attributes in the input,

called clues (35), there

rather than another.
pain’, are also

What

is

is

S',

with

class of things or

when S gets an input from sensory

he presses a lever which, he says, he has been “tuned to press”,
the experience under

(1970) in

i.e.,

outlet

he categorizes

Bruner says, “On the basis of certain defining or

what are usually called cues although they should be

a selective placing of the input in one category of identity

The category need not be

elaborate

examples of categorized inputs” (Bruner

p.

:

‘a

123).

sound’

‘a touch’, ‘a

Bruner also says,

interesting about the nature of inference from cue to identity of

perception

is

that

it

is

in

no sense

different

from other kinds of categorial
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inferences based on defining attributes.
‘That thing is round and hubbly
in texture and orange in color and
of such and such size
therefore it is
an orange: let me now test its other properties
to be sure.’ In terms of
process, this course of events is no different
from the more abstract task
of looking at a number, determining that
it is divisible only

—

unity,

and thereupon categorizing

it

in the class of

by itself and
prime numbers. So at the

outset,

it is evident that one of the
principal characteristic of perceiving is
a characteristics of cognition generally
In no sense need the process be
conscious or deliberate. A theory of perception, we assert,
needs a mechanism
capable of inference and categorizing as much as one is
needed in a theory of
cognition (p. 123-124).

Biuner compares categorization to the placement of an element
from a universe
in the subset of that universe of items;

ordered dimensional pairs,
puts forward for his view
non-categorized.
identity
125).

it is

He

triplets, n-tuples.

is

to be a

is

made on

The strongest argument

the basis of
that Bruner

the impossibility of communicating perception which

says, “If

doomed

such placement

....

experience

gem

is

ever had raw,

i.e.,

is

free of categorical

serene, locked in silence of private experience”
(p.

He compares perception with understanding

natural language, which also has

a conceptual basis.
Like Bruner, Schank (1972) thinks that our understanding of natural language

is

conceptually driven. Schank (1957) criticizes Chomsky’s transformational generative

grammar

(p.

65) which

is

give any serious theory of

analysis of a sentence
it

may

is

syntax based; the

human

latter,

Schank contends, does not

understanding. According to Schank, syntactical

sufficient for

programs which use natural language, although

not even be necessary. But, as he observes, the only function of syntax

be a pointer to semantic information rather than as a

first

is

step to semantic analysis.

Schank says,
....

That is, I claim that there
which linguistic structures
a given language map during the understanding process and out of which
the basis of natural language

exists a conceptual base that
in

is

is

conceptual.

interlingual, onto

such structures are created during generation...
possible for

immersed

in

humans
it

for a sufficient

The simple

fact that

it

is

any given natural language if they are
amount of time and to be able to translate

to understand

to
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from that language to whatever other natural
language with which they are
would indicate that such conceptual base has

well acquinted,

psychological
pass freely from one to another,
sometimes even being overtly unaware of what language
they are speaking at
a given instant. What they are doing is evoking
a package of mapping rules
for a given language from a conceptual
base. The conceptual base has in it the
content of the thought that is being expressed.
The conceptual content is then
reality.

mapped

People fluent in

many languages can

into linguistic units via realization rules

humans

certainly do

not regularly engage in the process of understanding
isolated sentences. They
understand sentences with respect to the linguistic and
situational contexts
in which they are uttered and any theory
of natural language understanding
must account for this too (p. 554-555).

Some experiments
top-down.

try to

show

that our information processing

These experiments take word recognition or the

a prototype of information processing.
in his article (1970) entitled,
in Science.

of a

The

phoneme

is

essentially

linguistic context as

Take an experiment reported by Warren

“Perceptual Restoration of Missing Speech Sounds”

intention of the experiment was to see whether the replacement

in a recorded sentence

two separate experiments. In the

first

by a cough could be perceived.

There were

experiment twenty undergraduate psychology

students were given a sentence with one-hundred and twenty seconds missing from

The

the original sentence.

met with

“The

their respective legislatures concerning their capital city.”

(the first use of

cough

original sentence ran as follows:

lature.

‘s’)

in

“legislature”

was replaced by a cough as

state governer

The

letter

follows:

‘s’

legi

Together with a portion of adjecent phonemes which might provide

transitional cues to the missing sound. After the students used the tape, they were

presented with a version of typewritten sentence which was an exact presentation
of

what they had heard and asked

to circle a missing

phoneme. Nineteen of them

did not see anything missing, but one saw a phoneme missing beyond the word
legislature.

In a second experiment, twenty subjects were presented with a tape

of the second sentence but

now

the cough

was replaced by a 1600hz tone

(intensity

equal to the peak intensity of the cough). Here too none of the subjects could identify

56
the position of the tone correctly.
the legislature

and most of them placed

restoration are linked to language

The experiments

sound.

Eight subjects identified the missing

skills,

it

earlier.

beyond

‘s’

As Warren remarks, “Phonemic

which enable the

involving the deletion of the

listener to replace correct

first

in ‘legislature’ did

‘s’

not permit the listener familiar with English any
choice (that

no other sound

is,

could produce and English word). But, Sherman
(3) found that when a short cough

was followed immediately by the sounds corresponding

to

‘ite’,

fragment could have been derived from several words, such
as
used other words

listener

392).

Warren

says,

in the sentence to

“The

so that the

‘kite’

or

‘bite’,

the

determine the phonetic restoration”

(p.

ability to understand speech with

masked phoneme

not surprizing: the redundancy of language can account readily for

our lack of awareness of the restorative processes

— our

this.

may

mechanisms underlying verbal organization”
belief/ expectations are fed
is

in’

meant here

is

However,

—

reflects

help us understand the perceptual

(p.

393).

What

this

shows

is

that our

back into our sensory inputs. As Fodor remarked, what

that information about high-level redundancies

the sensory input that

is

is ‘fed

back’ to

retinal disease that causes a person to miss a part of his visual field.

show that subjects having scomotae supply whatever
This experiment also supports the thesis that higher

cited to

S and
“I

P.

would

The experiment

show how

P

two words

is

information

a

Experiments

missing in their visual

level

is

is

field.

“fed back”

called the High Cloze procedures might also be

one’s expectation affects one’s lexical context.

utters a fragment of sentence token

like

‘fill

absent.

Another example worth considering here involves a case of scomota, which

into lower level.

is

illusory perception of the

speaker’s utterance rather than the stimulus actually reaching our ears
characteristics of speech perception which

word

and S has to complete

a simple breakfast of bread and

(a) butter or (b) chocolate.

S chooses

Take two people

”.

(a)

S can

which

is

fill

it.

P

says,

in either of the

the high-cloze or the
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most favorable

choice. In this case ‘most favorable’

means

‘one that

probably choose’. This shows that P’s expectations played
a role

P

would most

in P’s filling

up

the

blank.

contend, contrary to the above, that information
processing

I

up and that sensory inputs are
Before presenting

my

view,

to distinguish conceptual penetration (the

which our conceptual knowledge

in

affects

our sensory inputs) from

information processing within the module and
(1983) observes, the
the subject

phoneme

knows about

top-down information flow
knowledge”
is

is

essentially bottom-

at first cognitively or conceptually impenetrable.

want

I

is

restoration as described by

speech perception

Warren shows only

(p.

77).

illustrates

the hearer’s knowledge of the words in his language; such knowledge

as cognitive penetrability.

specified at

it

that

Here the only “background

a top-down flow of cognition within the language of module.

same

top-down

contextual facilitation. As Fodor

(2)

the lexical inventory of his language and
in

(1)

way

any of the

The

latter involves access to

levels of representations that the

This

is

not the

information that

not

is

language system computes;

these involve probable beliefs and intentions of his interlocuter. Fodor remarks,

Counterexamples to encapsulation must exhibit the

sensitivity of the parser to

information that

is not specified internal to the language recognition module
and constraints on syntactic well-formedness are paradigms of information

that does not satisfy this condition.

The issue is currently a topic of intensexperimental and theoretical inquiry; but as things stand I know of no
convincing evidence that syntactic parsing is ever guided by the subject’s
ive

appreciation of semantic content or of
is

not surprizing: there are, in general, so

saying the same thing that even
of

what

is

about to be

ability to predict its

We
An

‘real

if

world’ background. Perhaps this

many

(p.

ways

of

context allowed you to estimate the content

said, that information

form

syntactically different

would not much increase your

78).

have to distinguish between cognitive penetration and contextual

facilitation.

experiment described by Swinney (1979) shows that a very strong semantic

context apparently does not direct lexical access. In this particular experiment there

were sentences having

lexical ambiguity.

The contexts

act to determine sentential
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interpretations and not any higher-order cognitive
processes. These biasing contexts

usually aid in the final selection of a single
relevant reading for an ambiguous

word.

Usually two theories have been put forward to
explain how and when such

contexts aid in the final selection of a single relevant
reading for an ambiguous word.

These two theories are Prior Decision Theory (PRT)
and Post Decision Theory
(PST). According to PRT, prior contextual information
can act to direct
access so that only a single relevant reading

is

ever accessed for an ambiguity; such

lexical access is in general a contextually non-restricted,

According to PST, prior context has
an ambiguity.

for

Lexical access

autonomous process
of

all

in

is

its effect

lexical

only after

non-independent process.
all

information

is

accessed

thought to be an independent and relatively

which a context has

its effect

only following complete access

the information about a word.

The

subjects of Swinney’s experiment were eighty-four undergraduates from Tufts

University

who were

to be tested as part of their course requirement.

They were

given

four auditory tapes containing thirty-six sets of sentences (two of which occurred
sequentially) each occurring according to the permutation and combination of the
factors of ambiguity
either

and contextual

bias.

The

variable in ambiguity

was introduced

by introducing an ambiguous word or an unambiguous control word.

In

case of context, there were either disambiguous contexts or prior strongly predictive

disambiguous contexts. Each tape contained variations of the thirty-six pairs so that
the chosen variations were equally represented on each tape. All tapes also included

some

filler

sentences which are randomly intercepted in the actual test sentences.

The subject were

visually presented with three words. Table 4.1 depicts the

presentation went

7

way

the

.

Strings of letters appeared on the screen and, on the basis of these visual images,

students were supposed to decide, as fast as they could, whether or not these are

7

I

have adapted these tables Swinney

[1979].
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Table 4.1

Schematized Sample of Experimental Materials

—

Ambiguity condition
Context condition

Ambiguous

Rumor had

it

Unambiguous

that, for years, the

government building had been
plagued with problems.
The

No Context

man was

not

surprized

when

he found several bugs** in the
corner of his room.

Biasing context

it

that, for years, the

government building had been
plagued with problems.
The

man was

not surprized when he

found several insects**

in

government building had been
plagued with problems.
The

man was

man was

not surprized when he

and other bugs**
of his room.

isual

words

Displayed at “**”

words or non-words. Together with

roaches,

in the corner

Rumor had

it

that, for years, the

not surprized when he

found several spiders, roaches,
and other insects** in the corner
of his room.

ANT

(contextually related)

SPY

(contextually inappropriate)

SEW

(unrelated)

this visual image, the subjects listened to the

sentences on the tape, although there was no connection between the two.

At the

end of the experiment the students were given a sheet of paper containing twenty-one
sentence pairs.

They were asked

to the ones they

When

the

corner of his room.

Rumor had it that, for years, the
government building had been
plagued with problems.
The
found several spiders,

V

Rumor had

to identify whether these sentences were identical

had heard and whether or not there were any that were

left out.

the experiment ended the students were asked the following questions:

•

Were

•

Did any of the words that appeared on

there any ambiguities in the sentences played on the tape?

sentences they had heard?

the screen relate in

any way to the
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Mean Reaction Times, In Milliseconds For
x Context x Visual Word Interaction: Experiment
1

Table 4.2

Conditions of The Ambiguity

Visually presented words

Ambiguity

Context

Contextually

Contextually

condition

condition

related

inappropriate

Ambiguity

Biasing context

890

910

960

916

925

974

887

958

963

914

967

972

No
Unambiguous

Biasing context

No

In Table 4.2
find that

we

context

context

get the result of the experiment.

both readings of “bug”

By

Unrelated

analyzing the result we

(insects, spy) are facilitated (as contrasted with the

case of unambiguous words) in conditions having lexical ambiguity
and no biasing

context as well as those having a strongly semantic biasing context.
Swinney says,
Lexical decisions for words related to both the contextually inappropriate
meanings
of the ambiguity appear to be facilitated

The

effects of

compared

to decisions for unrelated words.

both of the unambiguous conditions also appear quite straightforward:

lexical decisions for the ‘related’

other two words are not.

word appear

to be facilitated, but those for the

Thus, by inspection, the result appears to support the

Postdecision Hypothesis; even a very strong semantic context apparently does not
direct lexical access. Statistical analysis supports this contention” (p. 651).

Fischler and

Bloom

not play a great part in
the

minimum

in

(1980) conducted experiments to show that expectations do
all

cases of information processing. Such expectations were

some cases and were reduced

was increased. One such sentence was
likely

word

identify.

but

all

(or “high-cloze”

Words

like

word)

“I will

for the

further

walk

when background knowledge

my dog

”.

The most

blank was “tomorrow”, which few could

“bread” and “butter”, we can conclude, are expectation driven,

words are not. As Fodor

says,

“Some processes which eventuate

identification are, doubtless, cognitively penetrated.

But

this

is

in perceptual

compatible with the
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informational encapsulation of the input systems
themselves.

siasm for context-driven perceptual models

on

may

Some

traditional enthu-

have been prompted by confusion

this point” (p. 76).

Experiments independently conducted

also

show that information processing

is

not top-down. In the case of perceptual illusion
in phoneme restoration, the subject
has explicit knowledge that what he

experiences an actual object.

is

experiencing

is

Suppose S has measured

A

length. 'W hen presented with

A

knows that the vision
moreover, that
eyeballs are

I

is

and B and have found them to be of

identical

and B, however, S experiences

A

as longer than B.

role in S”s experience.

Further, suppose

shifting although he sees the picture as static.

knowingly push

moving

latter

knowledge

says,

“When you

is

is

explicit,

my

left;

moving. This knowledge

is

side.

He

Suppose,

then the knowledge that

my

although the image remains the same; this shows that

move your

possessed of the information that

But

eyeballs to the

not available to the sensory input

voluntarily

affect

identical

looking at a portrait straight and then moves his head from side
to

is

on.

A

he

and B which are

So here prior knowledge did not play any

S

nonetheless,

This shows that prior knowledge does not

experience. Further, take the case of Muller-Lyre
arrows
in length.

illusory;

it’s

—

it is

encapsulated. Fodor

eyeballs with your finger, you certainly are

your eye (and not the visual scene) that

absolutely explicit;

this explicit information, available to

if I

you

is

ask you, you can say what’s going
for (e.g.) report,

is

not available

to the analyzer in charge of the perceptual integration of your retinal stimulations.

That system has access

to corollary discharges

from the motor center and

information that you possess. Modularity with a vengence.”
It

(sic) (p.

to

no other

67).

often happens that people hear sentences which they do not expect to hear

and recognize them.
well in the other

Suppose S says to

room”

.

P

P, “There

is

a dragon drinking from the

immediately understands the words, although he never

expected to understand them as they are unanticipated stimulus and has no

tint of
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our usual "high-level” beliefs and expectations.
As Fodor (1983) says, “Feedback

is

effective only to the extent that, prior
to the analysis of the stimulus, the
perceiver

knows quite a
of perception

world

is

lot

about what the stimulus
surely, that

is,

some way

lets

it

is

us find out

we do not expect

that

going to be

it

how

like.

the world

The

to be.

Whereas, the point
even when the

is

teleology of perceptual

capacities presupposes a considerably-less-then-omniscient-organism;
they would be

no use to God.

you already know how things

The perceptual

are ?

elsewhere)
is

If

(sic) is

are,

why

compute a representation
That

is

hence,

have shown here

we can conclude

ginning.

Of

course,

is

and

of the stimulus

(b) the input analyzers

from the information that

to say that the perception of novelty depends

bottom-to-top perceptual mechanisms”
I

things

possible only to the extent that (a) the output of the
transducers

the transducers supply.

What

how

analysis of unanticipated stimulus layout (in language
and

insensitive to the belief/expectations of the organism;

are adequate to

look to see

on

(p. 68).

that experiential inputs are cognitively impenetrable;

that concepts do not affect experiences from the very be-

we know

that in the case of learning this impenetrability has to

be reconciled with his background knowledge and learning (cognitive penetrability).

However, as Fodor says, “To demonstrate that sort of interaction between input
analysis and background knowledge

is

not, in itself,

tantamount to demonstrating

the cognitive penetrability of the former” (p. 74).

At

this point

we have

and the following two

to consider the relationships between encapsulated inputs

things:

(1)

faculty psychology, (2) reflexes.

According to

traditional faculty psychology, our faculties (faculties of willing, emotion, and intellect) are

completely separate and marked

off

from each other. Gall (1758-1828) was

an advocate of faculty psychology. Gall thought that each faculty

and walled

and

off

different

from one another.

Thus, judging music

is

in us

is

vertical

completely autonomous

from judging a mathematical proposition. By arguing

for

encapsulated
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inputs

my aim

is

not to produce autonomy in Gall’s sense;

merely want to show

I

that Schank’s and Bruner’s theories, that
our beliefs and conceptual knowledge affect

our experience from the very
Inputs are somewhat

m my

llvm § room but

start, are

like reflexes.

I

see

I

know

that

it

anyway and, owing

it

without thinking that perhaps

not correct.

it is

is

impossible to see a tiger

to reflex action,

a hoax to scare me. Here

my

run away

I

reflex action did

not exploit information and background knowledge
about whether or not

it is

a hoax.

In this way, reflexes are like sensory inputs:
they are both encapsulated. There

is,

however, as Pylyshyn says, one fundamental difference
between the two: Inputs have
a functional architecture which can be addressed
at a priviledged algorithmic level
of analysis. In this sense, they are computationally
elaborate in contrast to reflexes

which aie computationally simple when the stimulus

is

directly connected to the

response. Fodor says, “The typical function of the computationally
elaborated input

system
I

As

I

is

to perform encapsulation” (p. 83 ).

conclude this section with some reflections on how

On

having an X-type input, S reacts quickly to connect

the appropriate concept in long-term
is

interacts with inputs.

say later that there are two types of memories, long-term and short-term or

occurrent memory.

X

memory

stored.

As

memory where

S

the input interacts with the appropriate concept,

concept of

recognizes an X.

to escape

the

fire

having been

S has a

and he knows the

somehow.

memory

If

is.

fire

As Fodor

fire as fire.

experience

'

X

or,

as

I

said

He may use

it

to consider that he has

says, the speed of access will be slower the larger

worshippers, that

fire

fire

such as the beliefs that Persians

was symbolized by the Persians as a deity of

strength, etc, none of which are useful here, are accessible.
is

Ss

(fire)-type input, the input reacts with his

Everything he has heard about

insensitive to size, which

with

the conceptual knowledge of

undergoes a phenomenal change and S has the experience of an
before,

it

good

in this case.

memory

is

useful for

S

Short-term

The only thing which

is
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is

his ability to

judge a

have to get out of the building,

4.2.1

Some

reflections

In this subsection

I

the latter thesis, there

and

as fire

fire

Extreme Perceptual Thesis. According

to

nothing more in an experiential state than

Extreme Perceptual Theorists

,

representa-

its

as

show

I

here,

wrong.
First of

or

(I

on the Adequacy Thesis

briefly criticize the
is

it

etc).

tional content. This contention of the
is

his subsequent reasoning pertaining
to

suppose there are two trees T-l and T-2

all,

two hundred yards apart. Both trees are represented

of equal physical size;

S may

the other. This feature

is

Second, suppose that S
represent in

visual field a hundred

in S' s experience as

sense one as occupying more of his visual

not part of the representational content of

is

ST experience

than the other.

ST

in

in a

room whose

as being of the

This difference

is

ST

color; yet

than

field

experience.

walls are covered by blue paper.

same

being

S sees one shade

They

as darker

not part of the representational content of

Ss

experiential state.

There are also cases where the representational content changes, while some
other features of an experiential state remain the same, as, for example,

from monocular

vision changes

furniture in
first

it,

to binocular.

viewing the room

first

Suppose S

is

seeing a

when our

room with some

with both eyes and then with one eye.

His

experience (monocular vision) will represent some furnitures as being in front

of others; not so in the second one (binocular vision).

So there

is

a change in

representational content as he shifts from monocular to binocular vision.
these cases, however, there

is

in its representational content.

the

ABCD

side

being nearer than when the

In both

a sense in S that the scene has remained the same. This

sameness, according to Peacocke,

EFGH. When

Ss

is

a feature of

Ss experience which

is

not included

Another case involves a cube with sides
is

facing us, the experience

EFGH side

is

is

ABCD

and

represented as the cube

facing us; nonetheless, Wittgenstein (1958)
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says,

we do not

see any change

experiencing the cube. This

is

-

it is

not part of our representational content
of

also true of auditory experiences.

Suppose 5 hears the

engines of two motors running. Both experiences
are represented to him as being of

same magnitude; nonetheless,

there

is

a sense in which one appears to

S to be

than the other. These examples show that
the Extreme Perceptual Theorists
correct

— there

is

To summarize,
belief states,

element.

more

nearer
is

not

to experience than its representational
or semantic content.

experiential states, like belief states, are mental
states.

Unlike

however, experiential states do not necessarily
possess a cognitive

One can have an X-type

has the concept of an

X

,

experience without experiencing

it

as

an X.

If

one

then one’s conceptual capacity interacts with the
X-type

input and one has an experience of an X. This has
important bearing on the thesis
that

we can

trace inference-like connections between experiential and
belief states.

consider this thesis in the next chapter.

I

CHAPTER

5

Quasi-Inferences: The Objections of

Davidson and Quine

My

primary aim

in this

chapter

in certain causal transitions

as

I

argued

in chapter 1, is

such connection
Similarly, as
states,

is

we can

show

to

that

we can

trace inference-like patterns

between experience types and

belief-states.

a special kind of causal connection

among

here, in the case of transitions

belief states;

from experience types

states.

to belief

trace causal connections which are guided by appropriate
usage of

concepts, thus instantiating inferential patterns.

process of inferential transition; hence,
inference. Neither

I

am

I

contend that the rules regulate the

advocating here a regulative theory of

Quine (1975) nor Davidson (1986) agrees with the

thesis that

can trace quasi-inf erential connection between our experiences and our
I

Inference,

guided by proper usage of concepts involved within these

show

I

is

we

belief states.

discuss their views in the course of this chapter. In the concluding section

I

talk

of a rapproachment between philosophy and psychology in the context of concept
acquisition.

5.1

Rules as Evaluative and the Objections of Quine and Davidson

In chapter

example,

5" s

1

I

argued that belief states causally sustain other belief

mental state of believing that something looks

like

states.

an apple (B-l)

causally produces his mental state of believing an apple to be there (B-2).
belief states are causally efficacious.

states that they

As Marshall Swain (1978) says about

“Can be caused and be causes

of other states”

.

For

Thus
belief

Swain also contends
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that,

“The members of a

causally efficacious”
state

B-2

set of reasons, R,

belief is

based are also

Moreover, the causal transition from
states B-l to

27).

(p.

upon which a

instantiates an inference pattern because

concept of apple. One uses this rule properly
only

it

if

guided by the rule

is

for the

one can identify an apple as an

apple (as opposed to an orange). The
standard of “proper usage” for rules of
this

kind
5-7,

is

is

natural language usage. In the above
inferential transition, the basis
the causal reason for the derived belief,
B-2. In

transition

among

all

cases of such inferential

belief states other beliefs states are implicated.

additional facts about the concepts. These
additional beliefs, as
constitutes the evidential reason for the derived
belief state.

additional belief

is

These

beliefs assert

show

in chapter 5,

I

In the above case one

that there are no countervailing factors to there
being an apple in

My

the environment.

thesis

When

is:

causal transitions

among

belief states follow

the rules of concept-usage involved within these
states, an inferential pattern

these states

is

among

instantiated. In such transitions other beliefs are also
implicated.

Rules of concept-usage, as

I

conceive of them, involve general descriptions 1 of

the situation under which a particular concept

we can

belief.

say, rules are

norms according

to which

may

or

may

not be used.

Thus,

we are permitted under appropriate
,

situations, to use a certain concept. Causal transitions

inference patterns

when

causal transitions

among

belief states to see

whether or not

if

is

belief states instantiate

rules permit such transition. Thus, rules put constraints on
belief states.
it

We

can evaluate a causal transition among

has instantiated an inferential pattern by judging

the transition has followed the appropriate rules.

derived state

among

In all cases of inference the

well-grounded on the basis state which sustains

The question

is,

“How do

these rules function?”

One can

it.

reply that the rules

prohibit processes that are inappropriate for inferential transitions; one such process
is

wishful thinking. Thus,

'It

we can formulate

the following rule:

transition processes

should be noted that there are more to rules than just being descriptions.
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which are produced by wishful thinking are
not inferential processes (R
Suppose
x ).
S’

wishes to eat an apple

apple

is

(W aa

and

)

on the table (B aa ). The

wishful thinking.

The above

an inferential process as
similar to

it

latter belief state in

transition from

violates

Goldman’s (1986)

R

x

R

.

x

W

sa

to

S

is

a result of a process of

B sa cannot

I

According to the

rules, as

I

regulative

inferential transitions.
is

latter theory, rules

the sort of basis state that appropriately causes
a derived state;

so, the rules regulate particular inferential
transitions.
it, is

is

contend, however, that these rules put

by doing

see

be considered as

evaluates the process of transition and

reliability theory.

merely evaluate the process of transition.

some constraints on

wish produces his belief state that an

this

Thus

the function of

they regulate the causal process which instantiate

Thus a derived

caused by an appropriate belief

belief state

is

well-grounded

if,

and only

if,

it

state.

Certain misunderstandings about the regulative function of
rules have to be
clarified.

Goldman

(1986) says that rules regulate inferential transitions

subject consciously adopts and follows them.

He

says,

“A

regulative system of

formulates rules to be consciously adopted and followed

system of evaluation, by contrast, formulates rules
trait, or

A

for appraising a

the

norms

nonregulative

performance or

assigning a normative status, but without providing instructions for the

agent to follow, or apply.

judging”

when

(p. 25).

This

is

They

not

my

are only principles for an appraiser to utilize in
view.

As

pointed out in chapter

I

2,

these rules are

not explicitly written propositions that we can consciously adopt and follow; they
are internalized

commands which we apply under

appropriate conditions. They put

constraints on the transition process between the basis and derived belief states and

hence regulate the transition process; nonetheless, even without these constraints,
these belief states, as physical states, would follow one another causally but would

not instantiate an inferential pattern.
quasi-inferential pattern between

It is

also possible, as

&s X-type

I

show

later, to trace

a

experience and his state of believing an
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X to

be there; such quasi-inferential patterns
are regulated by the rule of X-usage.

In such quasi-inferential patterns
other beliefs are implicated.

Not

philosophers agree with the view that we can
trace inferential patterns

all

between one’s X-type experience and one’s

what we

identifies,

X-type
is

310)

(p.

between

2
.

call,

an

something red.

According to Davidson,

It is

Davidson (1986)

X-type experience with &s believing that he has
an

S'N

STs believing there

belief state regarding X.

is

in all

such cases the inferential transition

a red-type experience to his believing that
there

is

a transition from one belief state to another and
not a transition

from an experience type to a

belief state.

Davidson (1986) says that

S, for

example,

has a (green flashing)-type experience and the latter
causally sustains his believing,

m
is

the absence of countervailing conditions, a green
flashing light to be there.
likely that

P

flashing.

say

it

if

S has a green

flashing type experience then there

is

It

a green light

can say of S that he has inferred one from the other; S himself
cannot

unless he believes that he has green flashing type experience. In
other words,

S cannot

derive his belief that a green flashing type experience

green flashing type experience.
relation

is

there from a

So one can conclude, following Davidson, that the

between experience- types and

inferential connection between them.

belief states

Hence a

is

merely causal; there can be no

belief-state

cannot be well-grounded

on the appropriate experience type.
People

who adhere

to Quine’s theory of language acquisition

would

that the transition from, say, an X-type experience to believing an
instantiates only a causal law

and not an

inferential pattern.

X

also say

to be there

According to Quinians,

experiential statements (or to use a Quinian vocabulary ‘observation sentences’) are

occasion statements whose truth value depends on the circumstances of the speaker’s
utterance.

Quine says that the truth of the observation sentence “it

uttered by

S depends on

2

,

Davidson talks about a

the circumstances of the utterance.

belief; I

have substituted

is

raining”,

For example,

‘belief state’ for beliefs.

“it is
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raining”

,

uttered by 5,

is

a true sentence only

if it is

really raining;

it is

false if

it is

not raining.

Quine (1973)

An

says,

observation sentence, then,

an occasion sentence whose occasion is
this is still not enough.
After all the
sentence ‘There goes John’s old tutor’ meets
these requirement; it is an
ocassion sentence, and all present witnesses can
see the old tutor plodding by.
But the sentence fails of a third requirement: the
witnesses must in general
be able to appreciate that the observation which
they are sharing is one that
verifies the sentence. They must have
been in a position, equally with the
speaker, to have assented to the sentence on their
own in the
intersubjectively observable.

is

But

circumstances.
are in that position in the case of ‘This is red’
and ‘It is raining’ and
There goes an old man’, but not in the case of ‘There goes
John’s old tutor’.

They

Such, then,

ocassion

is

is an observation sentence:
it is an occasion sentence whose
not only intersubjectively observable but is generally
adequate,

moreover, to elicit assent to the sentence from any present witness
conservant
with the language. It is not a report of private sense data;
typically, rather,

it

contains references to physical objects,

(p.

88.)

Thus, for Quine an observation sentence results from a verbal
dispositions to
assent or dissent under suitable stimulus.

As Quine

condition of the sentence “This

is

linguistically in a certain way.

Quine (1973)

red”

is

says,

a disposition;
says, “In

it is

knowledge of the truth
a disposition to behave

what behavioral disposition

then does a man’s knowledge of the truth condition of the sentence ‘This

is

red’

consist? Not, certainly, in a disposition to affirm the sentence on every occasion of

observing a red object, and to deny
assent or dissent
or query

when asked

and dissent

—

it

in the

here

is

on

all

other occasions;

it is

the disposition to

presence or absence of red. Query and assent,

the solvent that reduces understanding to verbal

dispositions (p. 88).

Thus, Quine would say that
to

S

to be an

experience

only

if

is

there

is

A”

is

5° s

5” s

experience which one can describe as

“its

verbal disposition to behave in a certain way.

P’s verbal disposition to assent to P’s query, for

an X. Experiencing an

seeming
Such an

example, about

X is not a conscious occurence;

it is

X

a stimulus
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at 5*s nerve ending.

occurrences, there
individual

Between sensory inputs and our

S cannot

S cannot

To show
and

assert that his experiencing an

X to

5° s belief states

is

X is

there

belief state in question has

class of belief states with

us consider a few examples to

(2)
it.

Ss

experience types

show that the

To show

(1)

in

well-grounded.

is

able to do the following two things:

well-grounded on the experience type which caused

The

the appropriate experience

inferential connection between, say,

we must be

An

be there can be inferred. In other words,

such connection with the help of some rules and

state.

X is

assert that his belief state that an

that there

show that the

which are conscious

only complex causal relation and no inferential
connections.

is

type from which his believing an
this case

belief states,

and

(1)

evaluate

belief state

is

we need

to

(2)

been caused by an appropriate experiential

which we are concerned here are empirical. Let

show that

in evaluating a causal transition

between

an experiential state and a belief state we take into account the
appropriateness of
the experiential state.

as he has passed

it

Suppose S

many

passing a highway (which

is

is

quite familiar to

times) in his car on a foggy day and his friend

beside him. Looking at the distance,

S has an

exit-100-type experience and

experiential state he might express by the words “its seeming to
is

there.”

Now,

The above

in order to

experiential state causes

show that there

is

Ss
'

me

is

is

S

sitting
in the

that exit- 100

belief state that exit 100 is there.

an inferential connection between Ss A-tvpe

experience and his believing exit 100 to be there we need to be able to evaluate this
transition in the light of the rule of the relevant concept (the concept of exit 100).
In other words,

and that the

One can

we should be

belief-state

is

able to

well

show that

grounded on

the experience type

appropriate

it.

evaluate the above transition and consider

a good inference;

is

it

unsuitable to be called

one can do so by showing that Ss perceptual mechanism

not reliable over a long distance.

The argument

here

is

is

that the causal processes

(instantiating an inference pattern) which produce a belief state have done so by
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unreliable means. This kind of evaluation
of the causal process, however,
as Millar

observes, cannot account for the subsequent
evaluation that
transition (p. 109).

some important

he had passed exit 100.

if

really exit-100 that he

By

of this causal

S’s attention is distracted

5 now

had passed. The source of

begins to wonder whether

his

it

was

doubt here can be twofold:

(1)

considering the fog and the distance involved
he might doubt that he had seen

the exit, or (2)

by recollecting the visual experience he had when he
was looking

the exit he might doubt that he really perceived
exit 100.
that by replaying his previous experience he

see the exit number.

some
It

What

came

to realize that he did not clearly

exactly does he replay? In order to answer this question,

relevant and important point about replay theory has to
be introduced.

should be noted that the kind of replay theory that

theory, a visual

am

I

talking about here

image consists of a likening or copy of what one sees

The problem with
copy

of, say,

the copy theory

is

that

it

latter

does not make sense to talk of the

an acid smell. As Gilbert Ryle (1984) observes, we can make a visual
table;

however, not possible to reduce a smell or a taste or a tickle to a different

dimension

in imagination.

According to the replay theory

not reproduce a copy of the original but

Lycan (1986)

says, there will be times

for the real thing

“Cartesian”
fire

is

in perception.

copy of a table by reducing the three dimensional table to a two dimensional
is,

at

possible to conceive

It is

not the same as the Cartesian theory of copying or imagining.
According to the

it

by

international news on in his car radio. After
having passed the exit,

him

S”s friend asks

Suppose that on passing exit-100

S can make

,

may

when one

proposing, one does

really mistakes the reactivation

by confusing the causal sequences. For example, according

burning; according to the replay theory
I

am

simply reactivate an experience. As

the smell of burning that he recalls

the actual smell

I

had

earlier,

I

am

and not a copy of

is

the

image or copy of the actual

proposing, there

it.

Lycan

This theory holds that neither imagination nor memory
cing internal copies of reality but

is

to a

is

reactivation of

says,
is

involved in produ-

involved in producing a reactivation or
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replay of sorts of something that occurred
in ordinary perception. There
will
e times when one will mistake the
reactivation in imagination or perceptual
memory for the real thing; that is, one will confuse
the causal sequence
believing that, say, a smell of burning in
one’s imagination or

dream

by a real

is

caused

fire in

the house. According to a replay or
reactivation theory my
smelling a slipper burning by the fire in
imagination involves a replay or
part of replay of the experience of smelling
a real burning slipper in front

a real

ol

with one’s

own nose except the causal sequence is different
no burning slipper and no fire, and one
probablv does not
need to use one’s nose. Whatever are the brain
processes that are the end
product of receiving the signals through the olfactory
there

is

fire

in fact

nerve endings of the
nasal cavities from a burning slipper are the
basis of the experience of smelling
a burning slipper, in imagination or perceptual
memory they are reactivated
by some purely internal causal sequence. The
original experience left some
trace or residue, which are stored in some
form and is now reactivated to
produce a replay. The replay is not a copy of the original
experience; it is
having the original experience again, at least in its essentials
or else in a form
edited to suit one’s present purposes. A copy is often
just a simulacrum in
diffeient mateiials and in dimensions different from
the original. A replay
or reactivation, on the other hand, is the regeneration
of what went before,
albeit in edited or interpreted form at times (perhaps most
times). One does

not visually imagine or recall in two dimensions what one might
have seen or
has seen in three dimensions in perceptions. One imagines in
just the same
term as one sees” (p. 116).

Lycan describes the following experiment from Perky (1910)
relation

between imagining the image of the

Perky

experiment a group of subjects would

s

real thing
sit

and the

facing a wall

to

show

the intimate

real thing itself.

made

In

of ground glass

and would be asked to imagine tomatoes, oranges, and apples on the ground

glass.

Then, unknown to them, apples, oranges, and tomatoes would be projected on the

ground

glass.

The

subject’s were asked the shape, color, size, of each of these things.

They described those
clearly

mistook

real

images

for the

“images” of imagination, and so equally clearly

there are grounds for believing that there
(p.

118). Further,

Lycan concludes, “Perky’s subjects

of the ones projected.

is

Roger N. Shepard (1966)

an intimate relation between the two”

in

“Learning and Recall as Organization

and Search” describes the case of subjects who are asked
house.

The above

subject goes from one

room

to describe the

to another

rooms

in his

and thus makes a mental
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tour of the house as

he

if

visiting the real house.

is

Shepard and Metzler (1971)

describe what they call the “mental rotation”
of objects to show that what we recall
is

A

not a copy.

subject

asked to imagine a same object from different
sides and

is

angles they did this by mental rotation of the
same subject. Take the following chart

given by Alfred Binet (1969).

abed
e

f

i

m
Suppose S

is

do

so.

Thus,

if

to left instead of

way

like

first

saw and

n

o

from

is

p

he cannot do

it;

this,

it

is

“In visual

differently even

do so without making a

memory

tried to record the letter square. Visual

we have done

some

(at least in

can do

in visual

partial

way)

These experiments show that we can
images. Let us

now apply

When S

body

is

He

asked

lot of errors.

imagination are

memory and imagination

(sic) in

perception”

recall objects

this replay theory to the

(p.

when one

only what

119).

themselves and not their

above example of experiencing

replays his previous experience of passing exit 100, he did not

was an appropriate experience type

to his believing that there
It

he

at times)

memory and

reproduce a copy; he reproduced the original experience type
it

if

it.

or imagination, one does not form

one’s eyes (and head and perhaps whole

We

doubts that

asked to recall

asked, for example, to recall the table from right

to right, he cannot

left

the replay of perception.

exit 100.

1

a static picture; rather one reherses, reactivates, or replays the moves

made with

one

he learned

the subject

Lycan concludes from
anything

j

asked to memorize the chart and then he

recalls the table the

to

h

g

k

is

(exit

100 type).

Now

he

to produce an inferential transition

exit 100; hence, the belief state

cannot be well-grounded.

should be noted that here S does not take into account the appropriateness of a

former belief-state regarding exit 100; he takes into account the appropriateness of
the former experience type as causing a belief state. Further,

it is

not an experiential
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state with a content such as

of experience then

it

seeming to be exit-100. For

S would not have considered

corresponding belief

state.

What

yields 3

What

.

shows

this

is

was the

latter

type

inappropriate for producing the

it

he considers here

experience of a certain phenomenal type

if it

is

the conception he has of an

— the type which exit-100 on a clear day

that experiences of

phenomenal types are taken

into

account when evaluating whether or not a particular
transition has instantiated an
inferential process. 5”s believing exit 100 to be
there

may

be derived from his exit-100

type experience given the circumstances that there
are countervailing
In chapter 2
ability, it is

an

I

and only

if,

S

concept of an

said that, according to the operational theory, having
a concept

ability to identify

and distinguish

it

from

identifies

X

,

there.”

in the

its

an instance of a concept

is

a thing as an

X and

as follows: (1)

may

an

S,

who

X

if,

has learned the

order to have an experience of

fulfilled in

S must have an X-type experience and

(2)

seeming to S that an

“its

X is

take on the content that an

is

an appropriate situation

not a not-X. For

mental state which one can describe as

Experiences

in

complement. Thus, S has learned the concept of an

two condition needs to be

an X. The condition

must be

beliefs.

he

X is

there through the exercise

of the conceptual capacities in which the mastery of the relevant concept consists.

S may not have
of an

X or

the experience of an

X either

because S does not have the concept

because the content and the type of experience do not mesh together. In

the case of the exit

did not match.

example the content of

<S”s

experience and

In other words, the experience-type

concept of an exit to the present scene and he did
of the

wrong

is

this in

This

is

S

applied the

response to the experience

type. In other words, STs mastery of the concept of an exit was engaged

the fallibility of our capacities these different

3

phenomenal type

misapplied.

with an experience which was not an X-type experience.

content can

its

fail

to

mesh should come

Millar’s (1991) notion.

ways

in

As Millar

says,

“Given

which phenomenal type and

as no surprise” (p. 110).
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In order to clarify

my

point,

I

consider next another example from Millar.
This

case concerns nectarines and apples which
look almost alike;
visually distinguished

them

if

we look

error. First,

can, however,

Thus, 5 can have an apple-type

carefully.

experience as distinguished from a nectarine-type
experience.
to mistake a nectarine for

we

It is,

however, possible

an apple. Let us consider two different sources of
such an

one can look at a nectarine and have an apple type
experience because of

some perceptual

defect. This, as Millar says,

and not a problem with

a defect in S?s perceptual mechanism

is

his belief state. Second,

suppose S passes a

stall

where some

nectarines are kept and he glances at them and has
a nectarine type experience.

Later his friend asks him

if

there were red apples in the

stall.

As

S’

was distracted

as

he was talking to his friend, he did not attend in thought
to what he was seeing. So
he replayed his nectarine-type experience (which

the correct type of experience)

is

but applied the concept of apple and concluded that there were
apples

in the store.

Millar says, “Whereas in this case you do see properly what you are
looking
the

first

case you do not.

are there.

The experience

In both cases,
is

such that

it

you are too quick to believe that apples

seems that red apples are before you and,

there being no countervailing factors, so far as you know, that

But the experience

is

at, in

not of the type which

is

is

what you

believe.

apt for the proper engagement of the

relevant conceptual capacities” (p. 111).

From what we have

said above

it

is

clear that a belief state can be evaluated

as “well-grounded” or not depending on whether or not

appropriate experience-type.

When

a belief state

is

experience type an inferential pattern between them

was produced by

the

produced by the appropriate

is

4

Here I am concerned with concepts of observables only;
unobservables such as the concept of an X-ray.

it

I

instantiated

am

4
.

not considering concepts of
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Quasi Inference, Concepts, and Justification

5.2

In the last section

showed that we can evaluate a transition from an
experience-

I

type to a belief state as instantiating inference
pattern.
instantiates an inference pattern then, as

priate

and the

belief state

it.

Let us see

any inference-like patterns between experience types
and
has a red apple type experience then,

S

will

S

is

there”

is

there given

above example,

This

.

S

is,

also believes that there are

the following are not true: that this

we can

appro-

actually trace

belief states.

as, “its

Millar says, equivalent to

beliefs regarding the

if

is

Suppose S

has mastered the concept of a red apple,

be in the experiential state which one can describe

a red apple

apple

if

the transition process

said earlier, the experience type

I

well-grounded on

is

If

&s

seeming to S that

believing that a red

no countervailing

factors.

In the

absence of countervailing conditions assert that
not the time for apples to grow, this

is

a good place for apples, that there are some plastic apples lying
around,

etc.

is

not

These

additional beliefs are implicated in the transition from the experience-type
to the
belief state that

an apple

is

there.

Certain important features about beliefs regarding countervailing conditions have
to be addressed here.

These

beliefs,

I

contend, are part of one’s mastery of the

appropriate concept. In the case of the concept of apples, for example,

my

mastery of the

latter

world at certain times.

It

should be noted that these beliefs are not part of one’s

meaning of “apple” he learned
is

S learned

to identify an apple as an apple.

the primary

The more

familiar

and the countervailing factors regarding the concept.

To summarize what
,

as a child,

with a concept, in this case the concept of apples, the more one knows about

the additional

X

part of

concept that apples are found only in certain parts of the

primary acquisition of the concept of apples. When,

one

it is

I

have said above, S (the subject),

who

has the concept

on having an X-type experience reaches a conscious occurrence which one can

describe as

“its

seeming to S that an

X

is

there.”

This causes

in

him

the mental
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state of believing that

There

an

X

as Millar contends,

is,

there in the absence of countervailing
conditions.

is

a difference between having a positive
belief that

there are no countervailing conditions
and having an implicit belief that there are

no countervailing conditions,
seeming to S that an apple

is

^s

experiential state which one can describe as
“its

there”

may

cause

&s

belief state of

an apple being there

although he did not consider positively any countervailing
conditions.
question
It is

is,

“Are countervailing conditions insignificant

true that in

some cases we do not

If so,

for quasi-inferences?”

is

fact that

if

someone asked S (when

caused by his apple type experience)

conditions to there being apples,

No.

positively take countervailing conditions into

consideration; nonetheless, they are implicit in our
quasi-inference. This

from the

then the

if

S would

his state of believing

is

evident

an apple to there

he believes that there are countervailing

reply “no”. This shows that he implicitly

takes such beliefs into account in considering the quasi inference
although he never
explicitly considers them.

there being an X,

As Lycan (1971)

S must have have

says, in order to be in a belief state of

the proper input experience and also believe

that there are no countervailing conditions to there being an X. Hence,

we can

a transition between 5”s X-type experience and his belief state that an

X is

•

S has an Apple-type

•

S

is

(there are

•

S

is in

S

which

believes that the place

the belief state that an apple

is

is

there.

conducive for apples to be present
in the environment.)

there.

is

transition instantiates a quasi-inference as S’s mental state passes

from an experience type to a

belief state

is

Such inference

belief state.

the concept of apple in natural language.

and the

seems to him that an apple

it

no countervailing conditions to apples existing

The above

there:

visual experience.

in the experiential state in

In the latter state

trace

well-grounded on

is

guided by the usage of

The experience type

it.

is

an appropriate one
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5.2.1

Concepts as Dynamic

Psychology and Epistemological

entities:

Queries
In chapter 2

I

showed that having a concept

an

is

ability to apply properly rules of

concept usage under appropriate conditions.
Thus 5 has the concept of A" if, and only
if,

S knows an

X

as an

X when

theory of concept acquisition 5
he has an X-type input. Thus

he has an X-type input.

Here a subject,

.

I

call this the justification

5, is justified in identifying

when 5 has an apple-type input

an

X when

(the condition of there

being an apple obtains), his input interacts with the
rule of apple usage stored

memory and
the rule of

he has an experience of an X. This

X

usage in natural language.

As

I

is

possible because

S

in his

has acquired

said before, rules of concept usage

are not propositional; they are similar to the rules
of driving and swimming. Like
the latter, these rules of concept usage are internalized

as the situation arises.

As

I

show

form of propositions that are stored
are internalized and

in

may

be

first

learned in the

our long term memory; gradually these rules

we apply them without consciously thinking

the primary concept acquisition.
entities.

in chapter 5, rules

commands which we apply

Concepts

are,

of them.

I

call this

however, not a static but dynamic

Gradually S acquires more knowledge (propositional) regarding apples

that apples

grow

at a particular time

and

in

i,e,

a particular part of the world. These

propositions gradually become part of his rule of concept acquisition of apples and
are no longer mere propositional knowledge.

As S

internalizes these propositions,

they become part of his concept of apples.

When

a person’s concepts are enriched by propositional knowledge,

has undergone a process of secondary concept acquisition.
acquisition primary? Because

we can

justify

Why

5

This

is

a term

I

more

[1986].

call the original

same language. Thus

objectivity than the secondary.

borrowed from Pollock

I

say that he

an original concept usage as correct or

incorrect in the light of the standard use of the speakers of the
the primary learning has

do

I

It

may

at one time
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be part of STs rule of apple usage that they
grow only in a certain season;
however,

may

not be part of P’s concept usage.

a concept are

first

this rule,

Such secondary knowledge about

acquired as propositions and gradually they become
part of the

rule of apple usage in one’s vocabulary

and one applies them as the situation

arises.

There are innumerable rules of concept usage that can be
evoked when a proper
situation arises.

In case

have a

I

my

type input

fire

fire

experience interacts with

the natural language rules of fire usage, which are
stored in

and the result sustains
be

many

facts about

my

belief state that there

that

fire

is

worshippers. Now, the question
the

stored in
is,

knowledge that interacts with

escape

is

accessed.

Our

how much

my

fire

As

is fire.

memory

my
I

said before, there can

such as Persians having been

of this

is

accessed by

type input which

countervailing beliefs are

short term memory,

all

is

fire

memory? Only

necessary for

me

to

part of our secondary notion of

concept acquisition and hence develop as we become more and more familiar with
a
concept.
In concluding this chapter,

of concept acquisition.

I

I

would

have the concept of an apple

justified in recognizing or identifying

of apple usage.

like to discuss certain

The standard

or

an apple,

norm

i.e.,

if,

important aspects

and only

in properly

of proper usage

is,

as

I

if,

I

would be

applying the rule
said earlier, their

usage in ordinary natural language for the purpose of communication.

It

should be

noted at this point that the whole notion of concept acquisition that we have been
talking so far

must be

realistic

from a psychological point of view. In other words,

the whole notion of concept acquisition

(1975) contends that epistemology
believe that epistemology

our knowledge
science about

is

is

verifiable psychologically.

Quine

a chapter in psychology. Contrary to Quine,

I

a normative discipline concerned with the justification of

(beliefs, experiences).

human mind;

must be

Psychology, on the other hand,

hence, the two are distinct.

My

is

the natural

whole notion of concept

learning and belief formation rests on a rapproachment between these two disciplines.
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Thus,

I

contend that no true epistemological theory

solid findings of psychology.

is

successful without resting on

CHAPTER

6

Why We

Import Beliefs Into Our
Ontology and How we can Justify

Them

My

primary aim

in this

chapter

is

to discuss

why we need

tions (beliefs) into our ontology. Propositions (beliefs),
as

reasons

1

for the conclusion of a quasi-inference.

I

to introduce proposi-

show

here, are evidential

Further, in this chapter

I

consider

the nature and justification of these propositions (beliefs).

This chapter

is

divided into two main sections. In section

1 I

are represented and integrated into our cognitive framework. Also,

introducing propositions into

my

ontology. In section 2

I

show how objects
I

give reasons for

consider various theories for

justifying the general propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences from experience

types to belief states. Here

I

critically survey the following three theories:

Founda-

tionalism (with special reference to Chisholm), The Coherence Theory (concentrating

on the theories of K. Lehrer and

L.

Bon Jour), and

Millar’s theory of ‘normative

propositions.’

Language of Thought and Propositions

6.1

The following

is

a quasi-inference from STs apple-type experience to his believing

an apple to be there:

Tn

the course of this chapter

I

distinguish between causal and evidential reason.
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•

S has an Apple-type

•

S^

^

visual experience.

the experiential state in which

it

In the latter state S believes that the place

no countervailing conditions

are

S

•

is

in the state of believing

The above
lieving

Ss

there.

conducive for apples to be present (there

to apples existing in the

an apple to be

and

there,

ST s belief state

(

S

it

environment.)

there.

instantiates a quasi-inferential pattern; thus,

we

believing an apple to be there) in the light of his

experience type (apple-type experience).
say that

is

is

transition proceeds from an apple-type experience to a
state of be-

an apple to be

can evaluate

seems to him that an apple

If

our evaluation

belief state (an apple being there)

is

is

positive then

we can

well grounded on the appropriate

experience type.
I

have said in chapter

mental

state.

proposition;
I

it

A

1

that our state of believing something

is

a complex

mental state (such as a belief state) cannot be expressed

can only be expressed

in a

language of thought. Thought

contend, proceeds by a language of thought which

is

in a

in general,

non-propositional and which

represents objects non-propositionally in contrast to propositional representations.

Two

different theories have

been put forward regarding representation of objects;

they are as follows: (1) de dicto representation theory and (2) de re representation

theory 2
or

.

when

An
it

object
is

is

represented de dicto when

represented propositionally.

represent an object,

o,

represents an object,

it is

represented under a description,

Thus, some terms

may

be thought to

because they are associated with some description,
o.

J9,

that

But a description ultimately consists of terms, and

if

those terms could represent objects only because they are associated with further
descriptions that apply to the appropriate object,
regress of terms, each owing their reference to

2

I

have borrowed the terms de dicto and de

we would be faced with an

some preceding term

re representation

infinite

or terms.

from Pollock (1986).

For
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instance,

S may represent

Now

lives in the sea”.

the object whale under the description
“the

this description of a

description that applies to the objects,

and sea may be represented

whale

in the individual

further associated with the

is

mammals, and

mammal who

sea.

Objects

S by means

like

mammals

of other descriptions

involving other objects which in turn would be
associated with other descriptions,

and so on. Given that such a regress
terms must represent their objects

is

unacceptable,

directly

:

we should conclude

their representational function

depend on the representational function of some other terms. De
theory,

I

that

some

cannot

re representation

contend, can avoid the problem of infinite regress. According
to de re rep-

resentation theory, singular objects such as whales are represented
in an individual

S

non-propositionally.

To ‘know’

(non-propositionally) a singular object

is

to grasp

the conceptual role of the concept or term denoting that object in
natural language.

Grasping the conceptual
to use the concept.

such usage
a subject,
properly,

is

S,

i.e.,

The

permitted

role of a concept, as

concept of apple

is

To understand

said in chapter

correct usage of a concept
in natural

has a concept
identify

I

is

knowing how

judged according to whether

language and ordinary communication.

say, apple

of,

is

2,

if,

and only

if,

Thus,

he can use the concept

an apple (not an orange) as an apple; thus his usage of the

permissible in ordinary language.
the workings of our language of thought with

its

de re represent-

ation of objects, let us consider the functions of an artificially intelligent machine 3

S2 designed and created by
,

react to the external world.

sensation) he can react to
stage, however,

is

it.

5,

,

a scientist. S2 by using his sensors, can sense and

If

,

S2 has an X-type input (such

This

that he does not

is

version one of S2.

know

as a burning type

The problem with S2

at this

that he has a certain type of experience.

To

have the latter kind of knowledge, S2 must have another sensor which senses that he

3

1 have adapted the concept of an
machine called Oscar (1986).

intelligent

machine from Pollock. He talks of an

intelligent
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has X-type inputs; we can

call these sensors

“second order sensors”

.

Accordingly,

constructs a second version of S2, S2 with second
order sensors. S2a
a
,

knowing an
S2:

[t

X as

X when

an

he has X-type inputs.

can identify an apple when

some shortcomings:

know

(it is

is

capable of

is

more sophisticated than

has an apple-type input. Nonetheless, S2 has

it

does not have the sophistication to distinguish between,

it

a plastic apple and a real apple

however,

S2a

4

S2a can

.

S

identify

say,

an apple as an apple; he cannot,

not part of his concept of apple) where they grow and
what

part of the year they are produced; hence, he sometimes
mistakes a fake apple for a
real one.

Concepts, as

I

said earlier, are

dynamic and not

static entities.

Learning

a concept partially involves knowing the secondary factors
which include,
other things, certain additional and countervailing beliefs.
additional beliefs (that such a place

or

is

is

among

S2a does not have

these

not conducive to there being apples) and

therefore he identifies a plastic apple as a real apple.

S now constructs S2ai with

these

additional beliefs and also with beliefs regarding the absence of countervailing factors
as part of his concept of apples.

than that of S2a and there

is

a

S2 ai
less

’s

concept of an apple

more sophisticated

is

chance of S2ai identifying a fake apple as an

apple.

Our language

of thought, like the language of thought belonging to

by manipulating singular terms

in

S2ai works
,

conformity with the rules of appropriate concept

usage; these rules and our dispositions to conform to them constitute the conceptual
roles of

terms

in

our language of thought 5

.

Proper usage of concepts means, as

pointed out earlier, proper application of the rules of concept-usage.

4

This

is

a real one.

similar to the example
I

I

cited in chapter 2

where a child

identifies

A

rule

is

I

used

a plastic whale as

pointed out that in the process of learning about the concept of whale there are

various dimensions that the child has yet to grasp; hence, at this stage

it

is

possible for

him

to

make mistakes.
5

It

should be noted at this point that

than that of S2s

.

Human

human thought

consciousness, as

I

showed

primarily recognition and adaptive capability.

or consciousness

is

much more complicated
Edelman (1992), is

in chapter three following

The analogy with S2a should not be taken too

far.
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properly

if,

and only

ordinary language.

and only
is

if,

he uses

if,

it

has fulfilled

S, for

t

its

proper

role:

example, uses a term

meaningful communication

according to a proper

t

according to standard t-usage

in natural

correct or incorrect in relation to a certain
standard

rule,

r,

in

if.

language. So r usage

— ordinary

language and

communication; hence, rules are goal-oriented. Rules
are integrated into our general
cognitive framework by

most singular objects

means

of de re representation of objects.

in non-descriptive ways.

So we think of

Sometimes we learn many concepts

under a description. Eventually, however, we forget the
description; we merely retain

and internalize the rules

for their usage. Inputs of experience types
interact with the

appropriate rule, stored in our

memory 6 and we
,

that an entity
I

is

might have

reach the mental state of believing

there. Pollock says,
first

come

to think of Christopher

Columbus under the descripThe man my teacher is talking about but I can no longer remember
what description I might have used and I may no longer remember
Christopher Columbus satisfies that description. Such forgetfulness does

tion like

1

,

just

that

not deprive

me

my

ability to think of Christopher Columbus. I have a
of thinking of Christopher Columbus. Such nondescriptive
of thinking of objects are parasitic on originally having of some other

nondescriptive

way
way

of

way

of thinking of objects (either perceptual or descriptive), but they are
from these other ways. I call these nondescriptive way of thinking
u
of objects de re representation”
From an information processing point
distinct

of view

we can think of de re representations as pigeon holes into which we
we acquire reasons to believe that the objects represented

stuff properties as

having those properties. Properties may drop out of pigeon holes if they are
not used occasionally (i.e., we forget). In order to establish a pigeon hole as
representing a particular object we must begin by thinking of the object in
some other way, and that initial way of thinking of objects will be the first
thing to be put into the pigeon hole. For example, we must begin by thinking
of the object under a description, from that we acquire de re representation
of the object, and then we might forget the original description and only be
able to think of the object under the de re representation (p. 157.)

Mental representation which

Why,
6

am

It

is

constituted by singular terms

is

non-propositional.

then, are propositions introduced into our ontology? Propositions,

should be noted here, as

following

is

I

pointed out in chapter

1,

that

memory, according

not a data bit storage phenomenon but a biological one.

I

contend,

to the theory

I
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are entities to which truth and falsity
can be assigned 7

Propositions,

.

I

show

here,

are introduced into our ontology in order
to assign truth and falsity to our thoughts

by assigning content to them. There are two ways
of thinking a thought: thinking by

means

of that thought and thinking about that thought.

of a thought

something
is

we may think about whatever

in the

world

about something that

falsity to a thought,

terms of

its

I

“content”

.

is

think by means

about; usually, this

is

a pig or a fence, say. Sometimes, however, our
thought

about another thought; such a thought

it is

the thought

When we

is

a second-order representation because

is

about something

must think about

As Pollock

it

else.

When

I

wish to ascribe truth or

a special way:

in

I

must think

of

it

in

observes,

We

can think of a proposition in different ways. For example, I might
think of a proposition under the contingent description ‘the first
proposition
entertained by Bertrand Russell on the morning of April
1921.’

But

3,

I

not ordinarily be able to ascribe truth or falsity to the proposition so
conceived unless I know what proposition it is. To know what proposition it
is is to be able to think of it in another way, “in
terms of its content” and
will

,

know

We

that the two propositions are the

same

assumed

until recently that there are only

inductive. In valid deductive reasoning
to a truth (conclusion)

Given that

all

mammals

can conclude that

all

are true but that

if

may

something.

entails the conclusion.

are carnivorous and

have long

It

has been

two kinds of reasonings, deductive and

life.

all

(or premises)

In other words,

the premises are true the conclusion

if

mammals

for thinking

we proceed from a given truth

and the premise

in valid deductive reasoning

It

166).

have to accept propositions because we engage in default reasoning which

sometimes requires us to reevaluate our reason

7

(p.

must be

carnivorous animals

The claim

here

is

true.

live long,

we

not that the premises

they are true then the conclusion cannot be false.

In contrast

be objected by someone that propositions are ontologically unacceptable. In the course
I do not want to enter into the discussion whether there are propositions because

of this dissertation
that

is

a topic for a different paper;

entities to

I

simply assume that there are propositions and that they are

which the properties of truth and

falsity

can be properly assigned.
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to this, in inductive reasoning

we draw a conclusion from

premises do not entail the conclusion.
is

In other words, in inductive reasoning

not necessary that the conclusions are true

if

the premises are true.

observing about 100 swans and finding that they are
that

all

the premises but the

all

black,

I

its

Thus on

inductively conclude

swans are black. Here the premise confirms the conclusion

but does not guarantee

it

to a certain degree

truth. In recent years workers in Artificial Intelligence 8

have discovered that reasoning proceeds neither by deduction
nor by induction but

by default or non-monotonic reasoning. According to default or
defeasible reasoning,
a set of propositions

is

provided as an evidence for certain things

refuted and a different evidence comes into

till

the evidence

is

Pollock says,

its place.

According to default reasoning, S the subject, must be able to recognize that
one of his thoughts is the reason for another. Thinking of thoughts in this way,
,

S must be

able to assign truth/falsity to thoughts.

S must

In other words,

be able to think in terms of propositions. But

I will not ordinarily be able
to ascribe truth or falsity to the proposition so conceived unless I know what

proposition
in

it is.

To know what proposition

another way, “in terms of

are the same. This
necessarily a

way

is

its

content”

,

it is, is

to be able to think of

to think of the proposition in a “direct” fashion that

of thinking of that particular proposition

defeasible reasoning

it

and know that the two propositions
is

In correct

we must also think about our thoughts, judging, for
we used in getting to a particular conclusion was

instance, that something

We

false.

we

do not need the concept of truth

are thinking that thought.

The

in order to affirm a

affirmation

thought while

part of the thinking. But in

is

order to affirm a thought while thinking about

it, we do need the concept of
and think about our thoughts is required
for the operation of defeasible reasoning, and that in turn requires that we
have the evaluative concepts of truth and falsity (p. 165.)

truth.

The

ability to ascend a level

Take the following case of default reasoning: S predicts, on the basis
vation of nimbus clouds (evidence), that

it

will rain,

Sis prediction is

of his obser-

based on the

general hypothesis that nimbus clouds cause rain ( h ). According to default reasoning,

S
in

believes in h because there

is

nothing contrary to h that he knows

h by default. Such generalization

may

8

(1980), Doyle (1979), Reiter (1978).

Some

of these people are

McDermott

of:

he believes

be later refuted by further information that
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cirrus

— not

nimbus

—

clouds cause rain. After this new information
S believes

that the correlation between
5,

nimbus clouds and raining

is false;

so hypothesis

h, for

has been refuted (or superseded by) hypothesis h-1
which states that cirrus clouds

cause rain. Later h-1

Thus what we

may

be refuted or

see here

is

that

falsified

by further information.

when we obtain new information, we

to consider its relation to thoughts (or beliefs)

we have previously

often have

held,

and

this

requires us to think of certain thoughts (old and new)
in relation to their content

and truth values.

Thus,

can think after dinner today that

I

proposal; the sentence following ‘that’

thinking in terms of content.

We

can,

the content of

is

it is

true,

my

I

my

need to write

thought, hence this

is

sometimes identify our thoughts by

contingent properties that do not require us to assign contents to them: we
do this

when we think

of a thought as, say, the

of identifying a thought

is

first

one we had after dinner. But

in

a thought (or belief) by reference to the content.

into our ontology.

We

is

way

not satisfactory for defeasible reasoning where we need

to evaluate our reason for thinking something:

content of the thought

this

the proposition

can apply

it

involves,

‘falsity’ to

such a case we need to identify
Since, as

we have

I

indicated above, the

to introduce propositions

propositions that

is

needed

in defeasible

reasoning. Pollock observes,

The way

in

which we ascend

levels

and ascribe truth values to propositions

is

If P is a proposition I am able to entertain,
my language of thought must contain a mental representation ‘P’ of P,
my epistemic norms must license something like the following:

dictated by our epistemic norms.

then

and

What

I

believed was ‘P’

P
Therefore, what

I

believed was true.

Just to have a label,

I

call this disquotational reasoning.

I

write the mental

is suggestive of the way
The quotation marks cannot be taken altogether
not forming the quotation name of a sentence but

representation ‘P’ using quotation marks because this
the representation works.

seriously because

we

are

But there is a strong and
between the mental representation ‘P’ and quotation names

rather a mental representation of a proposition.

important parallel
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of sentences.

We

can

refer to a sentence in

as

the

terms of some property it has
sentence on page 137.’ In contrast to this,
quotation names are noncontingent ways of referring to sentences. The
rules
of English language dictate that enclosing a sentence in
quotation marks

contingently, e.g.

first

generates a term designating that sentence and no other sentence
(p.

165).

Default reasoning imposes propositions and concepts (as truth-conditional)

our ontology by forcing us to think of thoughts
assigning the notions of truth and

falsity.

a non-contingent,

in

way and

Why are beliefs as propositions

in

thus

opposed

(as

to belief states) needed in our quasi-inference from experience-types to belief states?

Because

beliefs (as

to causal reason
l

‘its

—

opposed to

belief states)

form the evidential reason

for the conclusion. In the

seeming to me that an apple

is

above quasi-inference

there” (e-i),

and

— as opposed

STs

mental state

his belief state that there are

no

countervailing factors {b-1), causally sustains his belief state of there being apples
there {b-2). In addition, e-1

and

b-1 are also reasons for b-2 because they follow the

rule of apple usage involved within these states. So

I

call these states causal reasons.

These, however, are not the same as evidential reasons. Swain (1981) says,
First,

there

is

the kind of reasons that

about a person’s evidence and

it is

,

propositions

a

who

are referring to

I

call causal

among

the causal reasons

that h

may

belief

very well be

the evidential reasons that this person has, and whether the belief
is

justified

propositions and

When

reasons for

upon which another

(say, the belief that h) is based; the propositions believed

among

talk

among other things, events or states of the
Some of a person’s beliefs (which are states

are,

has the belief

of that person) are often

when we

here that the talk of believed (or, known)

appropriate. Second, there are what

Causal reasons

belief.

person

is

we

it is

may depend upon
h.

Let us distinguish between two different kinds of basing.

appropriate to state that a person’s belief

of evidential propositions, then

upon the

the evidential connection between these

I

is

based upon some sort

shall say that the belief

is

evidentially based

set of propositions in question, (p. 75)

When we

talk about evidence,

as

Swain (1981)

says,

we usually

talk about

propositions. In the above quasi-inference (from apple-type experience to the state

of believing an apple to be there)

Si's

causal reasons for the derived state of believing
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an apple to be there

is

his believing that there are

evidential reasons for the derived state, however,

and the countervailing

beliefs

must think

me

for

in

to see

an apple clearly”;
;

we must know what

beliefs (in the case of the

terms of their content

place for apples to grow”

no countervailing

in

ways such

“this is a time

factors.

these additional

above quasi-inference)

as these:

To be

we

are;

“the lights are sufficient

when apples grow”;

“this is a

good

cases of apple-type inputs are caused by real apples

“all

existing in the external world

These additional propositions are not

’
.

dynamic because they can be refuted with

static

further information. For example,

but

when S

learns that non-real apples sometimes cause apple-type inputs, he
assigns falsity to
the proposition that “all apple-type experiences are caused by real
apples”

have to apply the notion of falsity and, as we saw above, we cannot assign
to a mental or belief state,

we need

to introduce propositions.

Since

.

it

we

directly

According to default

reasoning, the evidences mentioned above are prima facie reasons for hypothesizing
that an apple

there,

is

and they can be defeated or

falsified

by further evidence.

Hence, propositions must be introduced into our ontology.

6.2

Justification of Beliefs

The

beliefs that are implicated in our quasi-inferences

which we accept

belief states are propositions
justified

might

for the

(meaning we can take them to be true

later

be refuted. The question

is,

what

is

from experience-types to

time being as prima facie

for the

time being) and which

the justification for accepting these

propositions?
Ordinarily, a proposition
it

logically

within

is

justified in

one of the two ways:

from other propositions which are

itself; in

other words,

or logical truth such as
,

ical propositions,

it is

A=A,

self-justified.

(1)

By

deriving

justified, or (2) its justification lies

Propositions which express a priori

contain their justification within themselves. Empir-

on the other hand, are not

logical truths

and they can generally
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be justified only by deriving them

—

propositions which are themselves justified.

drove a car

down

these tracks a while ago

marks running down the tracks

tiie

means
him

that a car has passed

(r);

S

(

—

using logical methods

from some other

For example, S believes that someone
(

p ) because he believes that there are

and that whenever there are

q)

derives p from q and

and p

r,

marks

tire

is

it

justified for

so long as he accepts q and r to be true. So
q and r are the basis (in Swains’s

words they are “evidences”)
outside

p:

it lies

in q

and

There appear to be two

from which he derives

for S^s belief that p.

But what

r.

the justification of

is

possibilities here:

his beliefs that q

Here the justification

S might point

and

r or he

self-justified] their truths lie within themselves,

to

1

Ss

beliefs that q

is

and

r?

some other propositions

might say that these

and he

for p lies

beliefs are

them

justified in accepting

as true without the support of any other proposition.

The response
owe

just mentioned

their justification to

justification in turn.

only

if

beliefs

some

Many

is

problematic, however.

If 5” s beliefs

is

and

r

further propositions, those further propositions need

philosophers would insist that this justification

the other alternative

q

ultimately satisfied: that

by reference to which any other sort of

is,

S must have

justified belief

is

is

possible

self-justified

ultimately justified.

Unfortunately, the most plausible examples of self-justifying beliefs are a priori truths

such as ‘A=A’ or ‘A yard

an inadequate basis

is

equal to three

for matters of fact

feet’,

and these truths certainly provide

and existence, as

Hume

described the objects

of empirical beliefs. Foundationalists such as R. Chisholm claim that self-justifying
beliefs that

form the ultimate basis

identity of one’s

own mental

foundationalists argue,

we

states.

will

for empirical beliefs

If

such a view

end up with an

is

concern the nature and

not accepted, then, as the

infinite regress.

proponents of this view usually have the following structure
It is

obvious from the structure of Figure 6.1 that

either terminate

somewhere or there

will

be an

in

Millar says that

mind:

this chain of justification

infinite regress.

must

The problem

of
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B

Figure 6.1

Structure of Beliefs

infinite regress is particularly difficult here because, as

said earlier,

I

here a regulative theory of justification according to which
the appropriate kind of belief from which
the constraints on
is

B

1

is

not possible

that an inferential chain

yet groundless.

must know

the chain

is

infinitely long.

beliefs

foundations theory

is

mean

all

B

l

is

What

this

shows

from which

beliefs

Usually the class of beliefs that are held to be basic

As Pollock

(1987) says,

“The simple motivation

the psychological observation that

sensing the world, and

that

using

which are legitimate

According to foundationalists, these are basic

are observational beliefs.

am

can be derived. Such consideration of

must end somewhere with

other beliefs are derived.

takes this to

if

B

I

I

for a

we have various ways

of

knowledge comes to us via senses. The foundationalist

that our senses provide us with

epistemologically basic beliefs (construed broadly)
justify us in holding a belief only

if

we

what are then

(sic).

Reasoning,

identified as

it

seems, can

are already justified in holding the beliefs

from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification.

Only perception can do

that.

We thus acquire the picture of our beliefs forming a kind

of pyramid, with the basic beliefs provided by perception forming the foundation, and
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other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning
that traces back ultimately

all

to the basic beliefs” (p. 26).

The notion
ationalists,

of “basic beliefs” needs

An

incorrigibility.

is

overcome

here

is

mistaken about how

it

vocabulary as follows:

for

1

).

As

B

x

is

about one’s own mental

that there

all,

as

I

S may apply

affairs,

B

can be

such beliefs in

one can never be

into foundationalists

an apple

is

own mental
is

B

in front of
it is

me

(S)”

incorrigible

state.

not without problems.

First

the concept of nectarine to his apple- type

experience and reach the experiential state
latter state in

one’s

of incorrigibility, as stated above,

said earlier,

all

state, foundationalists argue,

S because one cannot be mistaken about
The notion

of

me

appears to

B

although one can be mistaken

that,

appears to him. Thus we can reduce
“it

belief

’

have erroneous perception) about an objective state of

(or

(

beliefs, foundationalists

show how S s

to

me”

in front of

problem by reducing

this

terms of appearance statements and then arguing

{B

an apple

is

important property of basic

The problem

incorrigible. Foundationalists

According to some found-

clarification.

observational beliefs such as “there

are properly basic beliefs.

contend,

some

“it

seems that a nectarine

turn sustains his belief state that a nectarine

is

is

there”

there. Here, as in

;

the

many

other cases, experience type and content has not meshed and this has resulted in a
belief state

which

that this could

red thing

is

is

not well-grounded. As Millar says,

happen

there.

Yet

in the case of experiences such that

it

seems possible

making over-hasty judgments about
to

him

that a red thing

experience.

“It is

is

in principle.

If

the colors of objects

it

perhaps not obvious

seems to you that a

a person has the habit of
it

could be that

it

seems

there on occasions in which he has a (brown-thing)-type

But then such a person might conceivably make over-hasty judgments

about his visual experiences too, believing that they are (red-thing)-type when they
are not” (p. 174).

95
Further, there are
so, for the believer

S

some

may

which seem to be incorrigible but in

beliefs

not know

why

that particular belief

is

believes in a complicated mathematical
formula, p, which

reality are not

incorrigible.

Suppose

derived from some

is

fundamental mathematical truths by the method of
deduction. S may not know why
p

is

S believes p

incorrigible.

to be true as

someone

told

him

so;

he himself, however,

has no idea of the deductive steps from which
p followed.

Chisholm, a well-known foundationalist, says that a
for

S because

is

it

“beyond reasonable doubt”

justified in accepting a belief

B

x

for S.

belief,

say

B\

is

incorrigible

According to Chisholm, S

is

by virtue of the two epistemic principles that he

accepts:

• If

S accepts B\ then B tends

• If

5”

l

accepts

B

probable for

is

Now, given

and

if

B

l

is

not discontinued by

Bs

system then

5

1

can we justify Bs accepting

B

l

total belief

5°.

the two principles, the question

beyond reasonable doubt”?

as

to be probable.

I

is,

think we cannot. First of

all,

B

l

is

an empirical

statement and to justify any empirical statement we have to take account of the
observer

means

(is

S

a kind of observer

of observation

(is

I

is

in the habit of seeing red apples?),

5”s observation (can

Aune

erroneous.

one see anything properly in this

which

a general presupposition and the consequent of which

9

This

is

The

Second,

According to Chisholm, both the above principles can be

by an a priori truth which

principles.

light,

(1991), that Chisholm’s justification of the above two

justified
is

5°s

someone seeing red apples?), the

round things?), none of which are considered by Chisholm.

contend, following

principles

is

this the place conducive to

background conditions of
specially red

who

is

general presupposition

a conditional statement, the antecedent of

is this:

a modified version of what Aune (1991) gives

p.

182.

is

one of the above
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am justified

in believing that I can improve and
correct my system of beliefs.
that are about matters of interest and concern
to me, I can eliminate
the ones that are unjustified and add others
that are justified; and I can replace
less justified beliefs about these topics
by beliefs that are more justified.
I

Of those

Chisholm’s claim

is

that the following conditional,

general proposition and whose consequent

is

whose antecedent

the above

is

the second principle stated above,

an

is

a priori truth:

S

If

is

justified in believing that he can

improve and correct his system of
can eliminate the ones that are unjustified and add others
that are justified and can replace less justified beliefs
about these topics by
beliefs such that he

beliefs that are

by

more

justified, then if

S*s total belief system,

B

1

is

S accepts B and B
1

probable for

l

is

not discontinued

S.

Chisholm claims that from the above conditional statement and

we can

supposition

derive the consequent, which

by using Modus Ponens. What are the grounds
statement as a priori truth?
is

justified in correcting

a belief

B

1
,

then

B

l

true a priori

is

is

Aune

really

is

is,

how

it

above conditional

there to say that the fact that one

belief

system shows that

if

one accepts

Chisholm has no answer

to

“The conceptual gap between antecedent and

says,

enormous, and

— that

the second principle as above,

for accepting the

tends to be probable for one?

to be taken seriously,

be proved a priori

reason

and improving one’s

either of these questions.

consequent here

And what

is

the general pre-

if

the claim that the conditional

we should be given some

indication

is

actually

how

can be derived from a priori axioms”

(p.

it

can

184).

Chisholm does not show how the above conditional statement can be derived from
apiori axioms. Hence,

we cannot depend on foundationalism

or Chisholm’s theory to

provide justification for the additional propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences

from experience-types to

belief states.

According to the Coherence theory, an empirical
of

its

incorrigiblity nor because

it is

belief

is

justified neither because

derivable from an incorrigible belief but because
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coheres globally with other beliefs. Thus
Coherence Theory rejects the idea of a

it

special class of beliefs

which are epistemologically

basic.

Here

I

shall consider the

views of two coherentists, Lehrer
(1974/5/81/82) and BonJour (1985). According
to Lehrer,

S

We

beliefs.

is

justified in holding belief

can describe the “competing”

B

incompatible with

l

and

(2)

Lehrer considers the case of
tickets

where each

some

ticket has

a

two things:

no

(1) that

as

)

it

beliefs of

On

ticket will be

B

Lehrer belief

l

of

belief that

will

it

B

drawn

(£)

10
;

2
...

(

beliefs

(

l
.

From

B2

B

l

...

this

is

l

S has

Bn

)

are negatively relevant to B.

B2 ...B™,

and, as

is

relevant” to

relevant to
I

it

it.”

If

then

B2

on the assessment of

...

S’

1

is

without such assessment. Further, take the case of &s belief

B2

).

B2

is

we consider

it is

said above,

I

of any particular

not a plastic imitation apple, or a nectarine which are

seeing

not be drawn

ET) that each ticket has 1/1000

S

is

ticket has

equally good reason to

is

(

.

S can conclude

(2) his ticket will

that an apple

there

l

incompatible with the

S cannot conclude

B

B

ticket in a fair lottery of 1000

his beliefs

be drawn. Thus, for Lehrer,

more probable than

as (1) those beliefs which are

drawn (B\) which

S competes with

they are ‘negatively relevant’ to

l

the basis of this knowledge,

has only 1/1000 chance of being drawn.

chance of being drawn. Each of these
for

B

competing

its

chance of being drawn and hence his

fair

conclude for each of the other 999 tickets

Now,

more probable than

if it is

Suppose S has a

belief that at least one ticket will be

B

l

of those beliefs which are compatible with

lottery.

1/1000 probability of being drawn.

(

B

assessed in relation to other beliefs such

B2

all

as,

“What

“negatively

in relation to all the beliefs that are negatively

more probable than

if

do not agree with Lehrer’s Coherence

have to take account of the vast web of our

we consider
theory.
beliefs.

B2

just by

itself.

This theory assumes that we
Pollock (1986) says that this

assumption does not take into account the difference between occurrent and nonoccurrent beliefs.

10

One assumption

We

have access only to our occurrent beliefs and not to our non-

that Lehrer

makes

is

that

we cannot make contradictory

beliefs.
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occurrent beliefs. Further, Lehrer’s theory
version of “a basing relation” which

is

incompatible with the Coherentist’s own

of course, distinct from the foundationalist’s

is,

notion of a basing relation. According to the
foundationalists, as we saw
belief
beliefs

In

justified in relation to another

is

which do not require anything

Coherence Theory there
formed. S

beliefs are

accepts

B

l

is

B

if

until

we reach a

special class of

l

class of beliefs in relation to

which other

coheres with the rest of his beliefs and then

on the basis of judgment. Pollock objects to

we do not

one

else for their justification; they are self-justified.

no special

judges

first

and so on,

earlier,

this sort of basing as (1)

ordinarily have such doxastic reconstruction of basing and
(2) there

a circularity here:

5”

first

B

and then believe that

l

l

coheres with the rest of his beliefs

coheres with the rest of our beliefs on the basis of that

The question

justification.

B

has to justify that

is

is,

which comes

— the

first

justification or the belief?

Lehrer’s theory does not give any answer to this question.
L.

BonJour adheres

that justification

to the Coherence

is holistic.

appearance of linear

The way he has

justification;

B\

This semblance of linear justification
“global”.

belief,

is

B

l
,

is

brought

in relation to another,

in

B

1

B

1

is

justified in relation to

soon vanished when justification

B2

.

(3)

life

is

B2

.

made

This notion

we

justify one

According to BonJour, the notion of coherence

B

l

consists of the following notions: (1) mutual

with other beliefs of the observer;

belief of the observer;
stability of

is

BonJour,

his theory, however, gives the

because in everyday ordinary

“truth-conducive”. Justification of

consistency of

for

up

set

BonJour, really are only “contextually basic”.

Beliefs, for

of linear justification

Theory of truth. Like Lehrer he too believes

(2) inferribility of

explanatory verification of

B

l
\

B

l

(4) relatively

from other
long term

under persistent observational input. Observations can be directly or

indirectly verified in principle. Confirmation

observers, observables, background, etc.

is

Thus

local

B

l

and conditional depending on

has to be justified in the context

of the position of the observer (was there sufficient light from where the observer was

perceiving the apple?), the observation (a real apple in midst of a bunch of plastic
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apples could have been been misperceived), the
background of the observer

(is

he a

person who, whenever he sees red round things,
thinks that they are apples?).

The Coherence Theory

of justification suffers from

some

vital

problems. First,

as with Lehrer’s theory, the coherence theory
talks of beliefs which are stored only
in the short
is

term memory and not

only amongst

real

world? Also,

beliefs, then,

is

.

Aune

term memory. Second,

if

coherence

one might ask, how can our beliefs connect to the

there empirical support to

one’s system of beliefs?

presumption”

in the long

show that one has an

BonJour simply accepts

it

in

overall grasp of

terms of what he

calls “doxastic

says,

We may justifiably

presume that we have a relatively specific system of beliefs
when we raise the question of how those beliefs can be justified, but if
we consider the wider question of how our propositional attitudes can be
rationally assessed, a doxastic presumption puts the cart before the
horse.
To be sure, philosophers have historically expressed little doubt about our
ability to monitor our thoughts and beliefs, but this estimate should
appear

excessively optimistic to a reader of Freud or Dostoyevsky. As these writers
emphasize, self-deception is ubiquitious in everyday life, and people who are

deceived about their personality and character are

some

commonly deceived about

of their beliefs, (p. 187)

Further, in choosing a hypothesis BonJour considers a limited
positions from which to choose.
of hypotheses
out, say,

He does not

and did not consider

others.

Goodman’s hypothesis from

justify

why

of pro-

he chose a limited number

He does not even

this set.

number

justify

why

he

left

Hence, BonJour’s theory cannot be

accepted.

The question
and yet not

of

how a

if,

p

is

can justifiably be regarded as legitimate, groundless,

self-evident, has been discussed by Millar (1991).

proposition or belief,

only

belief

normative

p,

According to him, a

can be accepted by S as legitimate yet groundless

for

S

,

or, as

if,

and

Millar says, accords with 5^s evaluative practices.

Following Wittgenstein (1958), Millar says that the status of such normative propositions are like the rules of the

game

that

we take beyond doubt,

dispute, and the need
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for support.

Millar further contends that
p must constitute part of S's perspective

on the world and hence should not require any

any group, G, we can say that
believe that

some

G

justification.

shares a perspective

if

Millar says that given

the people in that group

of the constituent concepts and propositions
of that group can be

held as legitimate without needing any other
justification (this

is

the

same

as taking

these propositions to be normative). Millar says,

a proposition

If

normative for a group it is treated by the group as beThis does not mean that if people think a proposition
is
normative they treat it as being indisputable. In general
people do not think
of propositions as being normative and otherwise.
It means that normative
is

ing indisputable.

propositions are ones which, among other things, people
treat as being
disputable. Their being treated in this way is part of
what
it

to be normative.

Doubt

in relation to such propositions

is

is

for

in-

them

ruled out, as

Wittgenstein says. But many of the examples which Wittgenstein
considers
are not ones with respect to which it could be plausible to
suppose that doubt
is ruled out absolutely. It is possible to imagine
contexts in which doubt, and
with it dispute, could naturally and sensibly arise. This presents no
problem
for the proposed conception of normativity since according to
that conception
there need be nothing intrinsic to that propositions themselves, nothing
about
the propositions qua contents, which rules out doubt on the part of those

who

grasp them. Thus they need not be intrinsically self-evident in the way that
the proposition that a triangle has three sides has been alleged to be. If this

we should not think of groups for whom certain propositions are
normative as being forover bound by their normativity. Such groups would
is

right then

look askance at doubt about propositions in question which were not backed
up by any reasons for doubt, a point which Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses.

But

this is not to say that there could not be, or that the

recognize, grounds for doubting
for

them

(p.

The following

some of

183).

beliefs are

normative

for Millar

although there are no grounds for doing

•

Mountains

•

Things do not vanish or cease to
long time.

groups could not

the propositions which are normative

because one

is

justified in holding

them

so:

exist for a very long time.

exit

when you stop looking

at

them

for a very
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Similarly, one might say that the propositions
implicated in quasi-inferences are

groundless yet legitimate. In other words, they
are normative. Sceptics

some objections against normative
positions are “genuinely basic”

,

propositions. Granted that

what guarantee

there that

is

may

some normative

some

T

during eclipse. For

• Articles

made

,

share the basic belief that articles

made

pro-

so called normative

propositions are not believed because of credulity
and dogmatism? Suppose

people in a tribe,

raise

all

the

of bronze change color

T, then, the following proposition is normative:

of bronze change color during eclipses.

According to Millar,

B is,

(

B

)

for the people of T, a legitimate yet groundless
belief; in

other words,

B is

gists that the

tribesmen believed the above proposition because of superstition; hence,

it

is

normative

for the people of T. It

not a legitimate belief even though

The problem with

was found out

by anthropolo-

later

accords with their evaluative practices.

it

Millar’s normitivity-thesis

is

that there

is

no

criteria to distinguish

between normative propositions that are apt to be true and those that are apt to be
false.

Millar says that since our aim

is

we should

truth-indicative,

into account only those propositions which are genuinely true.

constraints on propositions which

we can use

believe or take

Millar puts two

to judge whether a proposition

is

properly normative; these two constraints are as follows:

1.

2.

If

p

is

a normative proposition for S and p conflicts with other beliefs for which

S has adequate grounds then S cannot

hold

S cannot

he pleases in the absence of adequate

accept any proposition, p

,

p.

grounds.

Most
positions.

sceptics
I

would deny that those constraints

consider their position and

my

yield universal or general pro-

criticism of

it

in the next chapter.

CHAPTER

7

Justifying Propositions That Are
Implicated in Quasi- Inference

My

primary aim

in this chapter is to consider

some additional

theories for justify-

ing the general propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences
from experience type
to belief states. In this chapter

I

discuss induction and

its criticism.

I

also critically

survey the Hypothetico-deductive method and Inference to the Best
Explanation as
possible alternatives to traditional inductive methods.

This chapter

is

divided into two main sections. In section

justification of general propositions

of induction.

I

In section 2

critically

I

present the inductive

and Goodman’s criticism

method of

survey Inference to the Best Explanation and
I

its

inference.

relation to a

end the chapter with a brief note on epistemic

ends.

Inductive Justification: Criticisms of

7.1

Russell’s,

also critically survey the Hypothetico-deductive

simple version of Bayes’s theorem.

means and

and Hume’s,

1 I

Hume,

Russell,

and Goodman

and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method

We

saw

in the last chapter that according to Millar the general propositions

implicated in our quasi-inferences play a ‘normative’ role within our evaluative practices.

Millar put two constraints on the kind of propositions that can be considered

normative; these constraints are means to avoid the objections of the sceptics. The
sceptics, however, find these

two constriants unsuitable

for filtering out propositions
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that one dogmatically accepts.

If so,

then what

is

the justification of these additional

propositions implicated in quasi-inference ?

The propositions implicated

in

our quasi-inferences are

According to Hume, such propositions are

all

all

covert causal principles.

that by observing the constant conjunction
of A’s and B> s,

conclusion that

A

causes

B or

that All

A ’s

‘rule’

such as

To take a concrete example,

to be white, concludes that all

S

S,

Hume

said

reaches the general

are B’s. Such a conclusion

natural instinct or inclination and not on any
of deductive inference).

universal or general.

is

based on &s

Modus Ponens

(as in case

having observed some swans

swans are white. Here the “inductive leap” from the

particular to the universal does not follow any rule;
according to

Hume, S makes

the

“leap” by experiencing the constant conjunction of
swanness and whiteness. Thus,
S',

according to Hume, makes this “inductive leap” instinctively and not
rationally.

We

can leply to

Hume

color of swans) there

is

by saying that although

above case (concerning the

in the

no deductive rule working to produce the conclusion, there

is

an inductive rule working which produced the conclusion; hence, we can argue that
the conclusion

rational.

is

In the case of the swans,

from the premise to the conclusion

in the following

S can

rationalize the passage

manner:

n/m

of the swans

S

observed were found to have the property of being white; hence, he concluded that
probably

n/m

of induction

members

of

all

swans are white. This observation

and not on any natural

of a large,

instinct.

randomly selected

to possess a property (G), then one

The

is

rule

based on the practical rule

is

as follows: If

class of things of kind (E) have

may

infer that

n/m

of

all

that

it

will

is

of the

been observed

E’s probably have G.

In recent times the rule of induction has been criticized by Russell and

Since induction

n/m

Goodman.

not supposed (by anyone) to yield certain conclusions, the fact

sometimes give a

false conclusion

from true premises

is

not surprizing.

Russell (1948) argues, however, that the rule will give rise to false conclusions from

true premises as often as not.

Russell reached his conclusion by considering the
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evidence class and the
Russell, either

means

some

much wider

restrictions,

class that

unknown

it is

supposed to represent. According to

to anyone, should be put on the allowable

of specifying these classes or the inductive rule can
give rise to erroneous

inferences as often as not. Let us apply Russell’s reasoning
to the inductive principle
that

I

have given above. Suppose S

is

considering the property of being observed.

For his purpose, S observes some cows.

Since

all

cows observed by S have

property, he can conclude, using the inductive principle, that

Further,

if

all

this

cows are observed.

he thinks of the observed cows as being members of the larger group of

physical objects, then, using the above principle, he can also draw the ridiculous

conclusion that

my

about whether

physical objects are observed by

all

observations are

made randomly

not discuss) will not dispose of the problem because
not count as “random”

,

(p.

how

conclusions.

will

(1991), “Cavils

(a possibility that Russell did
if

my

observation of cows do
will

have this status,

be rendered useless for experimental

164).

Like Russell,
he showed

Aune says

no observation that a person can make

and the principle of inductive generalization
purposes”

S.

Goodman

also

showed that there are problems with induction;

a given body of hypotheses

To make

his point,

Goodman

may

used

give equal support to conflicting

artificial

predicates like “grue”; he

defines the latter as follows:

•

X

is

grue

examined

By

= de f X

is

green and examined before the year 2000 or

X

is

blue

and

after the year 2000.

observing some emeralds and finding that they are green, we reach the following

two conclusions:

• All emeralds are green.

• All emeralds are grue.

105
In case of emeralds before the year 2000 there
are no problems with these two

generalizations; according to both generalizations, emeralds
are green.

pioblem with emeralds examined

after the year 2000.

But

there

is

a

According to one generalization

they are green, according to another generalization they
are blue (or not-green). Since

both generalizations are logically confirmed by the inductive

rule, that rule

must be

defective.

The above problems with

Goodman show

the inductive rule brought about by

Hume,

Russell,

and

that the inductive rule cannot be accepted. In recent times induction

has been replaced by the Hypothetico- deductive method
often thought to avoid the problems faced by induction.

(

H-D

method), which

is

Instead of generalizations

from particular instances we can think of these general propositions as hypotheses
to be tested.

According to the

find explanations (reasons) for

H-D method, we

a

field of

enquiry and try to

some phenomena; we hypothesize some reasons and

predict consequences from those hypotheses.

If

hypotheses can be confirmed to a certain degree;
is

fix

the predictions are true then the

if

they are false then the hypothesis

discontinued. Let us try to understand this method by applying

case of elephants.

Here the

field of

enquiry

is

it

to the following

the color of elephants.

On

the basis

of STs previous experience he has reached the general conclusion “all elephants are

black

r
.

Suppose while

travelling through a particular part of Africa

S encounters

white elephants, and, instead of thinking that they are exceptions (or mutants), he
formulates the hypothesis that such elephants are a local subspecies.
to actually test this hypothesis; he predicts that there are

soon finds that there are many white elephants

more white

in that locality

The

is

tries

elephants.

S can say

that his

confirmed to certain degree. Aune (1970) says,

basic strategy of the

new method

is

to predict on the basis of a hypothesis

that certain events will occur under specified conditions and then check these

predictions for accuracy.

Schematically, this strategy

He

and that the offsprings

of these elephants are also white; on the basis of this observation

above hypothesis

Next S

may be

expressed as
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If H is a hypothesis or a general
assumption and C is the set of
conditions under which a certain result R is
expected, then the forms of
inference used to confirm or refute H are these:

follows.

Confirmation

Refutation

If

H

If

H

C

obtains.

obtains.

R

C

obtains.

R

does not obtain.

R

and C, then

Therefore,

H

is,

and C, then

Therefore,

to a degree, confirmed.

is

refuted.

Both schemata are highly
of confirmation

H

R

simplified,

and the important notion of a degree

not properly defined.

The essential idea, however, is
predictions based on H are frequently made and if, in addition, the
predicted R obtains whenever the stipulated conditions C clearly obtain
(for
many different Rs and Cs), then the degree of support or confirmation for
H becomes progressively higher. If, on the other hand, a predicted R fails
is

this:

If

when

the condition

The

or rejected.

logical principle of

conjuction of
least

one of

its

(p.

H must be modified
by deductive logic. By the
imply R, then if R is false, the

clearly obtain, then the hypothesis

latter alternative is rejected

modus

C and H

must therefore
well.

C

is

members

tollens

,

if

also false.

H and C
A conjunction

or conjuncts

follow, solely

is false; if

is false,

C

is

by the laws of deductive

however, when at

granted to be true,
logic, that

H

is

it

false as

155).

Let us see

if

this

new method can

solve the

Goodman

problem. Take the case of

emeralds as above. Instead of generalization from particular cases we can think of
the two propositions “All emeralds are grue” and “All emeralds are green” as rival

hypotheses to be tested.

We

can now make the following predictions from the above

two propositions:

•

The next emerald

will

be green.

•

The next emerald

will

be grue.

The problem

here

is

that

we can

test our predictions only before the year

and not afterwards; hence, using the hypothetico-deductive method, both

2000

will

be

supported to an equal degree by the success or failure of the predictions we can
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make. The obvious thing to do at

method.

7.2

I

this point is to

discuss the modification of

modify the hypothetico-deductive

H-D method

in the

next section.

Inference to the Best Explanation

We

should amend the hypothetico-deductive
method by requiring one to choose

the best hypothesis that accounts for
the data. This

deductive method

is

amended

version of the hypothetico-

generally called Inference to the Best
Explanation. According

to Inference to the Best Explanation
one can use several criteria
,

the best hypotheses.
(2) Testibility, (3)

The names

by which to choose

of these criteria are as follows:

Coherence with established hypotheses,

(4)

(1)

Simplicity,

Explanatory Power.

For example, suppose we are considering
two hypotheses, h and h-1, for explaining
evidence

e;

if

we choose h over

h-1 because h-1

better with other established hypotheses,

have applied Inference

to the

is

simpler, directly testible, coheres

and explains more

Best Explanation. G.

facts than h-1

Harman

,

then

(1965) observes,

making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain
hypothesis
would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In
In

general, there

be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence,
so one must be
able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is
warranted in making
will

Thus one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis
would provide a better explanation for the evidence than would any
other
the inference.

hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis

There
is

is,

of course, a problem about

how one

is

is

true.

to judge that one hypothesis

sufficiently better than another hypothesis.

Presumably such a judgment
would be based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which
is more plausible, which explains more, which is less
ad hoc and so forth
Uses of inference to the best explanation are manifold. When a detective
puts the evidence together and decides that it must have been the butler,
he is reasoning that no other explanation which accounts for all the facts is

enough or simple enough to be accepted. When a scientist infers
atoms and subatomic particles, he is inferring the truth of
an explanation for various data which he wishes to account for. These seems
plausible

the existence of

the obvious cases; but there are
is

telling the truth,

many

others.

When we

our inference goes as follows:

what he does because he believes

it;

(ii)

we

(i)

infer that a witness

we

infer that he says

infer that he believes

what he

we
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does because he actually did witness
the situation which he describes.
That
is, our confidence in his
testimony is based on our conclusion
about the
most plausible explanation for that testimony
(if, for example, he
stands to
gain a great deal from our believing
him). Or, to take a different sort
of
example, when we infer from a person’s
behavior to some fact about his
mental experience, we are inferring that
the latter fact explains better
than
seems to me that these examples of

some other explanation what he

does. It
inference (and, of course many other
similar examples) are easily described
as instances of the inference to the
best explanation (p. 89 ).

Sceptics
of

all,

etc.?”

may

some doubts about Inference

raise

they will ask,
Further, they

which an hypothesis

One can answer

to the

Best Explanation. First

Why

should we accept criteria as simplicity,
comprehensibility,

may

also raise the following question:

is

“What

is

the degree to

confirmed by a given item of evidence?”

the above questions by introducing
probabilistic reasoning in

Inference to the Best Explanation. Probabilistic
reasoning can be introduced by an
application of Bayes’s theorem such as follows:
•

P(h given e)= P(h)P(e given h)/P(e)

According to

this

theorem, the probability of a hypothesis given certain evid-

ence can be ascertained by computing the probability of
the hypothesis times the
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis and divide the
entire product by
the probability of the evidence.
the probability of this

Thus, by using the above theorem,

wood being rosewood

given that

it

is

red.

I

I

can compute

compute

first

the product of the probability of rosewoods in the world and the probability
of

anything being red given that

it is

rosewood, and then divide the entire product by

the probability of red things. If there

is

more rosewood

other types of woods) then the probability of this
again,

if

in the

world (compared to

wood being rosewood

there are few red things in the world then the probability of this

rosewood also increases. Mathematically,
side of the equation increases;

increases.

if

if

the numerator

the denominator

is

is

increases;

wood being

large then the left

small then the

left

hand

hand

side also
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To apply

the above theorem,

we must use propositions which already
have prob-

ability values. In the

above case we chose h because h has a
higher probability value

than

The question now

its

alternatives.

is,

“What

higher probability value to h or, in
this case, what
higher probability value to the proposition
this
the proposition this

then replace h by
to Bayes’s

r.

teakwood

is

(r)

is

the justification of assigning a

is

is

the justification for assigning a

rosewood,?”.

One might

has a higher probability value than

Surely, such assignments of probability
value, one

believe that
h;

he would

who adheres

theorem would argue, cannot be arbitrary.
How, then, are probability

values assigned?

One can answer

hypotheses look as

if

The

as follows:

probability values assigned to the

each hypothesis has an absolute probability value.
But in reality

most hypotheses are probable

in relation to a further probability
;

most of these hypotheses (except

m

values) are probable

words,

the initial ones which have absolute probability

relation to the probability value of

Thus each probability assignment must be indexed by
as the rule of conditioning.

in other

some other

its relative

proposition.

value; this

is

known

When we

use propositions in Bayes’s theorem these

relative probability values are implicit.

Thus, we chose the hypothesis “this wood

is

rosewood” over other hypotheses,

relative probability value.
all

in the

above case, because

The above answer, however,

probabilities are relative

how can an

initial

it

has the highest

gives rise to a problem: Since

probability be assigned?

Bayesians” attempt to solve the problem by giving the strategy the

I

“Radical

give below.

There are various ways of interpreting probabilities and one of them

is

the

subjective interpretation of the probability calculus which was adopted by some
statisticians influenced

probability value
h.

is

by C.S. Peirce.

According to the subjectivists view, the

the degree of value an individual, 5, assigns to a hypothesis,

Thus two people

starting with different

“opinions”

(subjective probabilities)

can go on “updating” their probabilities, and by persistently using the rule of
conditioning their “opinions” converge; in other words, subjective probability gives
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rise to objective probability.

Suppose S and

coins in his pocket one of which

is fair

chance of landing head. Both 5 and
tossing, pulls out a coin blindly

one.

P

P are

and the other coin

P know

from

planning to toss coins. S has two

his

about

P

thinks that the chances are 0.9 that
the coin

the chances are 0.5 that the coin

probabilities about the coin.

is

biased.

So S and

In the tables below

I

Now

this.

pocket and

is

biased

5. for the

claims that

is

P

show

-

it is

biased and

S

.

hypothesis and a posterior

Likelihood (LK1)
is

is

has 0.7

purpose of
the biased

thinks that

start with different prior

that by persistently using

the rule of conditioning the
difference in the mathematical values
of
priors gradually diminish 1

it

,5"s

and P's

mathematical value given a certain

the mathematical value obtained

by multiplying the

prior and the likelihood and divided by
the sum; the posterior becomes (in the
case

below) becomes the new prior probability
of the next throw:

Initial

Disagreement is 0.4
P

Hyp

Priors

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

Fair

0.5000

0.0156

0.0078

0.4196

Biased

0.5000

0.0216

0.0108

0.5804

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

S

Hyp

Priors

Fair

0.1000

0.0156

0.0016

0.0744

Biased

0.9000

0.0216

0.0194

0.9256

1

Here

I

am

using the following theorem of Bayes: P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/ P(h)P(e

given h)+P(-h)P(e given -h).
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New Disagreement is 0.345276

Disagreement is 0.345276
P

H yp

Priors

Fair

0.4196

Biased

0.5804

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

0.0156

0.0066

0 3433

0.0216

0.0125

0.6567

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

.

S

Hyp

Priors

Fair

0.0744

0.0156

0.0012

0.0549

Biased

0.9256

0.0216

0.0200

0.9451

New Disagreement is 0.288429

Disagreement is 0.288429
P

Hyp

Priors

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

Fair

0.3433

0.0156

0.0054

0.2743

Biased

0.6567

0.0216

0.0142

0.7257

S
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Hyp

Priors

Fair

Biased

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

0.0549

0.0156

0.0009

0.0403

0.9451

0.0216

0.0204

0.9597

New Disagreement is 0.234027

Disagreement is 0.234027
P

Hyp

Priors

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

Fair

0.2743

0.0156

0.0043

0.2147

Biased

0.7257

0.0216

0.0157

0.7853

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

S

Hyp

Priors

Fair

0.0403

0.0156

0.0006

0.0295

Biased

0.9597

0.0216

0.0207

0.9705

New Disagreement is 0.185200

Disagreement is 0.185200
P
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Hyp

Priors

Fair

Biased

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

0.2147

0.0156

0.0034

0.1650

0.7853

0.0216

0.0170

0.8350

Lkl

Prior*Lkl

Posterior

S

Hyp

Priors

Fair

0.0295

0.0156

0.0005

0.0215

Biased

0.9705

0.0216

0.0210

0.9785

New Disagreement is 0.143550

As we saw above,

the difference between STs and

Ps

opinions, represented by

mathematical values, gradually diminish; radical Bayesians
claim that these opinions
ultimately converge.

used

in the

Aune (1991) observes

that the kind of reasoning which

is

above case (showing that the different opinions converge
by persistant

conditioning) cannot be accepted as unqualified.
investigator (in this case

To employ such reasoning

the

S and P) must make some contingent assumptions. The

acceptability of these assumptions “Is not dictated by the evidence
of the throws or

probability theory” (Aune 1991 p. 210).

above

is

as follows:

given -h).

biased”

is

I

said before that the theorem

.

The disjunction

conjectured to be equivalent to “the coin

“The denominator

in this
e.

have used

P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/P(h)P(e given h)+P(-h)P(e

(See footnote as above) 2

not-h) to the evidence

I

theorem

Since e

probability calculus, that P(e)

is

is

is

a

sum which

is

“the coin

is fair

is fair

or the coin

or not- (the coin

is fair)”

is

as

obtained by adding the tautology (h or

& (h and not-h), we can say, by the
h and not-h). The denominator of the
be replaced by ‘P(e & (h or not-h))’ which

logically equivalent to e

logically equivalent to

P(e

&:

simpler version of the theorem [see above] ‘P(e)\ may
is equivalent, according to the axioms of the probability calculus, to the complex
denominator of
our above theorem.
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the hypothesis “not-(the coin

fair)”

is

and “the coin

conjectured to be equivalent. The
problem here

mean

in this case “not-(the coin

equivalence, as

Aune

says,

is

is

fair)”,

is

is

biased 0.7 towards heads”

is

that “biased” cannot be taken
to

but instead “biased towards head 0.9”.
The

not included

in the

reasoning pertaining to convergence

but can only be accepted by one on
a contingent basis. Hence, the
convergence of
subjective opinion into objectivity,
which radical Bayesians emphasize,
to

is

not

unqualified and cannot be defended a
priori.

7.2.1

Epistemic Ends and Norms

In this subsection

hypotheses.

The

I

offer a solution to the

initial or prior

problem

I

raised earlier about the initial

hypotheses needed to apply Bayes’s theorem are
not

intrinsically certain; nonetheless,

we

are justified in holding

them because,

here, they contribute to a rationally
unobjectionable epistemic

we have adopted. Thus, we can
Accepting a hypothesis
of behavior.

As Aune

used

in the

command

seat belt sign goes off”.
in

I

epistemic context

it

is

It

is

is

show

end and norm that

doing a certain action or exhibiting a certain kind
actions

Ss
’

accepting p as being

use the word “permissible” here in the same sense as

“you are permitted to take

What

off

your seat belts when the

constitutes such permissibility?

permissible for

contributes to an epistemic end or

norm

I

justify these hypotheses normatively.

we can evaluate such

says,

epistemically permissible.
it is

is

as

norm

S

As

to accept a proposition

that

said earlier,

I

we have accepted and

if

p
if

doing so

the end or

not rationally objectionable.
possible to conceive that our end or goal in epistemology

is

to attain

knowledge and hence we must accept only those propositions that contribute

to

our goal; we must, in that case, admit into our epistemological framework only those
propositions which are absolutely certain.
is

too strong, and

if

we adopt

it

The problem with

this goal

is

that

it

then the only propositions that we can justifiably

accept are mathematical and logical ones. This severely restricts the scope of rational
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investigation; hence,

more modest.

My

we must abandon
aim

(similar to

conceptual framework which
consistent,

and has a

is

the search for certainty

and aim

what the coherentists aim

at)

is

simple, has strong explanatory
power,

significant degree of fidelity 3

Simplicity

.

conceptual scheme which has no redundant
concepts and has a

at

is

something

to obtain a
is

maximally

a property of

minimum number

of

explanatory principles; “comprehensiveness”
refers to the whole world being
covered

by the scheme, both intensively and
extensively; and

“fidelity”

refers to

error compatible with the realization
of other epistemic values.
the properties

we

desire in a conceptual scheme,

we

minimal

Since these are

are not forbidden (or

we

are

epistemically permitted) to choose hypotheses
(propositions) that contribute toward
their exemplification. Further, there

conceptual scheme which
is

is

is

nothing rationally objectionable in seeking
a

simpler than

its

maximally consistent yet minimally redundant. Thus

over hi not because the truth of h
certainty) but because

As Aune (1991)

I

am

is

more comprehensive, and

alternative,

guaranteed (there

permitted to choose h

I

choose the hypothesis h

is

no such thing as factual

in relation to

my

epistemic norms.

says,

I suggest that, if the end is
to obtain a maximally comprehensive yet minimally simple conceptual scheme that can reasonably be
hoped to be minimally erroneous, two sorts of epistemic standards
are appropriate. The

first

prescribes policies that actively promote the end. To obtain
the intended
comprehensiveness in one’s scheme, for example, one should seek “causes”
or explanations for observed phenomena; and to obtain the simplicity
and

systematic connection in the scheme, one should minimize redundancy, attempt to subsume disparate phenomena under common principles, eliminate
nomological danglers, and so forth. Conceptual activity will be epistemically
permissible only

Moreover,

it

accords with such policies

should be noted that the status of the

(p.

initial

191).

probability are

somewhat

observation statements. In accepting the latter needed to apply Bayes’s theorem

like

we take

3

it

when

1

into account certain assumptions such as,

have adopted these criteria from Aune (1991).

“The observer

is

a dependable
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one

‘This

,

is

a place suitable

for this

kind of observation”; these
assumptions are

regarding background of observation,
observer, process of observation,
without
questioning them. These assumptions
are all empirical and if we
try to justify
ail

them

with the help of other assumptions
(which are also empirical) then what
we are doing
is,

as Clark

Glymore (1980)

says, “intellectual bootstrapping”.

should make our hypothesis consistent
with our other

some

initial

hypotheses because they

are reasonably justified;
(2)

we regard them

the light of further knowledge.
tentative spirit by one
levise or reject

and

I

it if

who

Aune

We

(p.

and can change them

an inferred belief

is

contrary evidence become available,
will

it

will then

be epistemically justified

in

may

in

held in a properly

be held

accepting

and to

it

critically

it

for the

192).

always choose our hypothesis from a set of
alternatives.

question

we accept

with our other beliefs which

as provisional

says, “If

Similarly,

has the will to consider what can be said
against

can allow that the believer

time being”

(1) are consistent

beliefs.

These assumptions

be question

may

be asked by the sceptics: “What

is

The

following

the justification of

choosing these limited number of alternatives and
not others?” One can reply that

we consider a limited number
possible to consider

all

of alternative hypotheses because

the alternatives to a hypothesis;

hypotheses which have some presumptions
critical spirit

in their favor.

is

relevant.

In considering these limited

is

not humanly

we consider only

We

and with an open mind, and we should be ready

hypotheses that

it

do

so,

however, in a

to consider

number

those

any new

of alternatives

we

are doing our epistemic best.

Goodman’s problem may be mentioned
saw

earlier, there is

here.

According to Goodman, as we

no way to decide between the two

emeralds are green” and

“all

confliciting hypotheses

(

“all

emeralds are grue”) in order to explain the color of

emeralds after the year 2000. One who adheres to Bayes’s Theorem might say that

we should

give the grue hypothesis a low prior probability as colors of things do not

117

change over time. Aune
(1991) observes, however, that

this is

because, “The character of our
evidence about color changes
in

question by

Goodman's hypothesis”

194).

(p.

There

is,

is

not a good solution

one of the things put

in fact,

no rational

criteria

by which we can choose the green
hypothesis over the grue hypothesis;
nonetheless,
there

is

because

a pragmatic criteria.

We

choose the green hypothesis, as
Aune observes,

accords better with our descriptive
policy and thus makes our induction

it

consistent.

Since our epistemic end, as

I

mentioned above,

consistent system and since consistency
of thought

is

is

to have a maximally

better than inconsistency,

we

prefer the green hypothesis over the
grue hypothesis.

To summarize,
ontology
tial

beliefs

(or

what we

believe to exist) are introduced into
our

due to defeasible reasoning. These

beliefs (propositions)

form the eviden-

reasons of our derived belief states in the
quasi-inference from experience type to

belief state.

Explanation.

I

have tried to justify these propositions by using
Inference
I

have interpreted the

of applying the latter

is

that

latter in

we have

to the

Best

terms of Bayes’s theorem. One problem

to start with hypotheses which already have

probability values. Although most hypotheses have
relative probability values, the
initial

ones are absolute.

We are justified

in

adopting some

initial

hypotheses because

they accord with the epistemic norms or ends that we
have adopted.
these initial hypotheses

we have

and cannot be absolutely

to

remember

In accepting

that these are empirical propositions

certain; nonetheless,

we can go on

revising

them

in the

light of further information.

As a

result of

my

here between what

discussion with Professor

we BELIEVE

TO EXIST

Aune

I

realized that

we have

to

make a

distinction

and what we BELIEVE TO BE TRUE or REGARD
AS WORTHY OF ACCEPTANCE. To say that we admit propositions into our ontology is to say
that we believe there are such things as propositions. Thus, when I speak of the epistemic goal of
accepting only those propositions that are certain, the consequence is that we accept only those
propositions as justifiably relied upon, used as premisses, etc.

CHAPTER

8

Conclusion

In this dissertation

I

have shown that we can trace quasi-inf
erential patterns

in

case of certain transitions between our
sensory-experiences and our belief states.

My

primary arguments

for establishing the

above thesis are drawn from

of belief states, experiential states,
and conceptual abilities.

my

theories

Following Edelman

I

have showed that belief states are states of
primary consciousness whose intrinsic
feature

is

recognition; in biological terms they are

loops) which get connected to value category
to these
3,

maps.

memory

The

recognition features into them. While recognition

states,

it is

that

difference between these
is

maps

of neural

(reentrant

endows value or meaning

Further, experiential states, like belief states, as

are also biological states.

way

maps

I

said in chapter

two types of states

an intrinsic feature of

merely an extrinsic feature of an experiential

is

the

belief

state. Also, in chapter 2

I

developed the operational theory of concepts according to which to know
the meaning
of a concept (or word)

to

an individual,

to this theory,

knows an

is

X to

know

its

proper usage in natural language. According

S, for instance,

has the concept of an

be an A, or only when S can use

of the natural language to which

X

belongs.

X according

In chapter 4

I

X only

when S

to the standard usage

traced the inferential

patterns that are instantiated by certain transitions between experience-types and
belief states.

our ontology:

In chapter 5

I

discussed

why we need

to introduce propositions into

Beliefs, as propositions, are implicated in

experience-types to belief states. In chapter 6

I

our quasi-inference from

discussed the problem of justifying

119
these propositions.

developed

There

are, however,

in this dissertation;

In chapter 1

I

a number of crucial issues that

researchers in Artificial Intelligence
in general, reasoning

manipulation.

human

According to

this theory, as

I

among

propositions.

Based on

conducted to reproduce intelligence or reasoning
succeed in

The

1,

any

can make implicit and

if it

this

Schank and

a matter of symbolic

is

pointed out in chapter

or machine, can be said to be reasoning

connection

have not

touch on these issues in the next few
pages.

criticized Schank’s notion of reasoning;
according to

I

I

entity,

explicit

view important researches were

most of which did not

artificially

fulfilling their goal.

failure to reproduce

human

intelligence artificially

is

usually blamed upon by

researchers on lack of funding and technological
development. Contrary to this view.
I

contend that the failure

is

due primarily to scientific-philosophical reasons. These

researchers had faulty concepts regarding

Moreover, they had no

human

scientific theory

human reasoning and concept

from which to derive a consistent theory of

leasoning. In the course of this dissertation

regarding

human

I

have tried to develop theories

reasoning based on Edelman’s view of the nervous system.

have also developed a theory of concept acquisition consistent
with
reasoning or inference.

human

The importance

AI research. Apart from philosophical

about the actual research pertaining to
left

nature 1

of this notion and

my

its failure

theories,

“intelligent

I

notion of

to capture

reasoning becomes apparent from a historical investigation of the

failure of

have

acquisition.

rise

and

something must be said

machines”

out in the main body of this dissertation because of

its

— something that

I

“non-philosophical”

.

The attempt

to create “intelligent machines” (those which passed Turing Test)

got heavily funded in the early 50’s.

This period led to a growth of enormous

1 am indebted to graduate student Ricardo Flores, Department of Philosophy University
of
California San Diego, for helpful discussion on the subject of AI research.
1
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research in intelligent machines".

The

first

machines were mere “number crunch-

no more powerful than an oriental
abacus.

ers",

They followed

strict

mechanical

mathematical rules and, given some
mathematical inputs, they could produce
some
mathematical output. Gradually, as the

science of Cybernetics developed,
these

number crunchers" became “symbol crunchers”

as vectors, sets, and letters, re-

placed numbers. Cybernetics developed
into two distinct branches

based on Von

Neumann mathematics

that cognition

is

intelligence

humans
The

at

a matter of heuristics and

— which

like

machines

(1)

computers) whose assumption was

(2) neural nets.

modeled on the brain’s physiology

circuits

as

(or digital

—

The

— the only structure

humans could gather data from

were

latter

known

electrical

to exhibit

the environment and “learn”

do.

first

attempt to develop “intelligent Von

Rand Corporation by

Neumann machines” was made

a team of scientists headed by Alan Newell and
Herbert

Simon. They developed the Logic Theory Machine which,
the researchers claimed,
could solve

Kant.

problems that had been plaguing philosophers from Plato to

all logical

Further, the researchers claimed that the machines
could think, learn, and

create like humans; in fact the machines could, these
researchers claimed, exhibit

human

intelligence.

In fact

some researchers went

so far as to predict that within

a few years these machines would win the world chess championship
and solve
logical problems.

meet
in

In reality, however, the General

this claim. First, the

a small number of

Problem Solver had
For whatever

to be

rules

human

learning

become a matter

involving games and puzzles.

programmed anew

Second, the General

each sort of problem

for

General Problem Solver learned in one

transfer to another field as

factor in

Solver’s ability did not

General Problem Solver could do relatively easy problems

fields, all

“skills” the

Problem

all

is

humans

do. Third, as

that although one

I

may

said in chapter

it

field, it

5,

attacked.

could not

one important

learn rules propositionally, these

of habit for that individual as in the case of

swimming

or
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riding a bike.

In the case of the General

Problem

internalization of rules occurred.
Fourth, the General

Solver, however, at no stage

Problem Solver could not get

information from the external world as
humans do. Fifth,
so vague that

is

it

much

of natural language

could not be symbolized properly for
the machine. Sixth, these

machines could not recognize patterns. Thus,

failing to take note of

how

the

brain actually works, the machines
failed to do what their makers claimed

human

— exhibit

human

intelligence. Indeed, Dreyfus
(1968) says,
Negative results, provided one recognizes
them as such, can be interesting.
Diminishing achievement, instead of predicting
...
success, perhaps indicates
some unexpected phenomenon. Perhaps we are
pushing out on a continuum

e that of velocity,

where further acceleration costs more and more
energy
the speed of light, or perhaps we are instead
facing a discontinuity, which requires not greater effort
but entirely different techniques, as
in the case of the tree climbing man
who tries to reach the
1

as

we approach

moon.

The
erally

failure of the first

phase of AI researchers to

blamed by the researchers on

lack of funding

fulfill

(p.

their claim

12).

was gen-

and technological drawbacks.

After the initial setback, with technical advancement
and more funding, research

on

digital

computers progressed; researchers claimed to have solved

all

problems

faced by their predecessor. Minsky tried to proceed along the
theory that meaning

a matter of symbolic manipulation.

is

by putting

it

He

tried to codify

knowledge of the world

into “packets” of semantic interconnections.

Research on symbolic

representation and manipulation of meaning resulted in some success in
technology.

Of

DENDRAL

these noteworthy are machines like

successful in

some

practical fields such as logic

chemical structure of a compound from
it

could not exhibit intelligence

a nursery rhyme.

SHRDLU,

in the

its

way

and

SHRDLU. DENDRAL

and analysis;

could infer the

mass spectometry data.

a child does

when he

Nonetheless,

or she understands

developed in MIT, was a simulation of mechanical arm

that could manipulate blocks of several shapes and colors in a

world.

it

was

Haugeland (1986) observes that

impressive block world program

(p.

SHRDLU

186).

is

the best

Although

computer simulated

known and

the

most

SHRDLU’s knowledge and
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vocabulary was limited to blocks at a
particular

table, yet within this

world he has

he could understand complex noun
phrases and ambiguous pronouns.

skills;

could also understand when a sentence
follow simple instruction of

another, say
Further,

dq, if

moving

asked to do

An

vague or ambiguous;

the blocks

around and do one job, say

defined for

SHDRLU

interesting feature of

words (concepts) via propositions. The following
•

Move

•

OK.

•

SHDRLU

in addition, he could
a,

before

by representing them

in the

so.

new words could be

forms of propositions.

is

He

SHRDLU
is

was that

an example of

it

could learn

SHRDLU’s

skill:

the red block (Instruction).

moves

a green block to

grasp the red block and

move

•

Move

•

I

•

There are three squares and

make space

so that he can reach out and

it.

the square.

DO NOT KNOW WHICH ONE.
SHRDLU

is

asking which one should he move.

• Find the tallest block (Instruction).

•

The system has

to figure out

what

“tallest”

means

here.

ASSUME THAT TALLEST MEAN “TALLER THAN THE OTHER BLOCKS”

•

I

•

Remove

•

SORRY,

•

“Ball”

means

When

a

the ball (Instruction).

I

DO NOT KNOW THE MEANING OF

word

BALL.

the round thing.

is

defined

it is

always put in inverted commas.
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•

Put the

•

OK.

ball

on the square (Instruction).

• Here one can use the

word

“ ball ”

to instruct

SHRDLU

as

it

has already been

Q

defined

.

In spite of its success, in reality
all, it

SHRDLU’s powers

could only answer questions about

its

own domain. Second,

purposive action unless purpose was introduced

in the

he had no problem with swiftly shifting
instruction

by most humans

- such

“move

as,

were very limited. First of

SHDRLU

had no

forms of instructions. Third,

— something greatly resented

the block”, “take the square”, etc.

Haugeland

observes,

SHDRLU performs so glibly only because his domain has been striped
of
anything that could ... require genuine wit or
understanding
Neglecting
the tangled intricacies of everyday life
while pursuing a theory of common
sense is not like ignoring friction while pursuing
the laws of motion; it’s like
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A round,
frictionless wheel is a
good approximation of a real wheel because the deviations are
comparitively
small and theoretically localized; the block world
“approximates” a playroom
more as a paper plane approximates a duck. (p. 190).
In the 1950

s

lobotics research gained

Artificial Intelligence.

body

(robotics) so that the robot like

case of the human, the robot’s

own body

that the

patterns.

In

humans

I

body had

have adapted

beings can get information directly

were not successful

to be represented to

else.

for,

So

it.

it

unlike in the

had to know

Moreover, one of the problems here was

fed to the robot, the longer time the machine took to recognize

the case

job (swimming, riding), the

2

human

in this area

before knowing anything

more data was

in

Essentially such researchers tried to give the computer a

from the environment. Research

its

some popularity amongst researchers

was exactly

less

reverse; the

more

time he would take to do

this small “conversation”

from Haugeland (1986)

p.

skillful

it.

one

is

in one’s

Furthermore, these

188.

124
researchers had no idea of

how

to organize data well to create

programs by which
robots could recognize relevant
information about the context in
which they were
situated. Thus, both digital

human

reasoning

computers and robotics researches

artificially.

Roger Roseblatt (1950) tried a
artificially.

failed to reproduce

He developed a

all

to reproduce

human

reasoning

neural net or Perceptron which was
a copy of the

brain in terms of electronic circuity.
the United States were

way

different

The

first

very simple because

human

perceptrons that were produced
(1)

in

knowledge about electronics was

very limited and
(2) contemporary knowledge of the physiology of
the brain was

very limited.

Rosenblatt’s Perceptron had an input unit, which
received stimulus

from the external world, a two dimensional

array,

and an associative unit

the electrical current between the input
and the responses.

to regulate

The Perceptrons could

recognize some simple patterns. Unlike digital
computers Perceptrons did not have
to be fed directly with data; they could
gather information

from the environment and

through electrical pathways (corresponding to the nervous
system
could eventually learn to perceive patterns by

trial

and

in

humans) and

error. Further, while digital

computers processed the data sequentially, Perceptrons were

parallel processors as

they had to process several signals coming from the same
object at once.

Perceptrons were not very successful in reproducing

human

reasoning.

were very slow and their work could not be transfered to any other

field.

They

Moreover,

although neural nets claimed to be very different from digital computers, they were
still

based on Von Neumann’s theory.

In addition, the electric currents did not

accurately reflect the synaptic responses of
brain

all

neurons do not work

in the

human

same way

brain.

Also, while in

as the electric discharge

is

human

different

for different neuron, in neural net they are

uniform and predictable. Furthermore,

while peripheral nodes are not

in neural nets, inner ones were.

Flores says,

programmed

Ricardo
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The

technological problem, at present,

is that even neural nets
continue to be
Neural nets are merely representations in
conventional digital hardware of what would be
actually neural connections
Also, wire-like connections between nodes
in a neural net mimic only in a
remarkably crude way the synaptic connections
that give complexity to the
bram. While the neural connections are more
or less set and communications
between nodes is provided by discreet electrical
charges, the physiological
neurons have unique patterns and use uneven

run by Von

Neumann

machines.

amounts of electrical charges,
increasing in this way the amount of randomness
and unpredictability of the
system. Finally, while peripheral nodes of the
neural nets are flexible and
not programmed, hidden nodes continue to need
algorithmic programming in
order to process information carried by digital
on/off electrical currents
unlike cerebral interconnections, which do not
have, as far
as

we know, any

semantic content or programming.

Research
Caltech

who

in neural

as Hopfield claimed in

a

like

the dendiites in

In Scientific

snail.

it

was revived

by Hopfield of

lately

,

will

This

be a “bio-computer” which will be able to smell

will not

will obtain

be “fed” to the computer,

data according to

it

be obtained

will

embodied needs.

American (March 1993) R.R. Birge

talks of Protein

some

special properties of biological molecules

Based Com-

— particularly

build computer components consisting of cards with both proteins

and semiconductors (Figure

8.1,

Page

127). Molecules, in such “hybrid” computer,

can serve as computer switches because their atoms can change position

in a

mobile

way; by directing that atomic position we can consistently generate states 0 and

This switching
light.

is

possible as

The two proteins

some proteins can change

that Birge talked about are rhodopsin

a light absorbing component

known

as chromophore.

and bacteriorhodopsin

With

mammal and

the help of laser

include

beams

the scientist can get information into the cubes of bacteriorhodopsin and read
laser

beams

1.

their properties in response to

(See Figure 8.2, Page 128) which are present in the retina of a

Green

its

bio-computer” will have electrical circuits similar to

its

it

puters which exploit

— to

Omni

human. Data

by this computer;

proteins

until

trying to produce a computer simulation of the brain; this
machine,

is

way thiough

network stalled

it

are fired through a plane of the cube and the protein photocycle

126
begins. Then, red laser

beams

are fired at the particular set of
molecules in the plane

to be converted to binary state

1;

the remaining molecules remain
in binary state 0

(Figure 8.3, Page 129). Birge claims that
the merits of such protein based
computers
are as follows: (1) they facilitate
parallel processing which

want to do;

(2)

they provide more

what computer

scientists

memory space than two-dimensional

memories; they can approach storage density
of one
are

is

more speedy than ordinary computers. Birge

trillion bits

per

c.c.;

optical

(3)

they

says,

The

hibrid computer we envision would be
highly flexible
computer should be able to handle large pools of
data, carry
scientific simulations or serve as a
cial intelligence.

With

the

out complex

unique platform for investigations of

close to terabyte (10 12 bytes) of

memory

arti-

in cubes of
bacteriorohodopsin, this machine would handle large
databases with alacrity.
Associative memory processing coupled with volumetric
memory would make
database searches many orders of magnitude faster than
is currently possible.

127

Cards

Hybrid

8.1

Figure

128

Bacteriorliodopsi

8.2

Figure

(.••'*)
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Figure 8.3

Firing Laser

Beams

130

Because the hybrid computer can be
designed to function as a neural
associcomputer capable of learning and of analyzing
data and images in much
the same way as the human brain,
the likely importance of hybrid
computers
to study artificial intelligence
cannot be underestimated
ative

T

ma y well be found in yet another realm
of data storage, neural associative
capabilities and a high
capacity for parallel processing, hybrid
computers will, for the first time
incorporate the three crucial requirement
for artificial intelligence. We
are
indeed at the threshold of an exciting new
era in computing (p. 95).
St

a PP lication

?Ar!wterabytes
With

have sketched above a brief history of
research pertaining to “intelligent Von

I

Neumann machine”. Most
cognition (or meaning)

of these researches were based on the
assumption that

either a matter of heuristics or a matter
of manipulation of

is

symbols. The fundamental cause of this

framework of the mental

failure,

I

contend,

activity, a theory of reasoning,

is

the absence of a scientific

a theory of concepts, and a

theory of concept acquisition. Further, none of
the researchers took any note of the

neurobiology of the brain. Even neural nets, which
are modeled on the

human

brain,

used piogiams to manipulate data instead of getting
information by experiencing the
external world as
at this

humans

moment pure

do.

Hopfield’s and Birge’s proposed projects, which are

speculations,

may

be closer to

artificially

human

reproducing

reasoning.

Concepts, as

I

have shown in this dissertation, are not logical items; they are

items in terms of which we think of the world.

It is

apparent from

the operational theory of concepts that the theory assumes that

of a concept

is

an

ability.

my

discussion of

knowing the meaning

This ability consists of being able to use the concept

accordance with the general usage of the linguistic community. This view

is

in

directly

opposed to the view that having a concept involves having the knowledge of some
inferential patterns.

that

I

A

notion related to the operational theory of concepts

have not discussed in the dissertation

contend, learns the concept

of, say,

—

is

A

the notion of context.

an apple by playing with

learns the concept of an apple within a practical context.

it,

biting into

The same holds

— one
child,

I

etc;

he

true for

all

it,

131

other concepts; one has to have
a mastery of his or her practical
context before one

acquires the ability to use concepts.
This “practical context” involves the
biological

and even the greater
by most researchers

social context in

which the child

in Artificial Intelligence.

and then understand concepts

meaning

different dissertation

3

is

and

essentially a
I

it

human

immersed

have to

in the context of this

raises philosophically interesting
questions;
intelligence or

We

is

whole 3

raises the
entity.

first

.

-a

fact ignored

experience the whole

The notion

of context

important question whether

That, however,

is

a topic

for

a

leave that for further research.

Going from the whole to the part

primarily has a cognitive overtone.

is

not the same as “top-down information processing” which
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